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1  Introduction 
 
 One of the ways by which the legal system has responded to different sets of 
problems, specifically to acts of negligence that has resulted in greater disastrous 
consequences to society due to the changing physical, economic, and institutional 
relationships is the blurring of the traditional scope and boundaries of criminal law, 
especially with respect to tort. The blurring of criminal law's boundaries means the 
trend seen in criminal law which now shares properties that were traditionally exclusive 
to it, both procedural and substantive. This includes the criminalization of acts that were 
formerly merely tortious or governed by regulation or administrative law (Bowles, 
Faure and Garoupa, 2008; Luna 2005); the use of civil procedures to pursue the 
objectives of criminal law1; the relaxation of mens rea in criminal law as seen in the 
case of corporate crime; and, in common law countries, the use of punitive sanctions 
outside criminal law (Mann, 1992). 
A debate exists in the legal as well as in the law and economics community 
regarding the desirability of this trend. While some think that the trend is advantageous 
to the society since it allows more flexibility in the legal system, enabling it to cope 
with fast-paced changes or with new problems in the society, others believe that there is 
some value in preserving the traditional boundaries of crime (See for instance Cheh, 
                                                 
1See for instance Cheh (1991). Civil remedies are being used to pursue criminal offenses mainly in order 
to sidestep the latter's strict procedural rules. See also Svatikova (2011) for a discussion concerning when 
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1991; Coffee, 1991, 1992; Cooter, 1999; Kadish, 1963; Koenig, 1988; Luna; Mann, 
1992). 
Among the often cited reasons behind criminalization are the need to impose 
harsher punishment in order to address increased harm and the need to address 
deterrence issues arising from a more complicated organizational structure. For 
instance, in the case of criminal of environmental pollution or disasters, the costs to 
society has increased dramatically,  making punitive sanctions necessary for firms to 
internalize such costs. Criminal vicarious liability is imposed on the corporation, a legal 
entity, for the acts of its employees. This prompts the principal to adopt rules within 
their organization to police their own ranks. 
Critics, however, claim that the harm principle is sometimes abused and 
exaggerated in order to pursue objectives other than a real and careful analysis of the 
costs and benefits to society. Criminalization, being the most severe form of sanction, 
sends a signal that the incumbent legislature and executive are serious in solving a 
particular problem in order to gain popularity (Beale, 1997). As such, they argue that 
criminalization has proceeded without a sound rational criteria other than serving the 
political and economic interests of the incumbent. Being the most costly sanction to 
administer, criminalization should therefore proceed only if it serves to enhance 
society's welfare. Others, meanwhile, argue that criminal law should be reserved for the 
most serious offenses and acts that show moral culpability (Hart, 1958; Kadish, 1968). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
an administrative sanction is optimal than criminal law, especially with respect to environmental offenses 
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1.1  Significance of the Study 
 
 According to a study documenting the cited trend in the US, there are over 
4,000 offenses that carry criminal penalties in the US Code, reflecting a one-third 
increase since the 1980s (Baker, 2004). These include non-traditional crimes such as 
fraudulent access to financial information and offenses committed against the 
environment, with the latter comprising 35% of the total. This trend is also happening in 
Europe, albeit in a less dramatic pace and more limited scope. Molina (2011) 
characterized the problem of overcrminalization as (1) the criminalization of acts that 
harms trivial interests, (2) the criminalization of acts that causes trivial harm to 
important interests, and (3) punishment that is not proportionate to the harm caused. 
Criminalization of the type involving the last two sets are the ones that are more 
manifest in Europe2. 
One of the results of the trend is the huge amount spent in the maintenance of 
the penal system. To illustrate, the rate of incarceration in the US has climbed by 240% 
from 220 per 100,000 individuals in 1980 to 753 in 20083. In 2001 alone, the US spent 
$38.3 billion to maintain their correctional facilities4. This rate of increase has exceeded 
spending in health, education, and natural resources from 1986-20015. In England and 
                                                 
2
 According to Molina (2011), in Europe, individual culpability as a requisite for a criminal act is more 
respected than in the Anglo-American jurisdiction. Among the other reasons he cited for this 
phenomenon are: the collection of criminal offenses as a single code as in Germany and Spain; the legal 
education; and cultural tradition.  
3See for instance Schmitt, Warner and Gupta (2010). 
4See State Prison Expenditures 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2004). The average cost of keeping an 
individual in prison in 2001 amounts to $22,650. 
5Ibid. 
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Wales, this figure amounts to 3.84 billion pounds6. Although there is an increase in 
prison population in other parts of the world, some countries such as Finland and 
Germany have tried to rely less on imprisonment to deliver criminal justice (Mauer, 
2003; Young and Brown, 1993). According to studies, the increase in the incarceration 
rate in the US reflects the shift in the punishment choice of the US, which gradually 
relies more on incarceration and stricter sentencing guidelines and less on probation, 
parole or community service as it has outpaced the growth in population rate and violent 
crime (Schmitt, et al, 2010). 
Although the huge costs of imposing more severe punishment is high, this 
should be weighed with the corresponding societal benefits. If a significant number of 
individuals were deterred from committing dangerous and harmful acts wherein the 
costs to the victims are higher than the enforcement costs and the benefits to the 
individual, then this trend may be considered welfare enhancing. If it has prevented an 
environmental disaster from occurring and if it could have averted financial crises with 
society losing more than what they pay for maintaining the penal system, then the shift 
towards punishment is an appropriate policy. However, if the same acts may be deterred 
and prevented from occurring using an institutional technology that is least costly to 
administer than criminal law, such as tort or administrative law, then society should 
prefer the latter set. 
Apart from this is the issue of overdeterrence. Criminal punishment may be 
considered as too severe to sanction some of these acts, diluting the welfare 
                                                 
6See Prison and Probation Expenditure, 1999-2009, Center for Crime and Justice Studies. A comparative 
study of incarceration is beyond the scope of this paper. For data on comparison of rates of incarceration 
rates across countries, see Bureau of Justice Statistics (2003) World Factbook of Criminal Justice System. 
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enhancement objectives behind the legislation. Aside from the monetary sanction, an 
offense branded as a crime may sometimes carry with it an informal sanction in the 
form of stigma, hence, resulting in a higher total sanction. 
 
1.2  Research Question 
 
This study aims to contribute to this literature by exploring how the diffusion of 
the traditional boundaries of criminal law and the overlapping of its scope and 
procedural rules with other branches of law, particularly tort law, aid in improving the 
society's welfare. 
Specifically, our main research question is concerned with determining the 
circumstances where the criminalization of an act leads to the improvement of society's 
welfare. We will focus and limit ourselves to studying two distinct sanctions that under 
certain circumstances can be invoked and can be present under criminal law -- 
incarceration and social stigma. These two properties are selected since these sanctions 
are claimed to distinguish criminal law from tort and administrative law. 
In order to provide an answer to our normative question, an understanding of 
how these two sanctions arise and affect individual behavior is necessary. Thus, we will 
devote our analysis mainly to the positive analysis of incarceration and social stigma. In 
particular, we identify the channels by which they affect the individual's decision to 
commit a particular act as illustrated in a theoretical model. 
                                                                                                                                               
See also Mauer (2003). 
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In the case of incarceration, we first asked how incarceration is different from a 
monetary sanction or a fine. The literature on law and economics does not usually make 
a distinction between the two forms of sanctions since the former can be transformed 
into a monetary sanction in the form of the individual's foregone income. Incarceration, 
moreover, is denominated in time and should also consider the individual's time 
constraint. Thus, we inquired how incarceration affects individual behavior differently 
from a fine, considering its relative scarcity as a resource. 
Social stigma is an informal sanction that is claimed to be present in criminal 
law. However, it is not always the case that a criminal conviction carries social stigma. 
Our goal is to understand the conditions under which social stigma exists in criminal 
law. We first asked whether criminal law possesses institutional properties that enable it 
to stigmatize certain behaviors as well as the individual found guilty exhibiting the said 
behaviors. Then, we explored its relationship with social norms and the extent of 
criminal law’s  influence over it. Finally, we explored the differences between the court 
that imposes formal sanctions and the loose group of individuals that impose the 
informal sanction of social stigma. 
The conditions that determine whether an act should be criminalized depends a 
lot on our description of how these two distinct sanctions -- incarceration and social 
stigma -- affect individual behavior. With the identification of these channels, we can 
then confidently move on to questions of policy. 
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1.3  Methodology 
 
Our study uses the tools provided by law and economics. Although there are 
other objectives that may be adopted to explain why societies should criminalize a 
particular behavior, our standard rests on social welfare considerations. 
We start from the assumption that individuals are rational and keen on 
maximizing their interests. They weigh the benefits and costs of committing a particular 
act. In the positive analysis of the role of incarceration, we apply the classical tools of 
economic analysis. Since incarceration is denominated in time, we considered the role 
of the individual time constraint in order to arrive at an unbiased description of how it 
affects individual decision-making. 
In our analysis of social stigma, we consider the difference between the court 
and the rest of society with respect to the process involved in imposing the formal and 
the informal sanction. Social stigma is imposed by a loose grouping of individuals who 
lack the time and information to calibrate and impose the sanction. As opposed to the 
court, which is a specialized institution that has relatively more time, knowledge, and 
expertise to assign blame and culpability, the rest of society has relatively less time and 
less specialized knowledge7. In this context, we used the tools of behavioral law and 
economics and social norms to understand the dynamics of social stigma. 
In both cases, we provided a model that captures our assumptions and 
                                                 
7
 Kahneman (2003) distinguishes two modes of decision-making that is illustrative of the difference 
between the courts and the rest of society. System 2 is characterized by deliberate reasoning, slow, 
effortful and rule-governed. System 1 on the other hand is associative, fast, emotional-based and 
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theoretical arguments. The process of social abstraction associated with model building 
allows us to identify the channels by which the sanction actually affect individual 
behavior. The identification of these channels can serve later as a guide for policy. 
Although the theoretical results still need to be tested empirically, we can also cite 
empirical observations that are consistent with and more explainable by our theoretical 
results. 
 
1.4   Plan of the Book 
 
The book is divided into four parts. The first part, which includes this chapter, 
provides a general introduction to the book and includes a general review of the 
criminal law theory and classical law and economics literature on criminal law. Since 
most of the overlap that we refer to in this book occur with tort law, we thought that it 
would be more appropriate to compare and contrast the law amd economics literature of 
criminal law with studies on tort law. 
The second part, meanwhile, revisits the old debate on the circumstances 
dictating the preference between fine and incarceration. The literature on law and 
economics generally posits that a fine should be preferred over incarceration since the 
same level of deterrence can be achieved without incurring the huge enforcement costs 
associated with it. This assumption implies that society should rely more on fines and 
impose imprisonment on the wealth constrained individual who is considered to be 
                                                                                                                                               
governed by habit.     
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judgment proof. However, instead of playing a diminishing role, incarceration, which 
can be treated as a case of full incapacitation, still plays an important role in different 
societies as a means of deterring individuals. Aside from this, forms of partial 
incapacitation, such as the driving penalty point system,  have been accepted in several 
jurisdictions. In light of this, we explored the justifications offered by theory to explain 
it. 
In chapter four, we considered the role of time constraint in the fines-versus-
incarceration debate in a model. We find that just as fines cannot deter the wealth-
constrained individual, the extreme case is also true, that the very wealthy may not also 
be adequately deterred by a fixed fine. 
The third part is devoted to social stigma in criminal law. Apart from deterrence, 
others claim that criminal law also serves an educative role in society (Hart, 1958). 
Criminal law is the formal articulation of society's moral standards and, hence, violating 
such norms results in social stigma. According to Coffee (1991), one possible 
consequence of the blurring of the boundaries between tort and crime, particularly the 
criminalization of morally neutral offenses, is the dilution of the cited aspect of criminal 
law. However, social stigma and the moralizing and educative functions of criminal law 
is scarcely understood in the literature. These issues are addressed in detail in chapter 
five. The relationship between social norms and criminal law is also explored in the said 
chapter. 
Chapter six, moreover, explores the conditions where social stigma is either 
present or absent in criminal law through the lens of behavioral law and economics. 
While the court is a specialized institution that assigns blame and metes out punishment, 
11 
 
the rest of society, on the other hand, have relatively less time to perform the cited tasks 
and relies instead on heuristic devices to impose the social sanction. Thus, we show 
how social stigma in criminal law can arise from the cognitive limitations of the rest of 
society who are imposing the sanction and how information is spread throughout 
society. The last part concludes. 
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2  Theories of criminal law: An overview 
  
In order to understand the role of incarceration and social stigma in criminal law 
and how it can shed light on the issue concerning its scope, we first make a necessary 
digression. In this chapter, we provide an overview of the different theories that 
surround criminal law as a way to contextualize the issues surrounding the debate on 
criminalization and which conduct should be sanctioned by it. 
 
2.1 Criminal law theory and criminalization  
 
Within criminal law theory, the debate as to what extent is the expansion of 
criminal law desirable can be rooted to the different schools of thought, of which, the 
most prominent are the legal positivists and proponents of natural law. The latter ties 
the scope of criminal law to issues of morality, justice and fairness. The former on the 
other hand, grounds criminal law to the existing governance structure of the society and 
the function that it serves. It is often divorced from moral issues. Although legal theory 
has developed such that it is hard now to classify scholars into any of these two 
polarized boxes since they have borrowed and enriched the discourse from one another, 
it is still convenient to think of the debate in this manner. The tensions between these 
two views always appear in the discussion of which acts should be criminalized. 
13 
 
 
Apart from the substantive issue, others express concern over its implications on 
criminal procedure. This particular aspect of criminalization is the main concern of the 
liberalists who warn against the potential dangers brought by the possible dilution of 
criminal law’s strict procedures. This could pave the way for the state’s potential abuse 
of the individual’s rights and a means to further constrain the liberty of the individual. 
 
2.1.1  The scope of criminal law: moral issues and retributive justice 
 
According to legal scholars, what distinguishes criminal law from other bodies 
of law is that the criminal law is a reflection of society’s moral values and the main 
reason why it is obeyed is not primarily because of the harsh monetary punishment 
associated with it but because society perceives it to be worthy of pursuing (Hart, 1958). 
Criminal law scholars are against the idea of criminalizing so- called morally neutral 
offenses involving economic activities such as antitrust and corporate crimes. What 
should only be considered as criminal are conducts that exhibit the elements of 
culpability, harmfulness and wrongness (Greene, 1997).  
 
According to Moore and Hurd (2011), criminalizing an act on the basis of 
negligence and other inadvertent acts is wrong. The criminal law is an institution that 
serves to deliver retributive justice within the society. Punishment is already an end in 
itself. For criminal law to serve this function properly, acts within its scope should at 
14 
 
the minimum, satisfy moral culpability in order to stoke moral reprehensibility within 
the community. According to Feinberg (1988), punishment has an expressive function 
in society.   The community should have a sense that the harsh punishment under 
criminal law that includes prison is deserved by the individual who committed the act.  
It is therefore important that the community recognizes that the punishment meted 
under criminal law is deserved by the individual and should reflect the moral landscape.  
 
On the other hand, Clark (2003) contends that retribution for its own sake is not 
the end goal of criminal law but the shaping of society’s values. Thus, to the extent that 
the shaping of the moral values can be achieved without resorting to the harsh 
punishment under criminal law, then this is also desirable. 
 
2.1.2 Economic crimes: morally neutral offenses 
 
According to Kadish (1963), it is also problematic to criminalize acts that are 
conducted within the course of a business activity, the so-called economic or regulatory 
crimes. The criminalization of antitrust violations for instance, may just be indicative of 
an aggressive behavior which is not reviled within the business community. Apart from 
this, most of the economic or regulatory crimes are commonly defined in vague terms 
and it is hard to pin down what constitutes an illegitimate activity. As a consequence, 
individuals are not fairly warned and would make it harder for them to avoid the harsh 
punishment of criminal law. Unlike the traditional property crimes, where the property 
15 
 
of the individuals are protected, the newly criminalized acts, according to Kadish, 
restrain the individual from exercising their property interest and hence, constrain 
individual behavior rather than free it. 
 
The ambiguity also has negative consequences for deterrence. According to 
Kadish, if the element of culpability is lacking or absent in the act, then it is improper to 
impose penal sanctions and the ensuing moral condemnation of committing a crime. 
Since the actor did not willingly and knowingly commit an act, it does not provide 
guidance to the actor or other persons with regards to how to behave in the future.  
 
Coffee (1991) however argues that society’s moral values are not static and are 
changing over time. Hence, to argue against the criminalization of economic crimes 
based on traditional concepts of morality that is strongly anchored in the past is also 
problematic. The criminalization of tortious offenses for instance may be just a 
reflection of this change. In order to properly gauge this development, it is necessary to 
look at both the informal and formal community standards and decide what has become 
acceptable behavior or not. He argues that when viewed from this evolutionary 
perspective, it appears that society first experiments with a standard sanctioned by tort 
which may eventually harden within the community and ripe for punishment under 
criminal law. If one looks at it this way, then it is necessary to look at the external 
factors that are pushing the changes and not be limited by legal doctrinal analysis alone. 
 
16 
 
2.1.3  Criminal law and sociology  
 
Ball and Friedman (1965) make a distinction between traditional concepts of 
morality and popular morality. They argue that the public’s prevailing perceptions of 
morality may depart from the traditional ones and criminal law can also influence it. 
Thus, the relationship between the violation of the legal code and to what extent can it 
be considered as a violation of society’s moral code is much more complex than what a 
static description would suggest. It is therefore important to consider the current 
perceptions of morality and how criminalizing an act affects the behavior of potential 
violators wherein the penal sanctions include imprisonment. 
 
The sociological literature emphasizes the educative and socializing function of 
criminal law. Apart from deterrence and retribution, the law also serves a socio-
pedagogical purpose with respect to the communication and transmission of moral 
values. According to Andenaes (1966), the punishment in criminal law is a modern 
means to convey social disapproval. It is a ritualistic device that captures symbolically 
the society’s condemnation that results in the stigmatization of the individual 
(Hawkins,1969). Punishment and stigma are effective in creating habitual lawfulness 
and its observance mainly arises through a process of imitating what the majority does 
and learning from the experience of those who have violated it. 
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The educative and socializing function of criminal law is also rooted in the 
institutional processes involved in criminalization and the procedures of trial and 
punishment. Criminal law is legislated and this provides an opportunity for society to 
discuss and arrive at a consensus as to what is culpable and wrong (Andenaes, 1966).  
Further, the criminal sanction is distinguished by higher standards of proof that ensures 
the culpability of the accused. Thus, it is through these institutional factors that the 
commission of a crime results in social stigma. 
 
Levine (2007) on the other hand suggested that criminalization is a vehicle for 
society to arrive at a consensus whenever a given problem arises.  It is therefore 
imperative to consider the interests of all the stakeholders and groups that are involved 
towards its resolution. This includes not just the victim, the accused, nor the legal 
community but also the media and religious groups who have different contesting views 
of the harm. He applied his framework to the case of how the legal definition of 
statutory rape changed over time and its relationship with the changing concept of 
morality as well as the views of the religious sector, the media and the whole 
community. Tigar (1984) also traced how the laws concerning theft evolved with 
concepts of property rights in feudal times and how individual culpability was defined. 
 
According to Green (1997), the complex relationship between what is criminally 
prohibited and what is morally condemnable can best be illuminated with empirical 
evidence or case studies. In his study, he found that while traditional crimes are 
18 
 
condemned, there are acts such as the dumping of waste in a river that are considered 
just as serious. More recently, Stucke (2006) explored the perceptions of moral 
acceptability of antitrust law violations. Van Erp (2011) on the other hand, conducted 
an empirical study on the publication of violations in the Dutch financial market and 
concluded that more compliance is achieved when the manner in which they are 
communicated contains a moral message that can serve as a guide for future behavior. 
 
However, the difficulty of conducting empirical studies is how to find a criteria 
that corresponds to moral culpability. According to Stucke (2006), it derives a lot from 
psychology as moral condemnation is dependent on the extent that it can derive 
sympathy from the individual. The individual puts himself in the position of the accused 
and decides whether he is capable of committing such an act. This implies that it 
depends on the other individual’s emotions. Moore (1998) also identified emotions as a 
gauge or a heuristic device to assess moral culpability. The individual and how he feels 
towards issues is shaped by the moral fabric of society and he merely articulates them.  
 
Meanwhile, according to Ball and Friedman (1964), the group of individuals 
whose conduct is the subject for criminalization do not usually perceive the newly 
criminalized act as reprehensible and often consider it to fall within the bounds of 
acceptable behavior. It is for individuals outside this group that condemnation usually 
first arises.  
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2.1.4 Liberalist critique of criminalization 
 
So far, the discussion above only pertains to the substantive issues of 
criminalization. Another aspect of the criminalization debate concerns the relaxation of 
the strict criminal procedures in criminal law for the sake of convenience (Mann, 1992; 
Cheh, 1991). 
 
At the core of the liberalist critique of criminalization is the unnecessary 
interference of the state on the individual’s freedom and liberties. The only acceptable 
criterion to prohibit an act under criminal law is when it imposes harm on others. 
Feinberg (1988) also expanded the concept of harm to include acts that cause offense to 
others and thus, may include non-physical harms. The scope of criminal law should be 
narrowly confined to harms and offenses since the vast apparatus of the state is invoked 
on the individual at all stages, from the gathering of evidence, investigation, 
prosecution, trial and punishment. Thus, the procedures of criminal law should be 
strictly adhered to in order to guarantee the rights of the accused and protect it from 
abuse.  
 
Ashworth and Zedner (2008) have pointed out that the expansion of scope of 
criminal law as well as relaxation of criminal procedures undermine the liberal concept 
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of criminal justice and individual autonomy. They traced the greater use of hybrid civil 
and criminal processes, of strict liability, of plea bargaining, to the changing nature of 
the state, from one that provides services to a regulatory state. They reiterated the need 
for a defence of criminal procedures especially when penal sanction is imposed. 
 
2.1.5 Criminal procedure  
 
So far, the discussion above only pertains to the substantive issues of 
criminalization. Another aspect of the criminalization debate, which the liberalist 
critique has focused their attention to, concerns its implications for criminal procedure. 
Apart from relaxation in criminal procedure, in the US, a form of hybrid penalties have 
surfaced. Punishment, a property traditionally reserved for criminal law is being 
imposed under tort violations. Koenig and Rustad (1998) called this phenomenon 
crimtorts.  
 
Koenig (2007) ignores the libertarian critique and welcomes the “hybrid 
sanction,” as a way to complement the law enforcement gap in the US. In Europe and 
Japan, these harms would have been prevented by a relatively strong regulatory regime 
and social insurance. This also explains why criminalization while posing problems in 
Europe is not as widespread as in the US (See also Molina, 2011). 
 
The spread of the level of criminalization between US and Europe can be 
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explained by the difference in criminal procedure (Diskant, 2003) as well as the 
existence of administrative and civil law remedies to complement the criminal sanction 
as a way of regulating individual behavior (See Enriques, 2003). 
 
Diskant (2003) illustrated this in the case of corporate criminal liability. 
According to Diskant, the absence of corporate criminal liability in Germany is often 
attributed to the degree of acceptability of a legal fiction committing  a crime. However, 
this can be explained more by the nature of the inquisitorial process that facilitates the 
gathering of evidence and the conduct of investigation under the principle of finding the 
truth. On the other hand, in the US, the rights of defendants are protected by the 
Constitution which can stymize the gathering of evidence but this is complemented by 
the degree of discretion conferred on the prosecutor. 
 
2.1.6 Discussion 
 
As what is apparent from the discussion in the previous sections, the legal 
theoreric discourse on criminal law is heavily steeped on issues of morality, retributive 
justice and the safeguarding of the rights and liberties of the individual based on 
liberalist ideals. While it can adequately explain the relationship between morality, 
culpability, and criminal law from a static point of view, the legal theory of criminal 
law have their weaknesses in explaining the dynamic relationship. Hence, it has its 
weaknesses in serving as a guide for which conducts can or should be criminalized, 
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even basing on the criteria that it has set. The sociological standpoint and psychology 
offers an alternative view to complement it. In our view, the economic analysis of law 
can also contribute towards a more refined account of this relationship. We will develop 
this idea further in the next chapters. The gist of the argument is that economics can 
provide an account of the strategic behavior of individuals and describe changes from 
one equilibrium to another based on individual private incentives. Hence, it can be used 
to describe dynamic changes and avoid the dilemma of defining morality and criminal 
law tautologically. We will also take into account the crucial role of information, how it 
is transmitted across individuals and its role in social stigma. 
 
In the succeeding section, we will discuss the law and economics of criminal 
law. The issues of the economic costs and benefits of the act to the society as well as the 
reconciliation of the private incentives of the individual with that of society’s general 
welfare interests play a peripheral role in the determination of the proper scope of 
criminal law under legal theory. These on the other hand are the central concerns of law 
and economics. Likewise, the setting aside of moral issues and retributive justice in the 
law and economics of criminal law had been a source of criticism. However, these too 
are being addressed in the literature and our aim is to contribute towards it. 
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2.2 Law and economics of criminal law 
 
In this section, we provide a survey of the law and economics of criminal law. 
Since we are interested in the dynamic process of criminalization, especially with 
respect to acts that can previously only be sued under tort law, the survey as presented 
here, is compared with the latter. 
 
The institutional properties of crime and tort are discussed with the aim of 
understanding what makes one law suitable to govern different types of behavior. 
 
2.2.1   Institutional objectives 
 
Tort law generally governs the set of acts that have positive benefits to society 
which, under certain circumstances or for a given level of activity, however, also inflicts 
harm. Parties,  conversely, can take precautions, albeit costly, to prevent the harm from 
occurring. Tort law encourages individuals to proceed with the act as long as the harm 
is internalized by taking the optimal level of precautions and making him legally 
constrained to pay damages if he does not (See Posner, 1972 and Shavell, 1987). In the 
case of strict liability, the individual proceeds with his act and fully compensate the 
victim. 
While tort is concerned with pricing a certain activity, criminal law is concerned 
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with its prohibition. The economic analysis of criminal law had been the object of study 
of Becker (1968) with his seminal article. Posner (1985) however thought that this 
account was incomplete as it did not consider the role of the substantive issues of 
criminal law. The punishment of harmless preparatory activity and an inquiry into the 
accused state of mind can be explained from an economic perspective as a means to 
prevent individuals from bypassing the market as a means of economic exchange. This 
bypassing, often accompanied by coercive transfers of wealth cannot be prevented by 
tort law alone, especially in the case of wealth constrained individuals. This also 
explains imprisonment as an additional sanction in criminal law. Further, most of the 
acts under criminal law are considered unproductive. 
Cooter (1984) on the other hand, argued that punishment makes the individual 
more responsive to the legal standard. The individual faces a huge discontinuous jump 
in the sanction that prevents the individual from committing the act as opposed to 
merely pricing the behavior. Thus, society must impose punitive sanctions under 
criminal law when it wants to prohibit.  
Another rationale for criminal law is the preservation of society’s chosen 
transaction structure. According to Calabresi and Melamed (1972), society has chosen 
which rights and entitlements should be protected by a property or a liability rule. 
However, some individuals may convert property rules into liability rules and criminal 
law prevents this from happening by imposing punishment which serves as a kicker to 
obey the particular transaction structure.  
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2.2.2   Amount of punishment 
 
Since tort is concerned with pricing behavior, imposing expected compensatory 
damage is enough to encourage the optimal level of care and the level of activity, 
assuming that agents are risk-neutral. Expected sanction that is higher or lower than the 
actual harm leads to overdeterrence. When agents are risk averse however, the sanction 
could be less than the harm. 
In common law countries, the scope for awarding punitive damages under tort 
law are extremely narrow and are usually allowed when the act is wanton, malicious, 
reckless and grossly negligent. This implies that the individual's awareness and 
willfulness in inflicting harm should be established as a condition for awarding punitive 
damages (Cooter, 1999 and Biggar, 1995).  The main economic rationale is that it is 
costly for an individual to take precautions or to avoid the injurer when the harm is 
intentional (See Biggar, 1995). In this sense, we can extend this argument and claim 
that the amount of damages between tort and crime is not discontinuous as 
compensatory and punitive but is actually, a continuous function that is related to 
varying degrees of culpability and intent.  
Criminal law on the other hand, aims to prohibit (Cooter, 1999). Hence, it is 
necessary for the amount of the sanction to be punitive. Equating the sanction with the 
harm will merely make the individual indifferent to the considerations behind 
committing an act or not. Aside from market bypassing, there are other reasons cited in 
the literature on law and economics on why punitive sanctions should be awarded, both 
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under criminal and tort law (See Polinsky and Shavell, 1998): (1) when there is a high 
probability that individuals can escape liability because of the difficulties of proving 
liability, (2) when the harm is often underestimated due to the difficulties in measuring 
the total harm, (3) when the injurer's gains are considered as socially illicit, (4) when 
opportunities for bargaining are absent, and (5) as a way to address the issue of 
marginal deterrence,  that is, more serious crimes should be punished more severely 
(Posner, 1985). Traditional legal theory, on the other hand, cites the necessity of 
punishing individuals who are found to be blameworthy and who have committed 
reprehensible acts. 
 
 
2.2.3 Mens rea, intent, and culpability 
 
Under the classic tort case, the individual’s state of mind is unnecessary to bring 
up a suit. It is sufficient to show harm, cause, and a breach of duty on the part of the 
tortfeasor. In practice, however, intent or culpability appears not as a discontinuous 
function that is absent in tort and present in criminal law but a continuous function that 
becomes a basis for awarding punitive sanctions under the latter. It appears that gross 
negligence can be substituted for the requirement of mens rea. This is illustrated by the 
existence of a category for intentional torts and negligent acts that are criminally liable8. 
                                                 
8Some cases of negligent acts that can be criminally liable are seen in the cases of newly criminalized 
offenses such as medical malpractice, environmental liability, and corporate liability. 
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Landes and Posner (1981) in their seminal work enumerated the circumstances 
when a certain act can be classified as intentional under tort law without looking at the 
tortfeasor's subjective state of mind: (1) when the probability of the harm occurring is 
low and the cost of avoiding it is zero or even negative and, (2) the probability of the 
harm is high and the cost of avoiding it is low. In both cases the defense for 
contributory negligence cannot be raised and, in some cases, punitive damages are 
awarded.  
On the other hand, gross negligence is also a basis for imposing criminal 
sanctions. From an economic point of view, the rationale does not differ from the 
awarding of punitive damages in intentional torts. However, from a deontological 
perspective, it is problematic to find a threshold of negligence that is reflective of the 
culpability of the individual (Hurd and Moore, 2011)9. 
In contrast, under criminal law, establishing intent or moral culpability is an 
important issue. An economic rationale stems from the assumption that the cost of 
avoiding harm on the part of the victims when harm is intentional is very costly for 
society (Biggar, 1995). Under criminal law, it is also possible to punish an individual 
even if no harm has taken place yet. The economic rationale is also related to the 
inefficiency arising from the costly spending to avoid intentional acts (Harel and Ben-
Shahar, 1996). 
 
 
                                                 
9They argue that negligence is not a sound basis for imposing criminal liability. See also Fletcher (1971). 
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2.2.4    Form of punishment 
 
In criminal law, non-monetary punishment can be imposed on the defendant. 
Since the imposition of nonmonetary punishment is costly, punitive monetary sanctions 
should be preferred over the former (Shavell, 1985). However, there are cases when this 
would be necessary for optimal deterrence such as when agents are wealth constrained 
or judgment proof. When individuals are wealth constrained, fines alone will not be 
sufficient to deter individuals since the value from committing the criminal act is high 
and the monetary sanction is higher than what they can afford to pay given their wealth. 
Thus, imprisonment is necessary to deter this group of individuals.  
Relying on high monetary sanctions alone may also encourage strategic 
behavior among agents and, hence, non-monetary sanctions may be preferable as there 
is no wealth transfer to the victim or prosecutors (Friedman, 1999).  
According to D'Antoni and Galbiati (2007), nonmonetary sanctions may be 
more credible in conveying information on the harmfulness of a particular act as 
opposed to monetary sanctions. Hence, individuals are more effectively warned of the 
potential harm they might cause to themselves and to others and results in greater 
deterrence. 
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2.2.5   Standard of proof 
 
Under tort, establishing preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prompt the 
court to award damages. On the other hand, criminal law requires a higher burden of 
proof. Criminal law theory as earlier discussed emphasize fairness and libertarian 
considerations for its existence in criminal law. One of the main reasons provided by 
literature regarding this main difference is to minimize the costs of making costly 
mistakes in awarding punitive sanctions (Kaplow and Shavell, 1994; Miceli, 1990 and 
Posner, 1992). 
In explaining the economic rationale for a higher standard of proof, previous 
literature has relied on the assumption that society suffers more when an innocent 
becomes convicted of committing a criminal act than when a guilty person is set free. It 
is based on an assumption of society's preference for fairness. Easterbrook (1983) took a 
different approach by considering the whole criminal procedure, not just the standard of 
proof, and explained the economic rationale behind it. The high standard of proof 
minimizes the huge error costs society incurs when it wrongly impose punitive sanction 
on the innocent.  
Closely related to our study on stigma which we will later develop is, Rubinfeld 
and Sappington (1987). They showed how the criminal court system could be a venue 
for individuals to properly signal their innocence or guilt, which is a characteristic that 
is unobservable to the court and the public. The innocence or guilt of the individual 
plays a role in the costs of bearing a criminal conviction and the benefits of spending 
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more on litigation expenditure. To minimize the total social costs of unnecessary 
litigation spending and other costs associated with determining fault, the court can 
select the social welfare enahncing level of burden of proof.  
Recent studies have also explored how the standard of proof could affect 
deterrence. At first glance, a higher standard of proof may reduce the expected penalty 
faced by the individual and hence encourage more violations. However, when other 
factors are considered this will in fact lead to higher compliance. Ognedal (2005) 
related the higher standard of proof to marginal deterrence. Lowering the standard of 
proof for serious crimes, while raising the expected penalty may lead to the 
counterintuitive result of increased crimes. This is because from the point of view of the 
individual, the change in marginal penalty between less and more serious crimes 
provides incentives for the individual to commit the latter.  
The standard of proof also has implications on the costs and benefits of 
gathering evidence. According to Hay and Spier (1997), in assigning the burden of 
proof, the courts actually divide the task of evidence production between the plaintiff 
and defendant. By properly choosing the burden of proof, the courts can help settle 
disputes in a manner that is more efficient. Froeb and Kobayashi (2001) on the other 
hand, explored the differences in evidence production implied by an adversarial and an 
inquisitorial regime. They found that the decentralized evidence gathering by two 
opposing parties reflected in adversarial regimes is just as efficient as the centralized 
nature in inquisitorial regimes.  Yilankaya (2002) on the other hand, considers the role 
of the court in minimizing the expected total cost of expenditure litigation through the 
choice of the burden of proof. For a given amount of penalty, a higher standard of proof 
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is preferred as the costs of making false convictions increases. If the costs of making 
false acquittals is low, then a lower standard of proof may be preferable. The effect of a 
higher standard of proof on law eforcement agents is considered by Pyne (2005). 
According to him, a higher standard of burden raises the incentives of police officers to 
gather more evidence in order to strengthen the case against the individual. The 
associated increase in the marginal probability of conviction hence deters individuals 
from committing these offenses. Judges, on the other hand, are shown to be empirically 
sensitive to the penalty that they are about to mete out and, hence, raise the standard of 
proof when they think that the penalty is too harsh (Andreoni, 1991). 
 
2.2.6  Control of prosecution 
 
Civil law is also different from criminal law with respect to who brings the case 
to court. The former employs private agents while the latter rely on public prosecutors. 
Bowles, Faure and Garoupa (2008) have explored this topic and noted that the main 
reason for making an act criminally liable is the consideration of the role of the victims 
as well as the nature and magnitude of harm to determine the efficiency of using 
criminal law sanctions. 
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2.2.7  Discussion 
 
There is a huge body of literature in law and economics devoted to the analysis 
of criminal law. The usual law and economics approach, as what is clear from the 
literature that is included in this survey, is to consider its different institutional 
properties and relate it with the specific problems of deterrence that each property tries 
to address. The weighing of the costs and benefits of each property of criminal law, or 
any rule for that matter, serves as a guide in determining which conducts should be 
appropriately governed by criminal law. Its scope therefore should be based on the 
implications for social welfare while other objectives play a secondary role. 
There are, however, criticisms to the traditional law and economics approach. 
Such criticisms claim that the functionalist arguments based on optimal deterrence is 
inadequate to explain the existence of criminal law as a separate category (Coleman, 
1988, Klerovick, 1985). According to them, law and economics had been successful in 
determining the justification behind the different properties of criminal law based on a 
cost-benefit analysis that is generally aimed at deterrence. However, the cited 
framework cannot explain its existence as a whole or as a different category in itself. 
In common law countries, punitive sanctions can also be awarded under tort law 
and, as such, critics argue that if the main objective of criminal law is solely deterrence 
and the minimization of enforcement costs, and these objectives are adequately 
addressed by tort, then the former should play a diminishing role over time. Meanwhile, 
other critics do not see the need to maintain a rigid boundary between criminal and civil 
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law (Cheh, 1991). Mann (1992) and Koenig and Rustad (1998) advanced the expansion 
of a "middleground" or "crimtorts" that possess elements of the two in order to better 
respond to changing situations. 
The justifications to preserve criminal law as a separate category, on the other 
hand, are tackled by Posner and Calabresi and Melamed. Posner argues that criminal 
law is needed in order to prevent the bypassing of the market. As voluntary transactions 
are channeled through the market and reflects also efficient exchanges, then society 
should protect this system of exchange from coercive transfers. Calabresi and 
Melamed's arguments runs similar to Posner. However, instead of the market itself that 
should be preserved, it is the society's chosen transaction structure that should be 
secured. Society chooses how to allocate rights and protect it with a property or a 
liability rule. This chosen transaction structure is then protected by criminal law with 
punishment and serves as a kicker to prevent individuals from converting property rules 
with liability rules. 
According to Klerovick, while Calabresi and Melamed, and Posner's account are 
satisfying, it is incomplete. It fails to consider the non-economic considerations in 
criminal law. The moral dimension pervades the criminal law category to the extent that 
renders it hard to ignore its justification. According to criminal law scholars, criminal 
law serves an important purpose apart from deterrence, that is, its educative and 
socializing function. It is a reflection of society's values and, thus, covers acts that are 
considered to be morally reprehensible by society. 
In Chapters five and six, these criticisms will be addressed in order to contribute 
to the attempt to furnish a more comprehensive law and economics account of criminal 
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law. We argue that much of the criticisms stem from the largely ignored role of social 
stigma, the informal sanction that is imposed by the rest of society on the individual 
who has committed a crime. 
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II   Fines, Incarceration and 
Incapacitation 
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3  To fine, jail or incapacitate? 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Imprisonment is one of the harshest penalties under criminal law that is also 
unique to it. Since it denies the individual their personal freedom, its role has often been 
the subject of debate. This part discusses the age old debate as to what purposes does 
imprisonment serve from the point of view of law and economics and explore to what 
extent can it lead to an enhancement of social welfare.  
Literature on law and economics widely accept that fines should be preferred 
over a jail sentence. Since individuals are only concerned about the expected 
punishment and due to incarceration’s higher administrative costs, monetary sanctions 
are seen to achieve the same purpose of deterring an individual from committing a 
crime while imposing lower costs to society. This is illustrated by the huge sums spent 
on the maintenance of prisons and the penal system. Imprisonment should only be 
resorted to under certain cases such as when fines fail to adequately deter individuals 
from committing a crime or incapacitate repeat offenders. 
The same attitude towards the minimal reliance on imprisonment is also echoed 
elsewhere in the field for reasons apart from achieving a particular level of deterrence. 
Imprisonment is considered as a severe and highly coercive form of punishment since 
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the individual is deprived of his or her freedom and forced to live in isolation from the 
community.  
Aside from this, there is evidence that imprisonment increases the probability of 
recidivism (See Drago, et al, 2011; Di Tella and Schargodsky, 2009). Using a unique 
dataset arising from the passage of a Clemency Bill in Italy 2006, Drago, et al (2011) 
showed that the length of time served in prison is proportional to re-arrest rates. The 
explanation is rooted in the relationship between social interaction and crime. The 
incentives an individual faces can be amplified by group effects and interaction. 
Indviduals in prison cultivate such interactions with their fellow inmates that continues 
outside of it. Thus, crime control policies should also consider the indirect effect of 
prison terms. Di Tella and Schargodsky, 2009 on the other hand, compared the effects 
of prison and an alternative form of incapacitating sanction, electronic monitoring in 
Argentina and found that the rate of recidivism for the latter is 40% lower.   
As an alternative to incarceration, other forms of incapacitation are proposed, 
such as electronic monitoring and engagement in community service10. Others, 
meanwhile, emphasize the role of improving labor market conditions and enhancing the 
employment prospects of individuals instead of focusing on punishment as a way to 
deter crime (Gould, et al, 2002). 
The law and economics theory and other frameworks, however, do not 
adequately explain the widespread use of imprisonment across the world. Instead of 
playing a diminishing role, some jurisdictions have increased their reliance on 
imprisonment as a way to control crime. In California, for instance, the scope of acts 
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punishable by imprisonment were expanded and the length of sentences for some acts 
were increased. Other measures like the "three-strikes law" and the implementation of 
minimum sentence requirements also serve to illustrate the prevalence of the said form 
of sanction. In some jurisdictions, moreover, jail terms have been imposed on corporate 
or white collar crime.  
Europe however, has a relatively lower prison population than the US. Its 
reliance on prison can be attributed to the more widely use of alternative sanctions such 
as probation, community service, and the day fine system. However, even in some 
countries that have earlier adopted a policy to consciously reduce prison population, 
there was an observed reversal of preference such as in the Netherlands and Sweden 
(von Hofera, 2003). The cited reliance on imprisonment may be partly explained by 
politico-economic considerations on the part of law enforcement agencies. However, we 
wanted to explore the extent to which it is explained by the theory on deterrence. 
 
3.1.1  Incarceration and partial incapacitation 
 
Imprisonment, where the individual is deprived of his liberty and prerogative in 
allocating his or her time, can be treated as a case of full incapacitation. Other forms of 
incapacitating sanction, where the individual is deprived from pursuing a particular 
activity for a given period of time, has also gained acceptance. The penalty or demerit 
point system used in traffic regulation, for instance, deprives individuals of their driving 
                                                                                                                                               
10See for instance, Sherman and Strang (2007) for other forms of restorative justice. 
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rights and privileges once a certain number of points that correspond to certain traffic 
violations had been reached. A number of empirical studies have shown that the said 
system led to a marked decrease in the incidence of road traffic accidents and, hence, 
deemed to have a significant deterrence effect. Due to its success in curbing accidents, 
this mechanism is starting to be replicated in other areas such as environmental 
regulation. 
Another example of an incapacitating sanction is probation. The movement of 
the individual is usually restricted and supervised by a probationary officer. Probation is 
also sometimes accompanied with the requirement of spending time for community 
service. Electronic monitoring is another form of an incapacitating sanction (Di Tella 
and Schargodsky, 2009). Restrictions on the individual’s movement are also imposed 
and his compliance is checked by an electronic device that he wears. The law 
enforcement authorities are notified electronically once he violates these restrictions. 
In this chapter, the fines-versus-incarceration debate is revisited in order to 
contribute to a greater understanding of why societies still resort to incarceration and 
the creation of new forms of sanctions aimed at partial incapacitation. We first provide 
an overview of the classical law and economics theory to identify the conditions under 
which incarceration should be resorted to. The scope for its imposition is narrow. 
We then discuss some of the weaknesses of law and economics’ treatment of 
incarceration. We take the stand of Miceli that incapacitation is often treated from a 
normative point of view, while its deterrence aspect is usually taken for granted as it is 
often treated as being similar to a monetary sanction. The implicit assumption is that the 
costs of incapacitation to the individual is no different from a fine since the former can 
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be converted into monetary terms. He then proposed a general theory that takes into 
account a positive and a normative analysis of incapacitation. While agreeing with him 
in this respect, we took another route by taking into account the role of time and its 
relative scarcity in the positive analysis of incapacitation. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we revisit the theoretical 
literature concerning the conditions under which incarceration, or full incapacitation, 
are used in lieu of a fine. Then, the role of individual time constraint is considered and 
laid out to see the distinction between a fine and incarceration from the point of view of 
individuals. Then we provided some empirical data related to our study. 
 
3.2  The Theory: Fines versus Incarceration 
 
There are three main reasons cited in literature for the need to impose non-
monetary sanctions and not just fines. The first concerns deterrence, the second is the 
need for incapacitation, and the third concerns justice or fairness and equity 
considerations. 
 
3.2.1  Deterrence 
 
In his seminal article, Becker (1968) proposed that individuals only consider the 
expected punishment when considering whether or not to commit a crime. Since 
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increasing the probability of conviction implies higher expenditures on law 
enforcement, society could then achieve the same level of deterrence with the least cost 
by increasing the level of fines. Society could also choose the type of sanction -- 
between fines and imprisonment. However, since the former requires huge 
administrative costs, then monetary sanctions are preferable. 
The conclusion that the optimal punishment should consist of maximal fines and 
low probability of conviction, however, rests on the assumption that individuals are risk 
neutral, face no wealth constraints, and homogenous. When one of these conditions 
does not hold, then there is a case for the imposition of imprisonment. 
 
3.2.1.1 Differences in individual wealth 
 
When an individual is wealth constrained, as what happens when the harm that 
they cause is greater than their wealth, there is a need to supplement monetary sanctions 
with a prison term, according to Becker. The main rationale is that when monetary fines 
alone are used, then the poor would only be able to pay the fine equivalent to their 
wealth. This provides them with incentives to commit the most serious criminal act that 
is correlated with the highest individual benefit. Thus, they could only be adequately 
deterred by combining fines with a prison term. 
Polinsky and Shavell (1991) makes Becker's second proposition more explicit 
and takes on risk neutral individuals with different wealth levels. While maintaining 
that societies should still rely more on fines than imprisonment, they derived different 
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optimal punishment depending on the wealth of the individual. For the poor, the optimal 
fine is equivalent to their wealth. On the other hand, the rich should not be imposed 
with maximal fines since this may lead to overdeterrence. Whether the poor should be 
imposed with a longer sentence however is not clear. 
The policy implication of Becker and Polinsky and Shavell leads to 
discriminatory punishment. The rich will be charged with higher fines alone while the 
poor will be charged with a fine equivalent to their wealth with corresponding 
imprisonment. However, this does not seem appealing on equity and fairness grounds 
based on the almost universal legal tenet that all individuals should be treated equally 
before the law 11. Aside from this, critics claim that in almost all jurisdictions, uniform 
fines are imposed.  
In Nordic countries and Germany, discriminatory sanction exists under the day 
fine system. An individual pays a fine proportional to his daily income and is imposed 
for some criminal violations and minor offenses. The main consideration for its 
imposition is that setting fines proportional to income is fair and just. However, we will 
also argue in the preceding chapter that it also serves the goal of efficiency when we 
consider the role of time as a scarce resource.  The day fine system has also been cited 
as one of the reasons why these countries have lower prison populations and is being 
tried in some states in the US as part of criminal justice reform.  
Lott (1987), however, claims that even if we see uniform expected punishment, 
this does not imply that the theory is wrong. What actually happens in practice is that 
                                                 
11See for instance Farmer and Terrell (2001) for an exploration of the tradeoff between pursuing the goals 
of deterrence and justice when there are two groups with different actual and perceived crime rates. 
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higher income individuals, who face a higher opportunity cost from serving a prison 
term are actually paying more to acquire good legal defense in order to avoid 
imprisonment. In effect, the rich are able to lower the probability of conviction by 
choosing and paying the same monetary fine plus the additional cost of avoiding a jail 
term. Thus, the facts actually conform with the theory and moves to put restrictions on 
the defense expenditure of the rich to avoid conviction is wrong. 
In response, Garoupa and Gravelle (2000) showed that allowing the rich to 
choose their level of expenditure spending does not lead to full efficiency as what Lott 
claims. He ignored the fact that there will still be a group of individuals who will be 
underdeterred, those belonging to the low income group. Further, for the efficiency 
conditions to hold, the high income group will still have to face higher expected 
sanctions. The welfare implications of setting restrictions on defense expenditure is 
therefore ambiguous, especially when the benefit to the crime varies. It requires 
comparing the changes in the behavior of the underdeterred poor and the overdeterred 
rich. 
 
3.2.1.2  Demand elasticity of crime and nonlinear cost of imposing the 
punishment 
 
The informational requirements needed to impose discriminatory sanctions are 
tackled in detail by Friedman (1981). Whether or not the poor should be imprisoned and 
whether or not the rich should pay higher fines should take into consideration the 
44 
 
individual demand for the criminal act and the cost of imposing the sanction. The 
crucial assumptions rest on the nonlinearity of the cost of imposing punishment and the 
dependence of the value of the crime on the wealth of the individual. 
There are situations where the value of the criminal act depends on the wealth of 
the individual. If this were the case, efficiency requires that the punishment should also 
vary according to the wealth of the individual. Thus, the rich who enjoy a higher private 
benefit from the crime should be charged with higher fines. On the other hand, the cost 
of imposing the expected punishment, Friedman argues, increases at an escalating rate. 
For the same level of act, deterring a rich person cost more than deterring the poor. 
Thus, this implies that imposing a higher expected punishment should weigh the 
demand elasticity for crime and the increasing marginal cost of imposing the expected 
punishment. 
To the extent that demand elasticities are different for various groups of 
individuals, then there are efficiency gains from discriminatory punishment. The rich 
then should be charged with higher expected punishment. However, this is offset by the 
increasing costs of imposing the punishment and, according to Friedman, this implies 
that law enforcement should focus on the poor. 
The view on discriminatory punishment also runs counter to the other widely 
accepted principle in law and economics that the optimal punishment should be based 
on the social harm alone (Posner, 1977). If some individuals commit the act, then their 
private benefit may be higher than the social harm. If there is a way to compensate 
those harmed, then there is no reason why society should prohibit it. This is often 
referred to in the literature as efficient crime. Setting the punishment equal to the 
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individual benefit would also achieve the same level of deterrence. 
In reality, however, implicit discriminatory pricing takes place in the legal 
system with the same monetary fines and prison sentence regardless of individual 
characteristics. The latter implies equal dollar punishment while the former implies 
higher dollar punishment for those with higher foregone income. According to 
Friedman, if the benefit depends on wealth, then the rich should be imprisoned. 
However, for the same level of criminal act, society faces a higher cost from imposing 
the said sanction on the rich. Therefore, it would be more efficient to just ask the rich to 
pay higher dollar fines. On the other hand, the wealth constrained poor should be 
imprisoned. 
 
3.2.1.3  Marginal utility of money and time 
 
The other implicit assumption behind Becker’s conclusion is that individuals 
have the same marginal utility of money. When individuals have different wealth, those 
with a lower initial endowment have a higher marginal utility of money as compared to 
those who have a higher initial wealth. Baum and Kamas (1995) show that when this is 
the case, the policy implications of imposing a uniform sanction would be inefficient 
and at the same time inequitable. They argue that such a situation is quite paradoxical 
for the justice system that claims to be fair and that strives to maximize welfare. 
Uniform punishment implies imposing the same monetary fine and prison 
sentence regardless of income and valuation of time. With a uniform monetary fine, the 
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poor suffer from a greater marginal disutility compared to the rich because of the 
difference in their initial wealth. Under such a scheme, the rich are relatively less 
deterred than the poor. On the other hand, with uniform prison sentence, those with 
higher income are punished more since the opportunity cost with respect to their 
foregone future income is higher than the low-income individual. This implies lower 
prison sentences for the rich. 
As an alternative, Baum and Kamas propose the use of time as the numeraire, as 
the standard unit of measurement of the sanction instead of money when finding the 
optimal punishment that would maximize social welfare. Money is often used merely 
for reasons of convenience. It is not necessarily ideal in a situation where there are 
disparities in wealth. In this respect, time has a particular advantage since individuals 
are endowed with the same amount of time per day and, based on their income and 
preferences, choose whether or not to commit a particular act. 
The use of money as a numeraire also led Lott to conclude that the willingness 
of the rich to pay for a higher legal defense reflects their marginal disutility for prison. 
However, we think that this may in fact due to credit constraints on the part of the poor. 
To cite, if the capital market is perfect and individuals could borrow then the poor 
would also avail of the services of good lawyers. 
The policy implication is that a time-based and a money-based approach to 
punishment could be adopted simultaneously. A time-based system could set the fine 
according to the individual's daily income, implying higher fines for the rich. Such a 
system is already in place in Sweden, Finland, and Germany. This has also been 
credited as one of the reasons why the prison population in these countries are lower 
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than in the US. On the other hand, the determination of the length of jail sentences 
could be based on the individual's foregone future income and, hence, implies that the 
rich spend less time in the jail than the poor. 
Bar Niv and Safra (2002) also argues for fines based on wealth because of 
individual differences in the marginal utility of money. If society does not consider this, 
then it results in a biased and unjust distribution of criminal acts where the rich are 
underdeterred. According to Bar Niv and Safra, there are actually two penalty regimes 
in place -- fixed and discretionary punishment. In common law countries, the latter 
takes the form of regulated minimum or maximum fines subject to the discretion of the 
courts. Low and medium offenses, on the other hand, are covered by fixed fines. In 
some civil law countries, as already mentioned before, day fines exist based on both the 
wealth of the individual and the severity of the offense. 
 
3.2.1.4  Asymmetric information 
 
The previous discussions were based on the assumption of either perfect 
information or imperfect information in which all parties share the same information 
set, with respect to both the known and the unknown variables. The other reason given 
in the literature for the existence of non-monetary sanctions such as imprisonment 
concerns the unobservability of certain factors like wealth and income from the 
perspective of the law enforcer. 
If individuals have different levels of income and wealth, then different 
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combinations of the level of fine and prison sentence should be imposed based on the 
wealth of the individual. However, when wealth is unobservable, then society may 
choose to rely on the uniform combination of fines and imprisonment as a next best 
alternative. 
Chu and Jiang (1993) considered risk averse individuals, who could choose the 
severity of the crime, with different wealth endowment. If individuals are enabled to 
choose the severity, then imposing maximal fines will efficiently deter the rich but will 
encourage the poor to commit the most severe crime. Because of their wealth constraint, 
there is a serious marginal deterrence problem on the part of the poor. In this case, the 
optimal fine should then be set as equivalent to the wealth of the poor. However, this 
may be low enough for the rich and will result in underdeterrence for this particular 
group. The next best option is to combine the fine with imprisonment in order to 
provide sufficient incentives for the poor who are said to be judgment proof. At the 
same time, it addresses the underdeterrence problem for the rich as their opportunity 
cost of spending in jail is higher. 
With asymmetric information, the social planner would choose the optimal fine, 
supplemented with imprisonment, that would lead to the best overall level of deterrence. 
The optimal fine would not be equivalent to the maximal fine for reasons that concern 
the marginal deterrence of the poor but should not also be too trivial for the rich. 
Polinsky (2006) considered the role of positive enforcement cost in such a 
situation. When wealth is observable, then fines alone should be used. However, when 
wealth is unobservable, there are two regimes that are optimal. The first relies 
exclusively on fines where the fine is set to be equivalent to the wealth of the poorest 
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group. The other is a choice between adopting a high fine or a low fine with 
imprisonment. In all cases, there is a level of underdeterrence and social welfare is 
lower. 
According to Levitt (1997), imprisonment serves as an incentive compatibility 
constraint to adequately deter individuals when wealth is unobservable. There are three 
reasons why without imprisonment, incentives may be incompatible. When 
apprehended, the individual can lie about his real level of wealth in order to evade 
paying the full amount of the fine. Even if the law enforcer has information on the 
wealth, there may be no direct way to compel the individual to pay the fine. Third, there 
may be difficulties in collecting the fine. Thus, given that the apprehended individual 
can choose to behave in any of the cited manner, imprisonment is needed on top of the 
monetary fine. The social planner is in effect, asking the individual to pay the fine or 
face imprisonment. 
 
3.2.2  Incapacitation 
 
The seminal article on incapacitation is written by Shavell (1987) citing that the 
main objective of imprisonment is to prevent criminals from committing more harm in 
the future. However, since the cost of maintaining the penal system is high, it would 
only be optimal to imprison individuals when their dangerousness or the harm that they 
would potentially inflict exceeds the per period cost of keeping them in prison. Shavell 
also considered the case when the dangerousness of the individual declines with age 
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and, making the benefit of longer prison sentences low. 
If the goal of society is to incapacitate, then the optimal sanction is independent 
of the probability of apprehension and the sanction is discontinuous at the threshold 
level which depends on the per period cost of punishment. On the other hand, when the 
goal is to deter, the sanction is a continuous function of the harm and depends on the 
probability of apprehension. 
Having proposed a normative approach to incapacitation, Shavell does not show 
how imprisonment affects the individual decision to commit a crime. What his study 
reveals is the conditions under which imprisonment is deemed optimal given that this 
particular punishment is costly. 
As Miceli (2009) points out, the law and economics literature has approached 
criminal punishment from two different perspectives. The criminal deterrence literature 
involves positive analysis and hence, tries to understand individual decision-making and 
how they respond to rewards and punishment. The incapacitation literature, on the other 
hand, is based on a normative analysis and addresses the question on the conditions 
where imprisonment would be socially optimal given positive enforcement costs. What 
is lacking is a positive theory that incorporates the threat of incapacitation into the 
decision making of individuals. 
Our view is that the main reason why most of the literature on imprisonment and 
other non-monetary sanctions that are incapacitating in nature -- such as suspension of a 
license, restrictions on movement, and occupation -- are confined to a normative 
analysis is that they are assumed to be made comparable in their monetary terms. Thus, 
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as long as the form of punishment can be set according to their monetary equivalent, 
then the form of punishment becomes immaterial (See Becker, 1968). They become 
perfect substitutes with respect to the generation of unit level of deterrence. The cost of 
imprisonment to an individual, for instance, is usually treated as the discounted sum of 
foregone future income and the value to him of freedom and the future loss in 
consumption (See Polinsky and Shavell, 1997). 
 
3.2.3  Fairness and equity 
 
Another reason cited in the literature -- mostly outside the law and economics 
literature -- for the existence of non-monetary sanctions concerns issues of fairness, 
equity and distributive justice. This has already been discussed in detail in Chapter 2.   
 
3.2.4  Deterrence and incapacitation 
 
To address the dichotomous approach at incapacitation, Miceli provided a 
theory that merges both its positive and normative aspects. According to Miceli, one of 
the weaknesses of the deterrence model is that it fails to take into account that there are 
some individuals who are undeterrable. They do not respond properly to sanctions and, 
hence, the only way to prevent them from causing harm is to deprive them of the 
opportunity to do so by keeping them in prison. These individuals are also likely to be 
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repeat offenders. The challenge, therefore, is to identify these types of individuals. 
While incapacitation addresses these issues, it has ignored the behavior of individuals 
when incarceration becomes an additional punishment. 
Miceli adopted a dynamic model that incorporates intertemporal decision-
making. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their benefit and face recurrent 
criminal opportunities throughout their lifetime. They then maximize intertemporal 
utility based on the present value of committing crime given a particular apprehension 
technology, amount of the the fine, and length of imprisonment. Imprisonment deters 
some potential offenders from committing a crime again and prevents first time 
offenders from committing further inefficient crime. 
According to Miceli, increasing fines could not serve the purpose of 
incapacitation because it merely prices the individual’s behavior. If individuals have 
infinite wealth then they could not be deterred. The only way to deter them is to deny 
them the privileges or rights for committing a certain act. On the other hand, 
incarceration is socially costly and, hence, it is crucial to screen undeterrable criminals 
from those who are responsive to sanctions and reserve it only for the former. 
 
3.2.5  Partial incapacitation: the penalty point system 
 
As discussed earlier, there exists other forms of nonmonetary sanctions aimed at 
incapacitating an individual without resorting to incarceration or full incapacitation. The 
individual is only prohibited from devoting his or her time to pursue a particular activity 
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that gives rise to the externalized harm. The basic penalty point system is mostly 
applied to regulate driving behavior and recently in environmental regulation (See 
Scheule, et al, 2004) . It works by allocating to each individual a maximum number of 
points for a given period. For each violation, a point is added12 based on the seriousness 
of the violation and when it is exhausted, the driving license is revoked for a given 
period of time. The license could be redeemed after enrolling in a driver refresher 
program and passing an examination. The penalty point system or demerit point system 
is never used alone but is always used to complement fines. 
Despite its widespread use and its relative success as suggested by empirical 
evidence, its deterrence effect remain largely unexplored in the law and economics 
literature. One reason is that the penalty point system emerged from the need to curtail 
accidents and had remained outside the purview of economists and lawyers. 
Bourgeon and Picard (2007) shows how the penalty point system acts as a 
mechanism both for deterrence and incapacitation. They assumed two types of drivers 
distinguished by their cost of exerting effort to drive carefully. Normal drivers have a 
low cost of exerting effort to drive carefully while reckless drivers have extremely high 
cost. Fines provide incentives for normal drivers to behave optimally. On the other 
hand, reckless drivers are insensitive to fines and cause greater harm. To the extent that 
the deductible acts in the point system are reflective of the recklessness of the 
individual, the point system effectively removes them from the street and hence reduces 
the incidence of accidents. 
In this context, the point system acts as a screening device, incapacitating or 
                                                 
12Depending on the jurisdiction, the points may be added or deducted from the initial allocation of points. 
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removing from the streets the dangerous drivers who appear undeterred by monetary 
sanctions. At the same time, from the point of view of deterrence, since the sanction is 
denominated in time, an additional constraint binds individuals and they calculate the 
costs and benefits of the activity with both monetary and time constraint. Those 
individuals who cannot be deterred by monetary sanctions alone may be constrained by 
the possibility of their driver's license being revoked for a particular period of time. 
Basili and Nicita (2005) started their analysis with the empirical observation that 
there is a correlation between the accumulation of demerit points and accidents. They 
consider as striking the empirical evidence which reveals that the rate of decrease of 
accidents depends on the number of points a person currently has, pointing to a 
nonlinear relationship between traffic rule compliance and the points they possess. 
They treat driving points as an input to the consumption of other goods, entering 
individual utility like income does. They identified three types of individuals depending 
on their respective valuation of points: those who are completely deterred, those who 
are partially deterred, and those who are never deterred. 
The rate of transformation of points to consumption opportunities depends on 
the type of individual and the relative number of points accumulated for a given period. 
For partially deterred agents, the cost of the non-monetary sanction is always greater 
than the benefit derived from consuming all the points. However, since they will only 
incur suspension once they have exhausted their points, complete deterrence will only 
set in once they achieve a particular threshold of points. On the other hand, the 
introduction of the point system does not affect the behavior of the other two types. 
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3.3  The Empirical Evidence: Fines, Incarceration, 
Incapacitation 
 
There had been a lot of studies that had been devoted to empirically test the 
theory of criminal punishment. Recently, Levitt and Miles (2007) provided an excellent 
survey of what had been done so far. Most studies show a strong correlation between 
higher expected punishment and the lower incidence of crime13. While this may support 
the deterrence effect of criminal punishment, there are many simultaneity issues 
involved with respect to other variables that affect the number of crime as well. 
 
3.3.1   Day Fines and Incarceration 
 
In 1991, the US Bureau of Justice Assistance introduced the day fine system in 
Maricopa, Arizona as an alternative to incarceration to address the problem of 
overcrowded prisons. Fines were based on wealth as well as the severity of the act. 
Turner and Petersilia (1996) found that the day fine worked as well in deterring 
individuals in the four jurisdictions where the system was introduced. They concluded 
that discriminatory fines are viable alternatives to a jail term14. 
                                                 
13See for instance Witte (1980) and Myers (1985). While previous studies used aggregate data, Witte 
used individual data and found that both the certainty and severity of punishment deter criminal activity. 
Myers on the other hand found that increasing certainty has a strong deterrence effect while the severity 
show weak effects which is consistent with the theoretical result when individuals are risk averse. 
14See also Zedlweski (2010) and Sherman, et al (1998). 
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3.3.2  Deterrence and incapacitation effect 
 
One of the challenges of empirical estimation that is of interest to the purpose of 
our research is the determination of the extent to which the reduction in crime is caused 
by a reduction in the number of individuals who had been deterred. The observed 
decline in crime could also be due to the incapacitation of criminals -- if there are less 
of them roaming the streets then there would be less offenses. To achieve this, Kessler 
and Levitt (1998) took advantage of a natural experiment in California where sentence 
enhancements for a select group of crime were introduced through a state referendum 
called Proposition 8. Sentence enhancements increased the length of jail terms for a 
select group of crimes and increased the jail sentence for third time convictions. The 
deterrence effect of a longer prison sentence could then be observed immediately after 
its implementation while the incapacitation effect would be observed with a lag. They 
found that after a year, the occurrence of crimes that fell under the scope of Proposition 
8 dropped by more than 10 percent as compared to other crimes, implying a large 
deterrent effect. After three years, it further dropped to 20 percent15. 
While Kessler and Levitt have succeeded in illustrating the deterrence effect of 
longer prison sentence, it would be interesting to find out if the same deterrence effect 
could be achieved with the use of commensurate monetary fines alone. If this were the 
case, then from the individual point of view, monetary fines and jail sentence are perfect 
                                                 
15This result however is questioned by Webster, et al. (2006). 
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substitutes with respect to the type of sanction. 
 
3.3.3  Partial incapacitation: the driving penalty point system 
 
The driving penalty point system, on the other hand, consists of both a monetary 
fine and the suspension of driving license that can be considered a form of 
incapacitation. Unlike imprisonment, it does not involve the total deprivation of all acts. 
The person is only constrained from performing a particular act. Before it was adopted 
in some countries, monetary fines were already in existence. Thus, the introduction of 
the penalty point system could distinguish the deterrence effect of a monetary sanction 
from combined fines and non-monetary sanction. 
The driving penalty point system is a scheme where individuals are allocated a 
given number of points for a given period. Every time he commits a traffic violation, he 
earns (or loses) points corresponding to its severity aside from paying a fine. When the 
points reach the maximum (or minimum), the driving license is immediately suspended 
for a certain period. 
Empirical studies conducted in Ireland, Italy, and Spain have shown a strong 
correlation between the penalty point legislation and the decrease in the incidence of 
accidents. In Ireland, Lenehan, et al (2005) showed that fourteen months after the 
system took effect in 2002, the number of traffic accident-related fatalities decreased by 
10 percent and the number of non-fatal injuries decreased by 20 percent. 
The point system was introduced in Italy in 2003. Using data from the Veneto 
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region, adjusting for seasonal and historical time trend of vehicular accidents (that 
interestingly peaks during the summer and falls in February), Zambon, et al (2007) 
observed that road accident fatalities dropped by 18 percent and a 20 percent reduction 
in non-fatal injuries was seen after an eighteen month period. Ireland estimates, 
meanwhile, show roughly the same results. Farchi, et al (2007) used data from the Lazio 
region and used a Poisson model to estimate the effect. They found an immediate 
decrease in road traffic injuries albeit lower than the previous estimates. Moreover, the 
occurrence of accidents further dropped over time. After the point system was 
introduced in Spain on July 2006, the reduction in the number of accidents was also 
observed (See Roca and Tortosa, 2008). 
These empirical studies on the driving point system, however, uses hospital 
records with regards to the number of traffic-related fatalities and injuries. This is 
because the point system was primarily devised by health and safety regulation 
authorities as a way to lower the number of vehicular fatalities and injuries which has 
reached alarming levels in Europe and the rest of the world. To the extent that they 
provide good proxy variables for individual compliance of traffic rules, then we could 
make inferences about the deterrence effect of the combined monetary and non-
monetary sanction that exist in the penalty point system. 
Since monetary fines were already in place prior to the adoption of the penalty 
point system, the immediate decrease in the occurrence of vehicular accidents could be 
considered an indicator of the deterrence effect of non-monetary sanctions on 
individuals. This intuition is akin to the Kessler and Levitt model. To the extent that 
monetary fines are roughly the same before and after the adoption of the point system, 
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then this would be true. However, this requires a more careful econometric analysis. 
The incapacitation effect would also contribute to the observed decline in the 
number of accidents. Chen (1995) showed that records of traffic convictions figure 
strongly as an important predictor of future involvement in accidents among 
individuals. Thus, the incapacitation of reckless drivers would also lead to a decrease in 
the number of accidents. However, the said effect would only be observed after a 
certain period of time. 
The evidence on sentence enhancements and the driving penalty point system 
point to the deterrence effect of imprisonment and other non-monetary sanctions that 
aim to incapacitate an individual. The data also suggests that their particular ex ante 
effect may be different from how monetary sanctions work. However, the law and 
economics literature, as pointed out by Miceli, has regarded incapacitation mostly from 
a normative point of view and has overlooked the positive side. As such, it lacks a 
description of how the threat of full or partial incapacitation affects individual decision-
making. 
 
3.4  Conclusion 
 
Incarceration is a very costly punishment to administer. However, societies still 
rely on this particular sanction to control individual behavior. In this chapter, we 
discussed the different conditions, as illustrated in the literature, when it is optimal to 
use this type of punishment as opposed to a fine from the perspective of law and 
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economics. 
To sum up, the optimality of incarceration over fines as it is discussed in the 
literature appear to be dependent on the heterogeneity of individuals. While the harm 
caused by the act might be the same, individuals might derive different benefits from it 
as seen in cases where they have different levels of wealth, risk aversion, or 
preferences. In this case, the sanction should not be necessarily based on the public 
harm alone but should also consider the individual's marginal benefits. This suggests the 
viability of imposing discriminatory sanctions which depend on individual 
characteristics such as wealth. Determining the wealth income group that will be 
subjected to fines or imprisonment depends to a large extent on the assumptions made 
with respect to the benefits and costs of imposing the punishment. 
Another issue that deserves reiteration is the observation that the literature on 
incapacitation is often conceived from a normative perspective, which led Miceli to 
provide a more general theory. The implicit assumption is that the cost of incapacitation 
to the individual is the same as that of a fine since it can be converted easily to 
monetary terms. However, according to Baum and Kamas, this neglects the role of the 
individual time constraint and its relative scarcity. In the next chapter, we will address 
these issues and incorporate it explicitly in the individual decision-making process. 
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4  The role of the time constraint 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, most of the previous studies concerning 
the fines-versus-incarceration debate start from the normative consideration of the role 
of positive enforcement costs in finding the socially optimal level of sanction. Implicit 
in the assumption is that at the level of individual decision making, imprisonment can 
be denominated into a monetary sanction in the form of foregone wage. Hence, a fine 
and a prison term can be treated almost as perfect substitutes in generating the total 
expected sanction from the point of view of the individual. 
However, foregone wage is not the only binding constraint at work since a jail 
term also involves time which is a scarce commodity. Since a prison term is 
denominated in time, its cost as well as its relative scarcity should also be considered. 
This chapter attempts to explicitly incorporate the role of the time constraint in 
individual decision-making starting with the assumption that the crucial difference 
between a fine and a prison term is that the former is denominated in time, which is a 
fixed endowment. As such, individuals face two forms of constraint -- a good and a 
time constraint. When the sanction for a particular activity is a fine, then the time 
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constraint is not binding. However, with a jail term, both become binding. Time, 
however, is an endowment that is fixed for all individuals regardless of wealth and 
wage earnings. 
The law enforcement agency actually places restrictions on how the individual 
allocates his time with an incapacitating sanction. Although the role of time has already 
been considered in the literature, its implications have not yet been fully explored, 
especially in cases where individuals have varying levels of wealth and income. We 
argue that this distinction between a fine and incapacitation becomes crucial when 
wealth and income heterogeneity exists in the society. Since time is a fixed constraint, a 
sanction that is denominated as such will affect individuals with different wealth and 
income differently from a fine. Thus, this, could potentially address the bias associated 
with varying initial wealth endowment . 
Jumping ahead of the argument laid out in this chapter, we find that aside from 
the judgment proof poor, there is another case where incapacitation may be preferable 
over a fine. To cite, individuals lying on the other extreme of the income and wealth 
spectrum may not be adequately deterred by a uniform fine. If the law enforcement 
agency is not allowed to impose discriminatory sanctions -- which is usually the case 
under the pretext of all individuals being equal under the law -- or when wage and 
income is unobservable, then incapacitation may be considered an alternative. However, 
it should be emphasized that incapacitation does not automatically imply incarceration. 
It should be underscored that the channel of deterrence lies in the nature of time as a 
fixed endowment and the ability of law enforcement agencies to constrain the 
individual's use of it to pursue all activities, as in the case of a jail term, or merely limit 
63 
 
its use for a particular activity as in the case of the revocation of driver's license. 
Our results show that when the demand for the prohibited activity behaves like a 
normal good then, caeteris paribus, an increase in wealth leads to an increase in the 
level of such activity. On the other hand, since time is a fixed endowment, introducing 
incarceration leads to higher deterrence among high wealth individuals. This is contrary 
to previous studies that show that incarceration should be reserved for the wealth 
constrained individual. According to this argument, low wealth individuals cannot be 
adequately deterred by imposing fines alone especially when the utility they get from 
the prohibited act is higher. On the other hand, we explore the extreme case where 
individuals have high wealth and we find that the opposite case is also true -- that is, as 
wealth increases, the level of activity increases as long as the activity behaves like a 
normal good. The introduction of the time constraint then serves to correct the initial 
bias in wealth endowment since time is a fixed endowment that is the same for all 
individuals. Individuals use time to earn income and when a sanction is introduced that 
is denominated in it, the total endowment that is sanctionable changes and is reflected 
as a higher opportunity for the high wealth individuals. 
The choice of whether to sanction an activity with a fine or imprisonment has 
been explored in the previous chapter. To reiterate, when fines alone are used, higher 
wealth individuals should be charged higher since the level of underdeterrence can be 
reduced at a less costly way. The prison length for the high wealth group may also be 
shorter or longer. On the one hand, given a particular length of incarceration, 
individuals with higher wealth are deterred more. When individuals can choose the 
severity of the crime and are heterogenous with respect to wealth, Chiu and Jiang 
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(1993) said imprisonment is needed to address the issue of marginal deterrence. 
Likewise, the said sanction addresses the issue of underdeterrence on the part of the 
rich. Friedman (1981), on the other hand, pointed out that the nonlinearity in the cost of 
imposing the punishment, the value of crime to the individual, and the demand 
elasticity, are related to individual wealth. Meanwhile, Polinsky and Shavell (1999) 
looked at the optimal length of the prison term with respect to the individual and 
society's discount rate. 
More recently, Polinsky (2005) addressed the issue of wealth heterogeneity and 
showed that when wealth is observable, fines alone should be used. When it is 
unobservable, then the next best option is a regime of very high fine alone or low fine 
coupled with imprisonment. This stems from the fact that a jail term may also act as an 
incentive compatibility constraint when individuals have private information about their 
wealth (Levitt, 1997). 
 
4.2  The role of the individual time constraint 
 
The crucial assumption that we make is that a prison term cannot be readily 
converted into a monetary fine without considering the relative scarcity of time. Since 
the publication of the seminal articles of Becker (1965) and Owen (1971), it has been 
widely recognized that ignoring the role of the scarcity of time generally results in a 
biased demand for commodities (See also Gronau, 1977). The theoretical prediction of 
demand may be understated or overstated. This is best illustrated by the individual's 
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decision to supply labor. If the time constraint is not taken into account, then theory 
predicts that an increase in the wage will always lead to an increase in the individual's 
labor supply decision. However, this is not supported by empirical evidence. After 
enjoying a given level of wage, the willingness of individuals to work decreases since 
spending time in leisure becomes more valuable. 
We argue that the same mechanism is at work when considering the impact of a 
prison term on an individual. Both money and time should figure in the utility of the 
individual in the generation of the individual's utility. The individual is treated not 
merely as a consumer but as a production unit who can devote his time to produce 
income. 
Most of the literature consider the cost of imprisonment on the individual to be a 
fixed exogenous value that is determined outside the model. However, when the relative 
scarcity of time is considered, the determination of total income becomes endogenized. 
While the role of the time constraint in imprisonment has been recognized16, to 
our knowledge, there are only a few studies that conceived the said constraint explicitly 
in the context of the choice between imposing a fine and imprisonment. Our approach is 
similar to Ehrlich (1975) and Block and Heineke (1975) who took into account the role 
of the time constraint in the individual decision to commit an illegitimate activity. 
This is also similar to the study of Baum and Kamas (1995) which proposed the 
use of time as a numeraire instead of money in deducing the optimal punishment that 
would maximize social welfare. They argue that when individuals have different 
                                                 
16
 See for instance Becker (1968), p.179. 
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wealth, the marginal utility for money would differ among individuals. On the other 
hand, time has a particular advantage since individuals are endowed with the same 
amount of time per day. As such, based on their income and preferences, individuals 
will choose whether or not to commit a particular act. 
 
4.3  The Model 
 
 Individuals derive utility from a bundle of consumption goods,  as well as an 
activity we denote as . We assume that preference is represented by a Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) since this allows fewer restrictions on the elasticity of 
substitution. Aside from exhibiting the other usual properties of a utility function, there 
are many advantages to using the CES (Stern, 1976). First, unlike the Cobb Douglas 
function, it does not restrict the elasticity of substitution to be equal to one and the input 
share in the utility function between  and  is set to be constant at all levels. This 
might pose some problems when the activity  is sanctioned by incarceration since 
there will now be a maximum level of  achievable as determined by the time 
constraint. Second, CES allows greater flexibility in analyzing cases at low levels of 
wealth or even negative levels of wealth. This is crucial in studying the optimal 
behavior of low wealth individuals and exploring behavior around the corner solution17. 
 We assume that individuals derive utility from consuming a basket of 
consumption goods,  and from performing a level of activity . The utility of the 
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individual can be expressed as, 
                                (4.1) 
 
where   and  and . We also assume that 
consumption is a normal good and hence  where  and  denote wage and 
wealth respectively. On the other hand, we do not place any restriction on  and hence, 
. In the CES, the parameter  is interpreted as the input share in the utility 
function and is usually restricted to . On the other hand,  is 
substitution parameter between  and  and is restricted to .18 
We assume that the activity  imposes externalities. To maximize social 
welfare, the social planner can either impose a fine,  or a nonmonetary sanction in the 
form of incarceration for a given length of time .  
In maximizing utility from the consumption of these two goods, the individual 
faces two forms of constraint, the goods and the time constraint. The goods constraint 
concerns the price of the consumption good , the per unit fine  on the activity  and 
the monetary income, which is comprised of labor income and wealth, represented by 
 and , where  represents the wage per time and  represents the time devoted to 
labor.  
 
 
(4.2) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
17Unlike the Cobb Douglas that becomes problematic as wealth approaches zero  . 
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To earn the labor income, the individual has to work  hours of time. We 
assume for simplicity that the individual spends his total time working and when he 
conducts activity , he is incarcerated for a length of time  proportionate to the level of 
activity. Thus, total time can either be spent working or being imprisoned, 
.  
We normalize the total time to  and we have,  
 
 
(4.3) 
  
The individual decision making problem therefore involves maximizing utility subject 
to the price of the consumption bundle, the monetary and nonmonetary sanction for , 
and the time constraint. We first consider the case of a fine only and incarceration only 
regime. Then we consider the social welfare maximization problem. 
In order not to complicate the analysis, we assume that the commission of  is 
observable and hence we ignore the probability of apprehension and conviction. 
 
4.3.1  Monetary Fines 
The individual decision problem is to maximize utility 
 such that  since . The 
Lagrange is  
(1/ )[(1 ) ] ( )L a c ax w I pc Fxµ µ µ λ− − −= −+− + + −   (4.4) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
18In the case of the Cobb Douglas this is equivalent to 1. 
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and we get the following first order conditions (FOC’s)  
(1/ ) 1 1(1/ )[(1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] 0L a c ax a c p
c
µ µ µµ λµ µ− − − − − −∂ = − − + − − − =
∂
 (4.5) 
(1/ ) 1 1(1/ )[(1 ) ] [ ] 0L a c ax ax F
x
µ µ µ µ λµ µ− − − − − −∂ = − − + − − =
∂
   
=w+I-pc-Fx=0Lλ
∂
∂
       
*
1 1(1 )
r
F r r r r
w I
x
F p a F
α
α− −
+ 
=  
− + 
     (4.6) 
( )
*
1 1
1
1
r
F rr r r
w I
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p p F
α
α α− −
 − +
=  
− + 
     (4.7) 
 
where 1
1
r
µ
=
+
and 1
1
r
µ
µ
− =
+
. 
Note that the optimal levels of  and  now depends on the fine, the price of the 
consumption good, the elasticity of substitution and the relative share in the utility19.  
Suppose that individuals are heterogonous with respect to wealth, then as wealth 
increases, the consumption and the level of  increases too. Thus, the optimal levels of 
 and  chosen for different levels of wealth is shown by the income expansion path 
(See Fig.4.1).  
                                                 
19In the case of the Cobb Douglas function,  just depends on the fine and not on the 
price of the consumption good. The elasticity of substitution between the illegal good or 
activity  and the consumption good  is also assumed to be equivalent to 1 which may 
be restrictive especially when 
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Figure 4.1: Optimal level of x with a fine and varying income. 
 
4.3.2  Incarceration 
 
When incarceration alone is used, then the time constraint becomes binding and 
the individual maximizes his utility subject to a goods constraint  and a 
time constraint . Combining both we have  
w(1-tx)+I=pc        (4.8) 
w+I=pc+wtx.  
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The Lagrange is  
(1/ )[(1 ) ] ( )L a c ax w I pc wtxµ µµ λ− − −= − + + + − −    (4.9) 
 
 
and the FOC’s are  
(1/ ) 1 1(1/ )[(1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] 0L a c ax a c p
c
µ µ µµ λµ µ− − − − − −∂ = − − + − − − =
∂
 (4.10) 
(1/ ) 1 1(1/ )[(1 ) ] [ ] 0L a c ax ax wt
x
µ µµ µ µµ λ− − − − − −∂ = − − + − − =
∂
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=  
− + 
 
 
 
What we can see here is that the level of activity  chosen by the individual 
depends on both the length of incarceration, wealth and wage. It also captures the role 
of the time constraint. Due to the endowment constraint, for a given level of wage, there 
is a corner solution defined by 1/x t=  and /c I p= 20.  
                                                 
20
 Note that we assumed that the value of x, and the amount of punishment are  the same for all 
individuals such that the differences in the level of commission of x depend on wage and wealth 
differences and the shadow cost of time. Chu and Jiang (1993) for instance adopted the assumption that 
the benefit from x depends on the wealth of the individual. The value is exogenous from the model. Our 
attempt is to endogenize the differences in marginal benefit arising from the valuation of different wage 
and wealth groups of time. 
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At the corner solution, given the government imposed sanction t that is 
exogenously determined, individuals whose wage is lower than a particular threshold 
will always commit x , while those whose wage lies above it will choose the level of 
activity that lies within the interior solution x x< . 
From Eq, 4.11, we derive the threshold level of wage w’ as 
( ) ( )11
1
1
r
r rr r
w I
wt tp wt
α
α α
−
−
+  ≤ 
  − +
     (4.12) 
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1
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1
'
t
t
w w x
t
w w x
t
≥ → ≤
≤ → >
 
Thus, if the individual’s wage is above the threshold w’, then the individual 
chooses x below x . However, if the wage is below this threshold, then the individual 
chooses x . For the moment, we will first focus on wealth heterogeneity and assume 
that all individuals have the same wage. 
 
Let us assume that individuals are heterogonous with respect to wealth. Then, 
there exists a level of wealth such that individuals whose wealth is equal to or above it 
are constrained to commit the maximum allowable level of activity for a particular . 
This level of wealth is given by .  
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Simplifying and factoring we get,  
1 1(1 )
r r
r r r rI p wt tw
wt wt
α α
α α
−
− −
    
= − − +    
     
⌢
   (4.13) 
 
Graphically, this is shown by the intersection of the income expansion path with 
the corner solution. Any wealth that lies above it results in the corner solution. On the 
other hand, all wealth that lies below it is in the interior solution.  
  
 
 
 Figure 4.2: Optimal level of x with incarceration and varying level of income. 
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4.4 Social Welfare 
In this section, we explore under what conditions would a fines only regime be 
preferable to an incarceration only regime.  
4.4.1  Fines Only Regime 
In order to simplify our analysis, we assume that there are two wealth groups 
where   and we let  be the proportion of potential criminals with wealth . 
We let  and  be the optimal choice of individuals with wealth  and  when the 
sanction is a fine, F. For every level of activity, society suffers a proportionate harm 
equivalent to h. There is a cost of enforcing a fine denoted by a which is also 
proportional to the amount of the fine.  
The social planner then chooses the level of the fine to maximize social welfare. 
We follow the social welfare specification in Chu and Jiang (1993).  To simplify the 
analysis, they assumed the following: society does not give any weight to utility of 
criminal21, individuals cannot be criminals and victims at the same time, and perfect 
insurance against crime (Chu and Jiang, 1993; and Polinksy and Shavell, 1979). In this 
case, the maximization of social welfare can be expressed as the minimization of the 
social loss function given by 
 
1 1 2 2
( ( ))
( ) (1 ) ( )
F i iSC h x F aF
hx I F hx I F aF
pi
pi pi
= −
= , + − , −
∑
                                     (4.14) 
                                                 
21
 The rationale provided is that it sets aside the debate on efficient crimes. 
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Thus, the level of x  that minimizes social cost is given by 
 
 
1 2 2
1 2 2
FSC x x xh h a
F F F F
x x x
a h h
F F F
pi
pi
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
= − + − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∂ ∂ ∂ 
= − + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
         (4.15) 
 
which means that the marginal social cost of increasing the fine should be 
equivalent to the change in the marginal social harm from x. Note that optimal 
conditions now depend on the proportion of individuals with different wealth. 
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4.4.2  Incarceration Only Regime 
 
Suppose that the social planner imposes incarceration instead of a fine. The 
individual spends a period in jail denoted by t. The cost of enforcement is given by b 
and is proportional to the length of the jail term. The minimization of the social loss 
function in the case of incarceration is given by, 
1 1 2 2
( ( ))
( ) (1 ) ( )
t i iSC h x t bt
hx I t hx I t bt
pi
pi pi
= −
= , + − , −
∑
           (4.16) 
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The level of t  that minimizes social cost is given by 
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4.4.3  To fine or to jail? 
 
A fine is preferred over incarceration if for a given level of enforcement cost, 
the total social cost from imposing a fine is lower than imposing incarceration. Since we 
let the enforcement cost to be the same, then aF=bt, then, whether a fine or jail should 
be imposed depends on which of them leads to a lower total social costs. Intuitively, 
given the same spending costs, a fine or a jail term, is preferred depending under which 
regime is total harm lowered,   
1 1 2 2 1 1
2 2 1 1
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) 1
1 1( ( ))
F t
F F t
F F F t
SC SC
hx I F hx I F hx I t h t
h x x x h x
t t
pi pi pi pi
pi pi
  
  
  
  
  
<
, + − , < , + − /
− − < − −
               (4.18) 
  
Thus, this depends on the percentage of the population having income lower 
than the benchmark multiplied by the difference between the optimal activity level of 
the two groups. This implies that the higher the proportion of individuals is in the 
interior solution, which means that the higher proportion of middle range income 
individuals in the population, the more should a fine be preferred over a jail term. 
 
4.5  Discussion 
 
This shows that on the contrary, when we consider the time constraint, 
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incarceration provides a stronger deterrence for the rich. This is contrary to what 
Polisnky and Shavell posited -- that incarceration should be reserved for the poor. This 
is because they considered the case of wealth constrained individuals whose 
externalized harm exceeds their wealth. In this respect, they cannot be adequately 
deterred by fines alone. On the contrary, we explored the reverse case and found that 
when individual wealth is very high, fines may not provide adequate deterrence for the 
high wealth individuals. Imposing a jail term, on the other hand, will provide better 
deterrence for high wealth individuals since the social planner introduces a form of 
constraint, time, which is the same for all individuals regardless of wealth. Thus, while 
individuals may have different wealth endowments, considering the extent to which this 
affects their decision to commit different levels of crime, introducing another constraint 
in which individuals have the same initial endowment has the effect of correcting the 
bias in the initial endowment of wealth. 
The result may not comport with the empirical fact that there are more low 
wealth individuals who are in prison as opposed to the rich. We propose two reasons. 
For one, high wealth individuals may have already been adequately deterred by the 
sanction and that is why we do not see them in jail. Thus, it may be more interesting to 
look at the change in behavior of individuals in a situation where a particular act was 
originally sanctioned with fines alone after which incarceration or incapacitation was 
introduced. It may be hard to find such cases. However, one that may readily come to 
mind is the introduction of the driving penalty point system in some countries. The 
deduction of points for every particular traffic violation results in the revocation or 
suspension of the driving license. There is an observed decrease in the number of 
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violations in jurisdictions where it was introduced. The deterrence effect of 
incapacitation in this case arises from the introduction of the time constraint. 
The second main reason is that we have not yet taken into account the role of 
wage. We have shown that when a sanction is denominated in the form of incarceration, 
it is jointly determined by the length of incarceration, which is a fixed endowment, and 
the wage which is the opportunity cost of time. This may show that for individuals who 
possess the wealth above the given threshold and earning a high wage, choosing the 
corner solution is no longer optimal and they will opt for the interior solution instead. 
Thus, when the wage is very low or zero, then it becomes optimal for an 
individual in every wealth level to choose the corner solution and commit the maximum 
level of the crime since there is no opportunity cost for it. Corollarily, an increase in 
wage will lead to a decrease in x . We study its social welfare implications below. 
 
4.6  Social Welfare and Wage Heterogeneity 
For simplicity, we assume three different wage groups, 0w , 1w , 2w  where 0 0w =  and 
0w  1 2w w< <  where 1w w≤  is the average wage. We also let oρ  be the proportion of 
population who have wage equal to 0 , 1ρ  is the proportion of the population whose 
wage is 1w  and 11 oρ ρ− −  are those with wage 2w   
 
The social welfare can be rewritten as 
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Thus, the social welfare function depends on the proportion of individuals with 
different wealth and wage levels. Thus, individuals with high wealth and high wage will 
not choose the maximum allowable level of x  or the corner solution since the 
opportunity cost of spending time in jail becomes high. This will only be the case when 
they earn a low wage. On the other hand, low wealth individuals will still behave in a 
manner predicted by the corner solution as long as their wage is not equivalent to zero. 
In such case, as the wage approaches zero, they will choose the highest level of activity. 
 
The optimal level of t  is given by 
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                            (4.20) 
 
This implies that the marginal cost of the length of incarceration is equivalent to 
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the marginal decrease in the total social harm arising from the reduction in the level of 
activity. Note that the marginal reduction of social harm now depends on the percentage 
of individuals with high and low wealth and the proportion of those below the average 
wage and zero wage. 
 
 
4.7  Tort and Crime 
 
The analysis can also be applied to decide which acts can be governed by tort or 
criminal law from the point of view of social welfare maximization. Since criminal acts 
are punishable with incarceration, the scope of criminal law, impliedly, is actually very 
limited. However, acts where the wage income is highly correlated with social harm can 
be considered. For instance, insider trading and similar offenses in the financial sector, 
where individual wage increases with the harm, may be considered. The said analysis 
also argues for shorter jail term in order to avoid overdeterrence. However, there is a 
least costly alternative than imprisonment that would achieve the same level of 
deterrence by constraining the inividual use of time. A form of partial incapacitation for 
instance, may also be considered such as the temporary revoking of license. If the wage 
distribution of professionals within the group is also skewed towards the higher income 
group, then the reduction in total social harm may possibly be greater than the increase 
in enforcement cost when incarceration is imposed as opposed to imposing a fine. 
It is also interesting to note that during the Middle Ages in England, there was 
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no rigid distinction between tort and crime (Seipp, 1996). The same act, such as felony, 
can be addressed in either branch. The decision was left to the victim and it depended 
often on the wealth of the accused. Since the victims could not expect monetary 
compensation when the accused is poor, they opt to pursue the suit under criminal law. 
On the other hand, when they are rich, they choose to be compensated under tort22. 
 
4.8  Fines plus incarceration as a form of discriminatory 
sanction 
 
 In the previous section, we considered the case where either fines or 
imprisonment are imposed. In some cases, however, sanctions consist of both a fine and 
imprisonment. In this section, we look at the optimal combination of fine and 
imprisonment when wealth heterogeneity exists. Our analysis is restricted to the case 
where society recognizes the benefit that the individual derives from the act23. However, 
the activity also produces harm that is borne by others. Hence, it is more concerned with 
pricing than the total prohibition of the act. 
Social welfare is simply the sum of individual benefits less the total societal 
harm from the activity x . Assume that the harm H  increases linearly with x . We 
assume that individuals have the same tastes and preferences. Hence, the total benefits 
                                                 
22See Seipp (1996), pp.83-84. 
23
 This excludes acts whose utility to the individual is not recognized by the society, for instance, the case 
of heinous crimes. 
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to society is just the summation of individual utility24.  
 
( )SW i
Nc x NHx
U c x Hx
c x Hx
α β
α β
=
=
= −
∑ , −  
 ∑ −
 
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where N  is the number of individuals in the population.  
Maximizing social welfare with respect to x , 
1 0SW Nc x NH
x
α ββ −∂ = − =
∂
 
 
1Nc x NHα ββ − =  (4.22) 
 
The above equation tells us that the socially optimal level of x  is when social marginal 
benefit is equivalent to marginal harm. Solving for x , gives us 
1
1
S Hx
C
β
α β
− 
=  
 
 (4.23) 
 
If there is no sanction, then the individual is unconstrained in the level of activity x  
since the harm is externalized to others and the social welfare maximizing level will not 
be achieved. In order to maximize social welfare, the government can constrain the 
                                                 
24In this case, we used the Cobb Douglas function for ease of computation. The CES can also be used and 
the same result will be derived.  
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individual by imposing either a fine, incarceration or both. We assume that there is  no 
cost of enforcement.  Although it is an unrealistic assumption, we abstract from it in 
order to simplify our analysis. The main objective of which is to find the most 
appropriate policy to pursue when there is wage heterogeneity and when this leads to 
different levels of harmful activity among individuals. 
When individuals are homogenous, then it is sufficient to impose a fixed fine in 
order to achieve the optimal aggregate level of x . Substituting the above level of Sx  to 
the individual maximization problem, we get the optimal level of the fine that will 
achieve this objective. 
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       (4.24) 
 
Thus, when individuals are homogenous, a fixed fine alone will lead to a level of 
x  that maximizes social welfare. 
 
4.9  Optimal sanction and distributional preference 
Suppose individuals are heterogenous with respect to wage, and we denote the 
individuals with wage w  as the one indifferent towards obeying and violating the fine, 
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then those with w >  w   will violate it. From the point of view of society, this may still 
be optimal since those who violate can still compensate those who are harmed as long 
as the transaction cost is zero. However, individuals who violate enjoy a surplus given 
by Si25. 
The social planner may have a distributional preference to deny violators of the 
surplus arising from wage differences alone26. Another reason to deprive individuals 
from the surplus may be grounded on the overall incentives to the economy. Suppose 
that there are substitute goods or activities available in the economy that are less 
harmful, this will discourage individuals from choosing these legal or less harmful 
activities over the legal ones. 
 
4.9.1  Income is observable 
 
As such, the social planner would then desire the total level of activity where 
marginal social benefit is equal to marginal harm and individual surplus will be equal to 
zero. In this case, the optimal sanction will be to set the per unit fine equal to SF   which 
is equivalent to the marginal harm and a fixed sanction, Ai that is equivalent to the 
individual surplus which we denote by Si. We assume that individuals have the same 
tastes and they only differ with respect to wage. In this case, the optimal sanction is 
                                                 
25The surplus is simply given by ( )( )
( ) 1 1 0
iw L I
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26The specification of distributional preference on the part of the social planner is studied in the public 
economics literature. Our study in this respect is similar to Sharkey and Sibley (1993), Spence (1977), 
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nonlinear, 
 
 
S
iA F x+                       (4.25) 
 
where i iA S=  for each individual. This implies that everyone faces the same marginal 
fine SF  which is equivalent to marginal harm and a fixed sanction that depends on the 
preference and income of each individual. Assuming that individual characteristics are 
observable, the social planner can act like a perfectly discriminating monopolist and 
achieve the socially optimal aggregate level of x   and deny those who violate at the 
existing fine the surplus. An example of this sanction scheme is the day fine system. If 
we assume that individuals have the same preferences, then the surplus or the maximum 
willingness to pay is determined by income. 
 
4.9.2  Income is unobservable 
 
However, in some cases, individual demand or wage is unobservable or costly to 
observe27. Individuals can take actions to understate their assets and the social planner 
only has knowledge of the population distribution.  Hence, the social planner cannot 
distinguish the types. In some cases, the social planner may also be constrained to 
impose a uniform sanction. This may also be due to issues of fairness, prompting the 
                                                                                                                                               
and Cremer and Gahvari (2000). 
27
 This is similar to Polinsky (2006) who has considered the unobservability of income as reason for 
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policy that all individuals have to pay the uniform fine. Then the optimal sanction 
would still be to price the per unit equivalent to the marginal harm, SF  but the fixed 
fine should be set equivalent to the set of individuals with the lowest surplus. 
 
Let us assume for simplicity that there are just two types of individual violators, 
the low wage Lw  and the high wage earners Hw , where the proportion of high income 
is denoted by δ . The respective individuals will undertake, ( )( )L Sw L IL Fx βα β +∗ +=  and 
( )( )Hw L IH Fx βα β +∗ += . Since H Lw w>  then H Lx x∗ ∗>  and ( ) SH H HS F x w x F x∗ ∗= , −  
( ) SL L LS F x w x F x∗ ∗> = , − .  
 
In this case, the uniform sanction is given by a fine SF H=  that depends on the 
level of activity and a fixed sanction equivalent to the surplus of the low income 
individual ( L LA S= ). The high income individual enjoys a surplus. Then the sanction 
will be 
 
S
LA F x+                        (4.26) 
where L LA S= . Setting the fixed sanction above LA  will lead to aggregate level of x  
that is below the socially optimal. At this level, the low income individuals do not enjoy 
any surplus from paying the fine. On the other hand, the high income individuals now 
enjoy a positive surplus.  
 
On the other hand, the social planner can also choose to impose the fixed level 
                                                                                                                                               
imposing both a fine and a prison term. 
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of the sanction not in terms of a fixed monetary fine but with incarceration. 
 
St F x+                         (4.27) 
The question is how to set the length of incarceration t  such that the socially optimal 
aggregate level of x  is still achieved. The surplus can be expressed as the time it takes 
for an individual to earn it given his wage, 
 
i
i
w t S
S
t
w
=
=
                     (4.28) 
  
We first assume that the surplus for both groups is the same. Then the length of 
incarceration that will deprive the high income individual of his surplus will be lower 
than the low income group. To allow efficient violations, t  should be set equivalent to 
the length of time to capture the surplus of the higher income group which is lower. In 
this case, high income individuals will have zero surplus while low income individuals 
enjoy a positive surplus. The intuition behind this is that although they face the same 
length of incarceration, the sanction proves to be more costly for the high income group 
since their foregone income is higher. Thus, they actually pay a higher fixed cost. 
Hence, t  should be set at the lowest possible level in order to allow for efficient 
violations. This depends on the weight the social planner assigns to each group as well 
as the distribution of individuals. 
When individual income is unobservable, there is a tradeoff between finding the 
right incentives to encourage the optimally level of the sanction and capturing the 
surplus. There are different forms of nonlinear sanction in criminal and tort law. One of 
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the possible rationale behind this is finding the right balance between the two. Aside 
from the distributional preference of the social planner, this may also depend on the 
nature of the aggregate harm which, for simplicity, we assumed to be linear in the 
activity. 
Our analysis is similar to the price discrimination policy of a monopolist. In this 
case, the social planner has the monopoly of regulating or prohibiting the rights of 
individuals to perform a harmful activity. Most of the literature on law and economics 
posit that optimal sanctions should be based on the harm caused by the activity, not on 
the characteristics of the individual such as income and wealth. This shows that there 
might be a reason to set sanctions based on the characteristics of the individual if the 
objective is to capture the surplus of violators. This does not necessarily affect social 
welfare. It only affects the distribution of gains. However, since individuals are 
incapacitated or incarcerated, the surplus is actually not captured monetarily by the 
state. We have also ignored the costs of enforcing the social sanction and the shadow 
cost of implementing the distribution. 
 
4.11  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we took into consideration the role of the time constraint in the 
individual decision making process to explore the conditions under which a fine could 
be preferred over incarceration. We make the crucial distinction that the latter is 
denominated in time and, hence, the model of individual behavior should reflect the 
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relative scarcity of this resource. 
We first considered the case when individuals are heterogenous with respect to 
wealth and how different groups of individuals behave when the sanction is only either 
a fine or incarceration. We found that under a fines alone regime, the very wealthy may 
not be deterred by a uniform fine. In order to be deterred, fines should be an increasing 
function of wealth. Imposing incarceration, on the other hand, deters individuals who 
are very wealthy. In order to complete the picture, we then considered wage 
heterogeneity. We found that individuals whose wage is below a given threshold also 
cannot be deterred. The choice of whether to fine or to jail then becomes dependent on 
the proportion of the wealth and wage groups in the society apart from the usual 
consideration of the harm and enforcement costs. 
Our results show that when individuals are heterogenous, optimal fines are 
proportional to wealth. This scheme is similar to the day fine system extant in Europe. 
When it is not possible to impose discriminatory sanctions due to certain legal 
constraints that prohibit such discrimination on grounds of equity or in cases where 
wealth is unobservable, incarceration may be resorted to. However, we underscore that 
the channel of deterrence works through the law enforcer's control or restriction of the 
individual's use of time. Incarceration is a case of full incapacitation. On the other hand, 
there are other less costly ways of restricting the individual's time allocation. One such 
scheme is the driving penalty point system. 
Since incarceration acts as an incentive compatibility constraint for the very 
wealthy, this may be the reason why law enforcement agencies choose to criminalize 
acts that are correlated with this group. However, as discussed earlier, imprisonment is a 
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very costly sanction. As such, alternative forms of constraining time allocation should 
be explored. For instance, professional licenses may be suspended or revoked or subject 
the  individual to electronic monitoring, or probation.                                                                                       
It also points to the role of affirmative action as a complement to incarceration. 
As we have shown, an increase in wage and wealth will unambiguously lead to a 
decrease in prohibited activity. 
To sum up, although effective at deterring particular groups, incarceration 
proves to be a very costly sanction. Since the mechanism of time allocation restriction 
can be replicated in other schemes, society should first explore these said methods. 
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5   Social Stigma and Criminal Law 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The existence of social stigma as an additional sanction in criminal law is 
widely recognized in the literature on the cited subject. It is not clear, however, why 
criminal law has a stronger capacity to stigmatize certain behaviors or why individuals 
who are convicted of a crime suffer from stigma. 
The informal sanction28 that is referred to here is more general than economic 
stigma which is commonly treated in the literature, starting with the seminal article by 
Rasmusen (1996), as the difference between the wage levels of the unconvicted and 
convicted individuals (See also Funk, 2004). Folllowing Goffman's (1963) pioneering 
work, stigma stems from the alienation experienced by an offender. In particular, we 
define social stigma as an informal sanction, ranging from mere disapproval to the 
social ostracization of an individual by second parties for violating a particular social 
norm or for possessing an attribute that is devalued in a particular context and time (See 
Crocker, et al, 1998; Shoham and Rhav, 1982). Referring to social stigma as a sanction 
                                                 
28See also Faure and Escresa (forthcoming) for a more general discussion of social stigma as an informal 
sanction. 
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avoids the problem of arriving at a definition that is tautological. 
Although some argue that social stigma is distinguishes criminal penalties from 
other sanctions, it is also not always the case that every conviction is accompanied by it. 
Thus, some skepticism have been expressed towards the existence of stigma in the new 
sets of criminalized acts such as regulatory and economic offenses. At the same time, 
social stigma is also invoked by law enforcement agencies as a reason for criminalizing 
a particular offense. Stigma as a form of sanction has a very low, if not zero 
enforcement cost and, thus, has attracted the interests of law enforcement agencies keen 
on providing additional means of deterrence. This becomes more apparent in some 
jurisdictions where shaming sanctions are employed. However, there is potential danger 
as stigma imposes huge costs on the individual since its variance may be high. The 
individual may thus suffer from a sanction that is very low or very high and in the latter 
case, deemed to be too severe as a punsihment. 
What is needed therefore is an understanding of the social process of 
stigmatization that takes place under criminal law. We need to understand the 
conditions under which social stigma exists as an additional sanction. Once we have 
answered these questions, we can have a better understanding of the criminal justice 
system as it relates to social stigma. 
There are three issues that need to be addressed in studying the existence of 
social stigma as an additional sanction in criminal law. The first concerns an 
investigation of criminal law's institutional properties that enable it to inflict stigma. 
The literature on the subject is rich in suggesting ways by which criminal law's 
substantive and procedural issues relate to stigma. In fact, they attribute its existence to 
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these institutional properties. 
The second concerns the nature of the sanction. Formal sanctions imposed by 
courts and law enforcement agencies are typically based on the actual harm or damage 
inflicted on the victims and individual culpability. On the other hand, the metric of 
social stigma is largely determined through a social process. It is largely based on the 
extent of the individual’s deviation from the expected average conduct of a member of 
the group and the degree of difference that such attribute exhibits in relation to the 
average characteristics of the group. What is considered to be the average conduct or 
trait depends on social norms and the societal context that includes individual values 
and traits that are considered to be important. 
The third concerns the particular characteristics of the actors imposing the 
sanction. Unlike formal monetary sanctions, social stigma is imposed by a loose group 
of individuals who we conveniently call the rest of society. While the court is a 
specialized institution that discovers and assigns blame in a more rational and 
systematic manner, the rest of society lacks the time, capacity, and skills involved in 
arriving at such carefully made judgments by the court. Hence, courts arrive at a 
decision in a relatively more rationale and systematic manner compared to the rest of 
society. Apart from their decision-making, we also have to consider how individuals 
behave as a group in assigning the sanction. There is a burgeoning literature in 
behavioral law and economics devoted to understanding the mechanisms behind second 
and third party enforcement and their relationship with one another. The former refers 
to group or peer enforcement, usually through social norms, while the latter refers to 
state enforcement  through a legal rule. Social norms and the law are not unrelated and 
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there are circumstances when they reinforce each other or undermine the other. We 
draw on this literature to understand how criminal law affects social norms and 
illustrate their degree of complementarity and substitutability as sanctions29. Thus, an 
appreciation of how they behave as a group, how they acquire information, and how 
they arrive at decisions is crucial to our analysis. 
 
5.2  Criminal Law and Social Stigma 
 
In this section, we look at the substantive and procedural issues of criminal law 
and how legal theory as well as the literature on law and economics relate it with the 
existence of social stigma. While the legal theories of criminal law emphasize its 
educative and socializing function, the law and economics literature, on the other hand, 
looks at the deterrence aspect. 
 
5.2.1  Substantive Issues 
 
According to Hart (1958), "what distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction 
and all that distinguishes it, is the judgment of community condemnation which 
accompanies and justifies its imposition30." This captures succinctly what is echoed by 
                                                 
29
 To be sure, social norms and the ensuing stigma that arise from its violation depend a lot on the culture 
and it varies across space and time. Its particularization and the specific application is not within the 
scope of this study and is a fruitful agenda for future research. 
30Hart (1958). 
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many in the field regarding the stigmatizing aspect that is unique to criminal law31. 
Hence, a crime is defined as "conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will 
incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the 
community32." 
Aside from the monetary and non-monetary sanctions delivered by the court, 
there is an additional burden to the person criminally convicted who must also grapple 
with the way others perceive or treat him as a member of the society. While it is 
possible to ostracize an individual for certain wrongdoings, criminal law is an 
institution that somehow legitimizes the stoking of such negative sentiments towards an 
individual33. As conviction is the expression of the "community's hatred, fear, or 
contempt," it sends the message that after going through a trial, the individual is found 
to be morally culpable and blameworthy34.  
What is apparent in the definition is that it is the community that directly 
imposes the added sanction on the individual. The government can only influence it 
indirectly by identifying particular acts as criminal. This implies that in order to be 
binding, the community should first recognize the legitimacy of the criminal standard. 
Otherwise, if the community does not perceive the act to be wrong, and it is still within 
                                                 
31This may also be subject to debate as some tort scholars claim that civil sanctions also carry social 
stigma. 
32See Hart, op.cit. 
33
" On other hand, the sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any 
offense what a seal is to hot wax. It converts into a permanent final judgment what might otherwise be a 
transient sentiment... . In short, the infliction of punishment by law gives definite expression and a solemn 
ratification and justification to the hatred which is excited by the commission of the offence, and which 
constitutes the moral or popular as distinguished from the conscientious sanction of that part of morality 
which is also sanctioned by criminal law. The criminal law thus proceeds from the principle that it is 
morally right to hate criminals, and it confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals 
punishments which express it... ." -- James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 
1883 as cited in Dressler, Joshua, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law (1994) pp.28-29. 
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the bounds of acceptable behavior, then there would be no ensuing condemnation. 
This may be the reason why criminal law is legislated and not judge-made. The 
legislature, composed of the citizen's elected representatives, offers a suitable forum for 
dialogue and consensus-building in modern democratic societies. When the government 
criminalizes a certain act, however, it does not necessarily follow that the act will carry 
with it the moral indignation of society, and will be automatically considered as 
wrongful. A distinction is thus made between acts that are inherently wrong or malum 
in se and acts that only became wrong because the government criminalized it or malum 
prohibitum. Courts and legal scholars, however, have difficulties using these 
classifications35 
The cited classifications are also not rigidly maintained throughout history. 
There are a number acts considered to be merely malum prohibitum that over time, 
became malum in se. Larceny, for instance, slowly expanded in scope from an offense 
against possession to an offense against property from the feudal times onwards as the 
system of ownership became more sophisticated with the rise of the property-owning 
classes36. When embezzlement was enacted as a statute in 1799, the boundaries of what 
can be considered as wrongful behavior by an agent towards his principal was less clear 
as it is nowadays (Tigar, 1984). 
Over time, the contours of moral responsibility became clear alongside legal 
responsibility. A detailed illustration of the historical process,  determination of the 
                                                                                                                                               
34Lafave, Wayne and Austin Scott. Criminal Law 2nd ed. 
35Ibid., pp.32-34. 
36See Tigar (1984). Possession is based on reciprocal duties and obligations inherent in concepts of fealty 
and vassalage during feudalism. Property is the ownership of an object and connotes rights and usage. 
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factors behind the cited development, and an explanation of the crucial role of 
criminalization is beyond the scope of our study. What seems certain, however, is that 
once an act has become malum in se, the standard had been most likely internalized by 
a majority of the population and the cost of enforcement for a given level of activity 
could be potentially lowered. 
A certain act does not have to be considered morally wrong in order to be 
internalized as a social norm. Conversely, it seems that such is one way that society 
defines its norms, with criminal law serving as the medium for internalizing such 
notions. The moral dimension pervades the language and substantive concepts of 
criminal law, rendering it difficult to deny that the said branch of law leans towards this 
direction. To cite, criminal law consists of prohibitions meant as guides to behavior37. 
With regards to efficiency, the next question that begs to be asked is why an act 
should be prohibited based on concerns of morality, or why it is important to label an 
act as morally wrong? Admittedly, this merits another separate discussion but for our 
purposes, moral acts may be defined as the minimum standards of behavior that is 
observed and expected from a member of a group to maintain the stability of the group 
or community38. Refraining from murdering, raping, and stealing are the minimum 
standards of behavior that are observed and expected in civilized societies. Extreme 
cases of medical malpractice, for instance, can be prosecuted under criminal law 
                                                 
37Coleman, op. cit. As opposed to tort that is involved with allowing a behavior as long as the individual 
pays all the cost of his action. 
38This definition comes from an evolutionary perspective of morality. Alexander (1985) for instance, 
defined morality as rules that stems from the "logical outgrowth or extension of the practice of social 
reciprocity by a complexly social organism which changes as a result of both genetic evolution and 
cumulative social learning." 
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because it goes against the grain of medical practicioners’ professional commitment39. 
The substantive concepts also point to other roles that criminal law plays in 
society which is not limited to sanctioning or pricing behavior. According to Coffee 
(1991), criminal law operates as "a system of moral education and socialization," 
distinguishing it from other branches of law. It is a system for communicating society's 
moral values, consistent with Hart's view that people obey it not so much because of the 
legal threats that come as a consequence of its violation but because people consider it 
worthy of compliance. 
Robinson cited two ways through which society defines its social norms. First, 
every criminal adjudication and legislative debate provides an opportunity to confirm, 
refine, or change a particular norm. Second, the passage of a criminal legislation 
ensures that a critical level of support had been achieved for the emergent norm 
(Robinson, 1996). 
The first instance aids in the acquisition of information and the learning of 
individuals within the community. In a situation where society's moral values are 
changing because of rapidly changing conditions, criminal law can facilitate the process 
of achieving an equilibrium situation where moral values are appropriately suited to 
changing needs. It is within the range of these indeterminate cases that criminalization 
can provide clarity as to which acts can be considered morally reprehensible in the 
context of changing situations. 
                                                 
39See for instance Bosk (2003) on how the medical profession regulates members of their community 
through social norms. He shows how certain diagnostic and patient managerial procedures serve as 
occupational rituals to validate and perpetuate rules of behavior in the community. See also Greaney 
(2008) for a discussion of why physician behavior may contradict economic predictions. 
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There are certain constraints that should be observed when using criminal law as 
such. As pointed out in Parisi and von Wangenheim (2006) and then later, Carbonara, 
Parisi and von Wangenheim (2008), the law can have countervailing effects -- the so-
called compliance paradox when it is at odds with social norms. The implication is that 
legal innovation needs to proceed in incremental steps. We observe it happening also in 
criminal law as most cases of acts recently criminalized used to be and still can be sued 
under tort law. According to Coffee (1991), society first experiments with a certain 
standard under tort before it is prohibited in criminal law and, therefore, if there is a 
blurring distinction between these two bodies, it is but a natural, if not healthy process. 
We can consider morality as a subset of the general set of social norms. In the 
case of criminal law, however, one of the main reasons why it is obeyed, at the risk of 
being redundant, is that it conveys the shifting standards of society's morality (Coffee). 
Dau-Schmidt (1990) claims that a more appropriate channel by which criminal 
law affects individual behavior is the shaping of preferences. Society can choose to 
shape either individual opportunities or preferences, depending on the costs and benefits 
of tackling both. Criminal law belongs to the latter institutional technology as evinced 
by the substantive issues and structure of the criminal justice system. 
According to Dau-Schmidt, this becomes apparent when the following 
characteristics are considered. First, the language of criminal law speaks directly to the 
individual. The focus on intent and premeditation is a clear indication that it serves as a 
warning for individuals who want to violate social norms. Second, imprisonment and 
fines are incommensurate and should not be considered perfect substitutes for each 
other. While the role of imprisonment in the usual analysis is reserved for judgment 
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proof individuals, Dau-Schmidt claims that society places a higher stigma on 
incarceration. This implies that it could be imposed against more serious offenders even 
if there is no limit to their solvency. The additional cost of doing so is what the society 
is willing to pay to shape social norms40. Third, criminal punishment varies in amount 
and form depending on the characteristics of the individual, unlike in tort where the 
traits of the tortfeasor do not play a role in the determination of the damage. According 
to this view, only by looking at these other functions can the substantive issues and 
other elements of criminal law be explained -- including the greater role of intent or 
mens rea, the punishment of attempt, the secondary role of actual harm and irrelevance 
of compensation, and the proof of guilt as a prerequisite for conviction. 
According to Robinson (1996), a number of defenses allowed under criminal 
law can also be explained by the role of stigma and its relationship with social norm 
formation. The de minimis defense allows an individual to be acquitted even if the harm 
has been proven as long as it is too trivial to deserve the criminal label. On the other 
hand, if the act is sued under tort, damages should be paid no matter how small. It 
appears that courts are conscious of the huge discontinuous jump in stigma associated 
with criminal conviction that is absent in civil law. Another is that while the defense of 
consent is allowed under tort law, it is not considered under criminal law. The rationale 
is that a norm has been violated regardless of its voluntary nature41. 
                                                 
40We should also note that Shavell (2003) claimed that there is a cost to imposing guilt on an individual 
but refrained from elaborating how. We argue that one way society does this is by using criminal law. 
41This argument is compatible with Calabresi and Melamed's need for the maintenance of society's 
transaction structure but appears inconsistent with Posner's market bypassing theory for the existence of 
the criminal law. In this case, consent qualifies as a voluntary exchange and should not be prohibited. 
Some examples that come to mind are the so-called "victimless crimes" such as gambling and 
prostitution. 
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It could also explain why some acts, albeit petty like certain traffic violations, 
are considered  criminal. Certain acts are also designated as criminal but remain 
unpunished or rarely penalized such as sodomy and adultery. The police do not 
preoccupy themselves with investigating the commission of the cited acts. While the 
latter clearly lacks moral culpability or blameworthiness, and the former does not 
appear to serve some efficiency goal except to violate morality, the objective behind 
criminalizing appears to be influencing social norms and taking advantage of criminal 
law's socializing forces to achieve deterrence. 
To summarize, the stigmatizing sanction of criminal law is imposed directly by 
the community. As such, the magnitude may be subjective and arbitrary. Criminal 
procedure is distinct from tort and, as will be discussed below, appears to be especially 
designed to hold the inherent arbitrariness in check. 
 
5.2.2  Procedural issues 
 
Criminal law is distinguished by its more stringent procedural rules. At every 
step of the criminal proceeding, a number of evidentiary tests must be satisfied, the non-
fulfillment of which could either stall a particular phase or terminate the whole 
procedure altogether. There are rules regarding investigation, the arrest of a suspect, the 
filing of charges, the trial, conviction, sentencing, and even correctional treatment. To 
illustrate, in common law countries, for an arrest to be justified, probable cause should 
first be established; bringing a case to trial requires the magistrate’s review, a 
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preliminary hearing, or grand jury screening. The suspect also enjoys certain rights such 
as the right to counsel during trial and some pretrial stages, the right to trial by jury, and 
the beyond reasonable doubt standard for criminal conviction (Dressler, 1994). Most of 
these rules are constitutionalized42. 
As the procedure progresses with the tests satisfied, the defendant's degree of 
guilt becomes progressively established (Lafave, 1986). The trial ends with a conviction 
only if the the prosecution manages to establish an accused person’s guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt. Criminal proceedings are structured in such a way that once a case 
enters the trial stage, the chances of conviction become higher. 
Why is criminal law riddled with these evidentiary tests and stringent criminal 
procedures that seem to favor the defendant? A liberalist explanation is that it is ther in 
order to guarantee the protection of the individual’s rights against the potential abuses 
by the state.43 Without these procedures, the individual appears powerless as the state 
has at its disposal its whole machinery that it can mobilize to start an investigation up to 
the trial stage. 
Another explanation is offered from a law and economic perspective, the answer 
is that, since criminal law offers punitive sanction, such procedures ensure that no 
costly mistakes are made. There are two types of errors that can be committed -- 
convicting someone who is actually innocent or acquitting who is, in fact, guilty. In 
statistical terms, the former is referred to as a Type I error while the latter, a Type II 
                                                 
42See Stuntz (1996). In the US, the search for evidence, the interrogation of suspects, or make arrests law 
that governs is the Fourth or Fifteenth Amendments, Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments, provision of 
counsel is in the Sixth Amendment. Plea bargains are also regulated by constitution. Jury selection is also 
in the Sixth Amendment. 
43
 See also discussion on Chapter 1, Section 3. 
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error. The minimization of one increases the likelihood of the other. Posner (1985) 
posited that society places a higher value on reducing Type I errors (See also Posner, 
1999). From the point of view of substantive justice, this makes a lot of sense. From the 
point of view of setting up additional deterrence measures, however, society should be 
interested in reducing both types of errors as this would lead to greater accuracy 
(Garoupa and Rizzoli, 2007). 
If we consider the stigmatizing capacity of criminal law as a way to influence 
individual behavior and shape social norms, then there may be another reason, one that 
is consistent with providing additional deterrence, for the adherence to strict procedures. 
In US Supreme Court re Winship (1970)397 US35844 
 
 "The reasonable doubt standard... is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at 
stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility he may lose his 
liberty upon conviction and because the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction."  
 
The Court went on to add, 
 
 "Moreover, use of the reasonable standard is indispensable to command the 
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is 
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critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that 
leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned."  
 
This implies that procedural rules serve to protect the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system in the eyes of the people, which as pointed out earlier, is necessary for 
stigma to operate. By ensuring that only the guilty are convicted, the pool of criminals 
continue to consist of only the most culpable wrongdoers. This makes the criminal 
justice system more effective in fulfilling its educative and socializing role. The same 
concern is implicitly expressed in Robinson (1997), Coffee (1991), and Hurd (1996) 
over the expansion of criminal law without regard for its moralizing function45. 
In a situation where the standard for moral blameworthiness becomes 
ambiguous due to rapidly changing social conditions, criminal law can provide the 
necessary clarity. 
The step-wise fashion, characterized by strict tests to guide the process of the 
criminal proceeding may also function to check the arbitrariness of social stigma. The 
stigma does not necessarily start with the conviction but may already begin with mere 
supicion or investigation. The announcement that a person is being investigated already 
sends a message to the community that the individual is suspected of committing a 
crime. 
In common law countries, the accused under criminal law is also entitled to trial 
                                                                                                                                               
44As cited in Lafave, op cit. 
45Coffee (1991) calls it overcriminalization. "The excessive reliance on the criminal sanction, particularly 
with respect to behavior that is not inherently morally culpable." p.197. 
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by jury, ideally constituted by a fair cross-section of society. The defendant is given the 
choice between "the common sense judgment of the jury and the learned, calculating 
but less sympathetic reactions of the judge (Dressler, 1994)". In theory, even if the 
prosecution has met the required standard of proof, the jury could still acquit the 
defendant based on "some belief, some observation, some value or some other notion of 
that jury46." 
The issue of jury nullification, on one hand, seems confounding when viewed 
from a justice and efficiency perspective. On the other hand, if we look at it through the 
lens of stigma and socialization, it seems fitting that the community, either through their 
representatives in the legislature or the jury, can both define acts as crimes and choose 
not to enforce criminal sanctions. Stigma is a very subjective sanction the magnitude of 
which may be hard to quantify or predict. Jury nullification appears to be an appropriate 
check to the unpredictability of the effects of social stigma. As individuals going on 
about their daily lives, summoned to fulfill a duty to the community, members of the 
jury are better positioned to gauge the public sentiment. 
Another possible rationale of jury nullification involves the evolution of social 
norms. There are times when laws have become archaic or inefficient, with the 
legislature failing to adapt to certain changes in society. In place of such outdated laws, 
applying emergent or prevailing social norms have become more appropriate. In these 
situations, jury nullification serves a positive role as seen in the case of racial laws in 
the US. 
                                                 
46Dressler, 1994. "Can jury violate or overturn the law? After advising on the law, the burden of proof, 
the duties of responsible citizen, in the end, he can do whatever he pleases. Juries are not required to 
follow the law but their most important function is not to follow the law and the judge tells them this." 
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5.2.3  Summary 
 
Most of the traditional legal theory of criminal law explain that social stigma 
arises from its institutional properties. Its objectives underscore the shaping of social 
norms and not merely the pricing of behavior. The substantive scope of criminal law 
illustrates that the said branch of law is traditionally restricted to acts which society 
considers as morally reprehensible. The strength of social stigma relies on the 
community’s recognition of criminal law as an institution that reflects their moral 
values. Moreover, criminal law's strict procedural rules exist not only to protect the 
accused from judicial errors. They also serve to protect and regulate the force of social 
stigma that accompanies a conviction. In a situation where the standards for 
determining morally wrong conducts become ambiguous, the high standard of proof 
required to secure a criminal conviction ensures that only the most morally culpable 
individuals are convicted. When viewed this way, social stigma in criminal law and its 
ability to shape social norms depend partly on its procedural rules. This suggests an 
additional economic rationale for the stringent procedural rules of criminal law aside 
from avoiding costly mistakes. 
While literature on legal theory has served to illuminate how criminal law's 
substantive and procedural aspects give rise to social stigma, the whole picture, 
however, is far from complete. If we extend the analogy, the literature seems to suggest 
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that when an act is criminalized, any conviction for committing the said act will 
automatically result in stigmatization. This may not always be the case. We argue that 
what is lacking is an account of how the actors imposing the sanction behave 
strategically. This is appropriately addressed by the literature on law and economics, 
usually through game theoretic tools. 
 
5.3  Social Stigma: Perspectives from Law and 
Economics 
 
The seminal paper on stigma is written by Rasmussen (1996) whose main 
concern is to arrive at an economic measure of stigma as well as to provide a theoretical 
basis for its existence given that some studies are skeptical of its existence. In the moral 
hazard problem, a criminal possesses an unobserved characteristic, a lower marginal 
productivity of labor than the non-criminal. This particular trait, which is important for 
the employer, only becomes observable when he is convicted. A crime becomes more 
tempting for the individual when the difference between the wage of the convicted and 
the average wage of the non-convicted population is small. Thus, in order for stigma to 
be high, it is necessary that only individuals with low marginal productivity are 
convicted of a crime. In the adverse selection case, the incentive to commit a crime 
becomes dependent on the proportion of the criminal type to the population. The game 
theoretic tools allowed Rasmusen to predict the strategic behavior of group of 
individuals based solely on the assumption that individuals are acting on their own 
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private interests, without going into moral considerations.  
Applying the same game theoretic tools within the context of social norms and 
social relationships, Cooter (1999), and Cooter and Feldman (2008) showed how the 
law can coordinate expectations among individuals in order to reach a low crime 
equilibrium. Punishment communicates moral indignation on the regulated behavior 
and commitment that the court will uphold the law. This coordinates the expectations 
among individuals. As more individuals become morally committed to uphold the law, 
the building up of trust raises the gains from cooperation and this this results in a low 
crime equilibrium. In contrast to Rasmussen, Cooter is concerned with social stigma. 
He has identified the perceived violation of a group’s social norms when a law is 
violated as the reason behind the imposition of the social sanction. Thus, the low crime 
equilibrium described depends to a large extent on how law coincides with social 
norms. However, there are circumstances when the law does not coinicide or is opposed 
to social norms. What happens is that aside from the absence of condemnation, it may 
even have countervailing effects and lead to lower compliance (Carbonara, Parisi and 
von Wangenheim (2008). 
Stigma also arises out of the individual’s concern for their social status. Arbak, 
2005 showed that an increase in crime lowers the stigma of being convicted. In this 
case, an increase in the amount of the punishment will not always lead to additional 
deterrence. Further, when concern for social status depends only on a within-group 
setting and intragroup social status is deemed immaterial, the said concern may increase 
crime. 
According to Galbiati and Garoupa (2007), moerover, the higher standard of 
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proof in criminal law plays an important role in fostering stigma. This is because 
criminal conviction conveys more reliable information to the rest of the society about a 
person's guilt than a finding of liability in civil law. As such, stigma is higher in the 
former. Another study that is similar to this approach was conducted by Hylton (2005). 
His study looks at the function of criminal law doctrines such as intent and explains its 
economic rationale in order to establish a criteria to determine the scope of crime and 
tort. 
The studies mentioned have taken a signaling and moral hazard approach to 
criminal law and successfully illustrated how criminal law may be instrumental in 
attaining a desired equilibrium. Mostly using game theory in describing the strategic 
interaction of individuals in attaining equilibrium47, the cited studies were able to show 
how social stigma could be conceived as a real sanction and identify the conditions 
where it applies. In contrast, traditional legal theory tends to subscribe to a static view 
of social stigma. Its overemphasis on moral issues renders it inadequate to address the 
issue of determining which acts should be criminalized in order to improve social 
welfare (See Coffee, 1991)48. 
However, most of the law and economics literature is concerned with the role of 
stigma in economic relationships where a criminal conviction sends a signal concerning 
a person’s unobserved trait that is considered important in an economic transaction. For 
instance, in Rasmusen’s study, the cited attribute concerns the individual's marginal 
productivity. On the other hand, social stigma is based on a general measure of the 
extent that the individual deviated from the average expected behavior of the 
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community or how far his attribute deviated from the average trait of the group. These 
issues will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
5.4  Social Norms and Criminal Law 
 
Social norms can also be perceived as the average behavior that the group or 
community expects from its members. As social stigma is imposed on the individual 
who violates such norms, we need to have an understanding of the relationship between 
social norms and criminal law, particularly their complementarity and substitutability as 
sanctions. 
There are many reasons cited in the literature on why people obey social norms. 
We provide a classification based on the source of the motivation and, likewise, on the 
group imposing the sanction. 
 
5.4.1  Intrinsic or Personal Motivation 
 
According to this strand of literature, individuals obey a particular social norm 
because they feel particularly good about themselves when they follow a certain social 
convention and feel bad when they violate such convention. The representative 
proponent is Frey (2000). Since it is the individual who polices himself, it is sometimes 
                                                                                                                                               
47
 See for instance Gibbons (1992) for a discussion of game theoric applications. 
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classified as first party enforcement. 
Other social sciences recognize the existence of this motivation, particularly in 
sociology and psychology which question the economic representation of man, the 
homo economicus. Economists, on the other hand, have exhibited guarded skepticism, 
as the cited motivation readily appears inconsistent with the assumptions of individual 
rationality (Stigler, 1984). 
Personal motivation, however, could explain some empirical puzzles that could 
not be adequately explained by the earlier standard classical theory of incentives that 
only consider monetary rewards in the utility of the individual. Among them are the 
blood donation experiment (Mellström and Johannesson, 2008), the kindergarten 
experiment (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000), and election voting (Jones and Hudson, 
2000). In these cases, when a price was introduced to a voluntary activity, a decrease in 
the level of the activity was observed. In the labor market, moreover, data indicates that 
pay is weakly related to individual performance (Schwab and Olson, 1990). Increasing 
the price of labor does not necessarily lead to an increase in the supply. 
The process detailing how prices crowd out the intrinsic motivation of 
individuals explains this phenomenon (Frey and Jegen, 2001). There are actually two 
factors at work when increasing the price of an activity: the relative price effect that 
tells us that individuals will supply more a good with a price increase and the so-called 
crowding-out effect which leads to the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation by the 
monetary benefit, resulting in a net decrease in the supply of a good. In most cases, the 
relative price effect is the only factor at work. There are cases, however, where the latter 
                                                                                                                                               
48
 See also discussion on Chapter 2. 
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may be huge and we observe a backward bending supply curve. 
There are a number of situations where this is more apparent such as when an 
altruistic activity starts to be priced from zero to a relatively small amount (Gneezy and 
Rustichini). In order to avoid this from happening, prices should be set at a very high 
level when introducing the pricing of individual behavior. Frey, on the other hand, 
identified the important role of moral suasion. The backward bending supply is more 
observable when individual self-determination is reduced and the "locus of control" 
over a particular action "shifts from inside to (the) outside of the person." In other 
words, this occurs when circumstances diminish the individual's opportunity to do 
things voluntarily where they are merely pushed into doing things. 
Cooter also recognized the role of intrinsic or personal motivation and 
recognized that individuals feel good when they follow a social norm. McAdams (1997) 
refers to it as esteem. Sunstein (1996) calls it self-conception. When this happens, the 
individual is said to have internalized the norm. According to Cooter, most people obey 
and follow the law not because of the threat of material sanctions but because they have 
internalized the same values espoused by the law. For Cooter, the government can enact 
a law and it will still be observed and followed even without enforcement by virtue of 
its expressive effect. Sunstein agrees and observes that there is nearly always a social 
norm for every behavior and people observe it because they have an idea of who they 
are and they try to behave according to this conception. Otherwise, a person will 
experience a range of negative feelings from embarrassment to shame. 
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5.4.2  Desire for esteem 
 
According to McAdams, people obey social norms because people like to be 
accorded esteem. Individuals care about how others perceive them and how others 
evaluate them. According to McAdams, there are three conditions for esteem-based 
norms to exist: consensus, detection, and publicity. First, there should be a consenus 
within the population regarding the esteem worthiness of a particular behavior. This 
could exist when there are venues for group discussion and exit. Second, there should 
also be a means to detect a violation and the person who commits such violation in 
order to impose the good or bad reputational benefit. Third, the information should be 
well known within the relevant population. All three conditions pertain to the crucial 
role of information with respect to the announcement of the norm, monitoring, and 
enforcement. 
For McAdams, the granting of esteem by communicating approval has no cost 
and is often pleasurable on the part of the giver. For Cooter, however, upholding a norm 
involves certain costs. Whenever an individual decides to commit to a norm and 
enforces his obligation, he incurs certain costs in terms of lost time, effort, or the 
monetary equivalent of the lost opportunity had he decided to violate it. Norm 
internalization is not a costless process too. 
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5.4.3  Focal point to coordinate behavior 
 
According to Cooter, the net cost to an individual following a norm depends on 
the proportion of the people observing or violating it. When there is a small proportion 
of violators, the expected payoff of a norm violator is relatively higher than that of the 
norm follower. This being the case, more people will be encouraged to violate the norm 
-- increasing the proportion of violators accompanied by a decrease in the expected 
payoff. This will continue until it reaches a point where the individual becomes 
indifferent to following or violating a norm. 
However, it is unclear why a norm should depend on the proportion of people 
following it. One plausible reason is that a norm exhibits network externalities. As the 
number of people following the norm increases, the net benefit from following a norm 
increases. In this context, a norm serves as a focal point to coordinate people's 
expectations and behavior (See McAdams, 2000). 
Economics usually makes a distinction between private and externalized cost 
and benefit and assume that the individual only considers the former when making 
decisions. When society finds it difficult to exclude individuals from the enjoyment of a 
public good, self-interested individuals will free ride. Experimental evidence, however, 
shows that people tend to cooperate and refuse to free ride far more than the economists 
have expected (Cooter). People appear to have an awareness of the increasing benefits 
of cooperation and, hence, create informal rules that become norms that are enforced by 
117 
 
members of the group. 
As norms further exhibit network externalities, implying that the value derived 
from the act increases as the number of people observing it increases, the incentives for 
norm creation and observance increases 49. A bandwagon effect is observed until such a 
point where the norm becomes the standard and obeying it merely becomes a matter of 
custom and path dependence. 
 
5.4.4  Monetary Incentives 
 
Another reason why people obey norms is the associated formal monetary 
punishment in cases where a norm coincides with the law. In such cases, the 
punishment is meted out by the state. Individuals refrain from pursuing an activity 
because they face a monetary cost that is greater than the benefit. 
 
5.5  Criminal law and the signaling of individual 
attributes 
 
More than serving as a focal point, Sunstein argues that norms provide a system 
or a code to interpret the wrongness or goodness of a particular individual behavior. 
                                                 
49The process is similar to the concept of tipping-point first espoused by Schelling (1978). 
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Individuals play specific roles in society. People form expectations on how they should 
and ought to behave based on their respective roles. A doctor, for instance, has sworn to 
save lives and protect the health of his patients. Society, therefore, expects him to 
perform the said role. Similarly, bankers and financial advisors are expected to take care 
of the wealth and assets of their clients. Social norms, as behavior and rules of conduct 
that is followed by the majority, are therefore very role-specific. 
Individuals desire to live up to such expectations and build their reputations 
around them. They want to show that they perform their roles well and that they are 
committed to their obligations and responsibilities. A person’s desire could be driven by 
a host of factors such as enjoying the good opinion of others for its own sake or because 
their present and future transactions, income or wealth depend on it. 
Posner (1998) argues that the main reason why individuals obey social norms 
could be attributed to the desire to signal their individual type. His theory is an 
application of the asymmetric information problem in economics. A person would want 
to convey this information to society by performing observable acts, such as complying 
with a norm to signal their type. Building a good reputation results in higher future 
income, as employers prefer hiring a good type. However, signaling would only be 
valuable to the high type individual and the employer if the low type could not afford it. 
Cooter underscores the need for both coercion and expression. Our point is that 
criminal law appears to address the complex dynamics between these two, which will 
be expounded in the next sections. 
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5.6  Process of Norm Change 
 
Ellickson describes the process of norm change and provides a typology of norm 
agents. First, an exogenous shock occurs that changes the costs and benefits derived 
from following a certain norm. This can be due to new technological conditions. 
Individuals, called change agents, whose income or wealth are most affected by the 
shock have the right incentives to offer a competing norm to challenge the old way of 
doing things. Other individuals might also offer other competing norms. Individuals 
who also enjoy a tangible benefit and who possess technical skills and knowledge 
regarding the norm could best gauge the efficiency or the suitability of the emergent 
norm. Called norm entrepreneurs, their choice is decisive because their choice is 
communicated to the public, and provides a clue to the welfare enhancing capacity of 
the norm. This is partly because they have broader interests and, hence, regarded as 
more credible than the change agents. Then, Ellickson cited the role of opinion makers, 
who have a wider interest and more general knowledge that could further sway the tide 
towards the adoption or non-adoption of a norm. 
This process, according to Ellickson is not linear and could best be described as 
a cascade. A new norm emerges slowly and as the proportion of people following it 
increases; the momentum of the adoption also increases and reaches a "triumphant 
rush." This process is similar to the biological system, borrowing heavily from concepts 
120 
 
in evolutionary biology, population dynamics, game theory, and the economics of 
information. 
There are two sources of the norm cascade: one is informational and the other is 
reputational. According to Ellickson, it is optimal for an individual, after observing the 
actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual 
without regard for the information itself. However, blindly following what the person 
sitting next to you seems hardly optimal. The implicit assumption it seems is the 
existence of bounded rationality on the part of the individual. He has no way to 
determine whether others have followed the social norm or whether he is perfectly 
rational. He would instead be tallying and calculating the probabilities given the data 
that he has. However, since he faces computational limitations when making a decision, 
as he cannot compute his utility for each expected contingency (See for instance, 
Kahneman, 2003 and Simon 1991), he relies on heuristics, such as observing what 
others do as a convenient approximation of the real population statistic. 
The other source of the cascade works as the violator of the social norm 
provides a way to impose liability on the individual for the cost that he has externalized, 
which could be explained by traditional economic theory. 
 
5.7  Social Norms and the Role of Information 
 
When legislators criminalize a certain act, they usually engage the public in a 
discourse that makes them aware that a certain act has extremely harmful consequences 
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to society, making it fitting for society to spend resources to prohibit it. The 
establishment of a relationship between the act and the harm, whether intentional or not, 
changes the perception of society with regards to the act and the actor. Sometimes, the 
intent to stigmatize a particular behavior is explicitly stated as one of the intended 
objectives of legislation. When stigmatization is successful, an additional source of 
sanction, one that is non-monetary in nature, and relies on the rest of society for its 
enforcement, is evoked. 
The first concerns the fact that most social norms are not written. This being the 
case, the next questions that we ask ourselves are the following. How do people learn of 
its existence? How is it announced? How does this information spread across society? 
In the previous section, the process of norm change was described and individuals learn 
of an emergent norm by observing the acts of others. As more people observe the rule, 
the more likely the individual perceives it to be a norm. 
Even when a norm is written, as in the case where it coincides with a formal 
legal rule promulgated by the state or other organizations, it is still not easy to define 
what actually constitutes the prohibited act. The social norm and the law may not even 
coincide perfectly. Both could even contradict each other. Consider the case of killing a 
person, which is punishable by law and also carries a social stigma. The act generally 
carries both types of sanctions. However, there are certain conditions where one or the 
other may be absent. For instance, when killing another is undertaken as a means of 
defending oneself, the accused may be exempted from both sanctions. If the act was 
carried for the purpose of achieving a group's objective, for which the court finds the 
perpetrator guilty, the group may still confer honor to the act and the actor instead of 
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stigma. 
We should note that there are two sources of informational ambiguity with 
respect to defining and identifying a social norm. The first concerns the announcement -
- the process which makes people aware of the elements constituting an act that is 
sanctionable under the norm, given that such norm is informal and unwritten. Unlike a 
formal law, it appears that mere announcement of the norm is already a process that 
needs to be identified. The second involves communicating that a particular act has 
been considered wrongful by the sanctioning community. A picture of how this 
particular information is transmitted to individuals should also be provided and the 
channels of transmission identified. 
Another source of ambiguity lies in the nature of the social sanctions. If it is 
imposed by society and if it is non-monetary in nature, what unit can be used to 
measure it and if there is no such unit, what are the standards that could be used to 
approximate it?. Can it be monetized or is the subjective feeling one derives from 
violating the norm, including embarrassment, shame, and dispute, sufficient? (Sunstein, 
1996). 
 
5.7.1  Criminal Law and the regulation of social meaning 
 
Lessig (1995) posited that law affects social norms mainly by regulating their 
meaning. Social meaning is a semiotic resource that can guide or constrain individual 
behavior. It can be constructed. History provides a wealth of cases where the 
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government or other groups have used such regulation to pursue a certain objective. In 
eighteenth century England, for instance, criminal penalties were meted out to people 
who dress in a manner that does not correspond to their designated class. By associating 
the mode of dressing to a negative concept like crime, the former act elicited stigma 
during that particular period. 
While one method directly involves changing the social meaning of an act, the 
other works indirectly through a change in the frequency in which an act is observed. 
Semiotic technique proceeds by changing the social meaning of an act directly by 
"tying" it to or associating it with another act or institution that possesses the intended 
social meaning. The previous example works this way. Criminal acts carry stigma and 
tying improper dressing to crime makes the said act subject to stigmatization. 
Ambiguation, on the other hand, provides a second meaning to an act that would 
undermine its original conception. While tying aims to clarify the definition of an act, 
the latter method intends to blur its present social meaning. 
Behavioral technique changes social meaning indirectly by changing the 
frequency by which a particular act is observed. In the process, this technique changes 
expectations and meaning attributed to an act. Inducing certain behaviors over time will 
eventually affect these meanings. A law that inhibits an individual from performing an 
act that will result in the construction or reinforcement of a social meaning alters 
expectations and, hence, achieves deterrence. The other technique works, in contrast, by 
encouraging the ritualistic performance of an act in order to change social meaning. 
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5.8  Criminal law and social norms: Towards a synthesis 
 
In the previous sections, we considered criminal law as an institution that has the 
capacity to stigmatize certain behaviors and identified the institutional properties that 
enable it to do so. We are now poised to synthesize this with our understanding of 
individual behavior and social norms and show how this branch of law invokes the 
additional sanction of stigma and harnesses social norm. We argue that criminal law 
influences social stigma, to the extent that such is based on the deviation from the 
average behavior or trait, by determining the social distance of the act from what 
society considers as the average behavior. 
 
5.8.1  Punishment 
 
One of our propositions is that punishment under criminal law is suited to avoid 
the crowding out of personal or intrinsic motivation. Although personal motivation is 
commonly studied in the literature within the context of conferring honor and 
encouraging voluntary and prosocial activities, such as blood donation and voting 
during elections, the same mechanism applies when directing shame towards antisocial 
activities. Transposing the analogy to criminal law, most people do not commit a 
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criminal act because they want to avoid high monetary fines or imprisonment. The law 
had been internalized. 
Although these factors affect their decision-making, most individuals do not 
commit an offense because they have internalized the norm of not performing a 
criminal act. Hence, the state does not need to spend too much resources to enforce 
sanctions on the crime of murder because the norm of refraining from killing another 
person has been internalized. 
However, criminalizing a certain act that is not perceived negatively within 
certain groups could stoke intrinsic motivation and lead to more commission of acts of 
such nature instead of leading to a decrease in their occurrence. This is what happened 
when proposals for the criminalization of file sharing through the Internet surfaced 
during the 1990s (See for instance, Depoorter, et al, 2005; Feldman and Nadler, 2006). 
The number of file downloads performed using non-authorized mediums increased 
during this period. Prior to the said proposal, a norm of sharing has already developed 
among internet users who regard the free exchange of digital music and software as an 
altruistic and communitarian practice. If criminal penalties are low, then the personal 
motivation for performing the act could crowd out the prevailing price effect and, 
hence, lead to the backfiring of monetary incentives. Gneezy and Rusticchini (2000b) 
attributed the increase in late pickups of children by their parents when a meager fine 
was imposed to sanction their tardiness. Criminal law avoids this by imposing a very 
high fine, coupled with the possibility of imprisonment, intended to punish the offender. 
This would ensure that when criminalizing a certain act, the backfiring of incentives -- 
associated with low fines in a situation where personal or intrinsic motivation is already 
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at play -- would not occur. 
 
5.8.2  Inducing Norm Cascade 
 
With regards to the origin and evolution of social norms, a punitive sanction 
ensures that change agents, individuals who have a direct monetary benefit in changing 
or maintaining a certain social norm, would be deterred from performing the act. 
Change agents have a crucial role to play in norm cascades. To the extent that social 
norms are observed largely because a sizeable proportion of the population also 
observes it, the higher the population ratio that observes it, the more likely it is selected 
as to prevail as a norm to regulate a certain behavior. However, in order for a new norm 
to emerge, there should be a number of individuals who are willing to commit to it and 
enforce it. They are called norm entrepreneurs. The commitment to and the enforcement 
of a norm is not costless.Meanwhile, change agents -- persons who enjoy direct material 
or non-material benefit from the new norm -- are seen to be in the best position to 
supply it. 
When an exogenous shock changes the costs and benefits of a particular act, a 
number of different norms usually arise and compete with each other to regulate the 
particular behavior. Some of these norms may decrease social welfare and, hence, 
government intervention in terms of promulgating a new law is in order. Consider the 
case of criminalizing insider trading. Due to the increasing role of the financial market 
in our daily lives, we have seen how huge societal losses result from insider trading. 
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However, it is very hard to detect and it is much more difficult to develop a standard to 
define such a behavior50. There are a number of acts that could be considered within the 
borderline of insider trading that are nonetheless considered as prevailing norms within 
the community. Kaplan, et al (2009) showed that performing certain acts considered as 
insider trading depends on how they are perceived as parts of ethical norms. In a 
business that rewards profit-making and sound risk-taking, some of the acts are even 
considered unethical (Mc Gee, 2007). As criminalizing carries with it higher punitive 
sanction, a greater number of individuals will be deterred from performing it, 
particularly the marginal individuals whose current private benefits equal the private 
costs. Thus, our next proposition is that punishment ensures that a number of 
individuals would be deterred from performing a certain act,  sufficiently creating or 
destroying a new norm. Some of the critics of criminalization claim that society would 
suffer from overdeterrence, as it would also discourage efficient transactions. However, 
if the aim of society is to affect or influence social norms, while their observance 
depends on the proportion of people committing to and enforcing it, then 
criminalization may also serve this efficiency goal. 
Another group that plays an important role in norm cascades are the norm 
entrepreneurs. They tend to have high technical skills and possess information on the 
field where the norm governs. In the context of criminal law, norm entrepreneurs could 
confer a higher weight of social sanction on deviants. If the objective of criminal law is 
to start the actuation of second party enforcement and introduce a social norm, then it 
should understand the behavior of norm entrepreneurs. 
                                                 
50See for instance, Bainbridge (2000) on what acts constitutes insider trading. Engelen and van 
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5.8.3  Substantive Issues 
 
According to Kahan (1998) an individual's actions convey a particular meaning 
to society (Kahan, 1998). Communities try to encourage or suppress the meaning of a 
particular act through laws. It appears that criminal law has been a suitable vehicle to 
carry out this societal objective. Once an act is criminalized, the meaning of the act 
becomes obscured as it becomes associated with traditional crimes that are considered 
heinous and abominable such as theft and murder. Criminals are also regarded as 
individuals usually described as grossly negligent, amoral, wicked, or evil. This is 
bolstered by the requirement of establishing criminal intent or mens rea in commission 
of an act. A certain stigma is then created albeit small and ambiguous once an act is 
legislated as criminal. 
In this respect, criminalization can be considered a semiotic technique to change 
a particular meaning that works either by tying or ambiguation (Lessig). 
Most newly criminalized acts, however, are morally neutral and do not carry 
such negative connotations. In the case of insider trading for example, there is already a 
general and within group perception that the act is wrong. Making the said act criminal 
only clarifies the extent of the wrongness. In contrast, in the case of file-sharing within 
the small cybernet community the said practice is even considered as altruistic, 
fostering a norm of free exchange. Criminalization provided an alternative way of 
                                                                                                                                               
Liederkerke (2006) for a discussion on the difficulties of defining the act and its ethical signification. 
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interpreting the act, blurring the original meaning of the act. 
As more people are deterred, the occurrence of a criminalized act becomes rare. 
People's expectations regarding the criminalized act change as people's behavioral 
patterns are altered. While it might take a long time for criminal law, through stigma, to 
change the frequency of the act, the phenomenon nonetheless becomes more apparent 
with decriminalization. With the decriminalization of offenses pertaining to certain 
sexual acts such as sodomy, people have become more liberal in displaying their sexual 
preferences. As the act has become more and more commonplace, people's expectations 
regarding the act and the individuals behind the act have also changed. 
Punishment also carries a signification (Kahan, 1998) that society wishes to 
condemn an act apart from merely imposing compensatory fines. Aside from this, the 
process of criminal adjudication that starts with a public debate in the legislature 
ensures that consensus, one of the main requirements for norm creation, is achieved. 
To summarize, criminal law has another value aside from deterrence. This 
involves changing or constructing the social meanings of a certain act, affecting social 
norms, and inducing stigma. However, for such system to work, a key assumption is 
seemingly left out or had remained implicit in previous studies. This assumption, we 
think, should be recognized and made more explicit -- the individual’s bounded 
rationality used in distinguishing acts construed to be wrongful. 
 
5.8.4  High Standard of Proof 
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Choosing to obey a law or not, or choosing which of the competing norms to 
follow based on the individual cost benefit calculus is a difficult and challenging task 
even at the theoretical level. In real life situations, individuals could not be expected to 
act as perfectly rational decision-makers because of the constraints they face in 
processing information and formulating and solving problems (See Fox and Tversky, 
1995; Kahneman, 2003; Tversky, and Craig, 1995). Individuals are "boundedly 
rational" and rely on heuristics to aid and facilitate everyday decision-making. 
An individual could not make such calculation for himself but when he becomes 
aware that a certain act is criminalized, then the act joins the ranks of other acts that are 
considered harmful. As such, a person concludes that the said act is just as heinous as 
other abonimable crimes. Consequently, persons who commit the said act are tagged as 
criminals who then deserve to be ostracized and stigmatized. This process of cognitive 
simplification is called representative heuristics51. 
Merely enacting a law may not be sufficient for an individual to become aware 
of the criminalized act and what it exactly constitutes. Prosecution and conviction 
transpire in the public sphere and draw the attention of individuals. Awareness is 
completed when there is conviction. Since the intensity of the stigma inflicted on the 
individual depends on the extent to which his action deviated from what an person 
would normally do, the high standard proof required to convict a person ensures that the 
stigma inflicted will be high. 
 
                                                 
51Note that this is related to Lessig's semiotic technique. In fact, Lessig's tools for changing social 
meanings e.g. semiotic and behavioral technique could be considered as a subset of heuristics. 
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5.8.5  Criminal Law and The Problems of Information 
 
In the previous sections, we have provided an overview of the law and 
economics literature on social norms. We claim that a social norm’s conception and 
persistence can be explained mostly by the role that information plays. It is in this 
context that we appreciate criminal law's unique properties as a legal institution that 
affects individual behavior not only by increasing the monetary cost of a particular act 
but by influencing social norms as well as providing second party enforcement through 
social sanctions. However, we argue that this claim rests on two crucial assumptions 
that we feel should be made explicit. 
 
5.8.6  Informational Asymmetry in Determining Individual 
Types 
 
Individuals are heterogenous with respect to their intrinsic motivation. Some 
individuals are personally motivated and will follow a rule even if there is no fine or 
punishment for violating it simply because they derive a positive utility from doing so. 
We assume, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, that the distribution of individual 
types is natural. In real life, however, this is a very problematic assumption since it 
ignores the role of the socioeconomic environment that shapes individual types. 
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However, we can make a thought experiment and assume two identical individuals who 
are exposed to the same socioeconomic conditions. Any difference in their action could 
be attributed to their different individual types. 
Individuals who are more intrinsically motivated make good economic partners 
or good members of a group since the transaction and enforcement cost of engaging in a 
productive activity with them is lower. However, a person’s individual type is known 
only by himself. It is unobservable to  others. On the other hand, acts committed by 
individuals are observable. Society can make inferences regarding a person's individual 
type based on his commission of a particular act. In our case, such inferences will be 
based on whether or not a person committed a criminal act. Thus, committing or 
refusing to commit a crime can reveal to some degree the individual type of a person. 
Thus, criminal standards, in order to be considered as good signals of type 
should be set in such a way that it would be cheap enough for the high type to pass on 
the opportunity and tempting enough for the low type to seize it. Committing a crime 
signifies that a person is belongs to a low type. It is through such determination that 
criminal law inflicts stigma. However, if the standards include acts that confer honor or 
provide no clue regarding the type of the individual, the standard becomes confusing 
and would not be deemed as welfare enhancing. 
 
5.8.7  Bounded rationality and cognitive biases  
 
When there is perfect information and people face no computational limitations 
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in processing them, distinguishing harmful activities from those that are not would not 
pose any problem for society. Similarly, proving causality between an act and the 
ensuing harm would be easy. However, in real life, an act may be spatially and 
temporally separated from the ensuing harm and, thus, requires omniscience and 
foresight on the part of the observer. Even if all the information is provided to the 
individual, he faces computational limitations that prevent him from calculating the 
entire expected payoff for every alternative contingency that would help him choose the 
act that would maximize his utility. 
Criminal law appears to be a heuristic device that allows individuals to choose 
the act that maximizes both individual utility and social welfare. When individuals learn 
that an act has been criminalized, while construing that all crimes are extremely 
harmful, he circumvents the process of complex computation and concludes 
immediately that the particular act is also extremely harmful. 
It appears that criminal law as an institution has taken into consideration the 
presence of cognitive biases among individuals. In particular, it recognizes that people 
tend to overemphasize the role of personality dispositions instead of analyzing 
situational contexts. This is also called the fundamental attribution error (See for 
instance, Jones and Harris, 1967). If the aim of criminal law is to stigmatize certain 
behavior then the requirement of establishing mens rea and guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt, given this particular bias, would boost the magnitude of the stigma attached to 
the act. Both aid in the announcement and communication that an act has become 
harmful and should be prohibited. 
 
134 
 
5.9  Empirical evidence: Reputational penalties 
 
Karpoff and Lott (1993) conducted one of the pioneering studies in testing the 
existence of stigma accompanying criminal allegation. They observed, for instance, a 
significant decline in firms’ stock market values following allegations of criminal fraud. 
Thus, apart from the criminal fines by the courts, they are also punished by the 
market52. 
One difficulty in estimating the effects of stigmatization is separating the effect 
of a legal penalty that may also be translated to lower stock prices from a reputational 
penalty53. According to Karpoff, et al (2008) the reputational cost suffered by firms 
accused under civil, administrative, and criminal law is, on average, higher than the 
fines imposed by regulators and courts. On average, firms suffer a 38 percent decline in 
market values, 66 percent of which can be attributed to lost reputation. It also appears 
that the magnitude of the reputational penalty depends on the type of corporate 
malfeasance. To cite, the ensuing decline in stock prices of firms accused of 
environmental offenses can be attributed to expected legal penalties while allegations of 
insider trading leads to full reputational loss (Engelen and van Essen). Armour, Mayer 
and Polo (2011) conducted a similar study on financial firms in the UK and they found 
that the magnitude of the decline in stock prices depends on whether or not the act 
harms the interests of their trading partners. Thus, when the offense concerns the mis-
selling of financial products and misstatement of financial reports, the decline is higher 
                                                 
52See also Faure and Escresa (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion and review of the empirical evidence 
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compared to offenses that exclusively harm third parties. The effect of stigmatization 
also depends on the sociocultural context. In Japan, for one, shaming sanctions appear 
to be more effective than in the US (Tanimura, Okamoto, 2010). 
Most of the empirical studies that have been conducted so far are restricted to 
economic stigma where data is readily available. A recent study by Buonanno, et al 
(2007, 2009) shows that social sanctions provide a strong deterrent to property crime. 
Unlike the reputational sanction imposed on the firm through the stock market, social 
sanctions are imposed through a number of social interactions. Thus, the higher the 
social interaction density, the higher the social sanction, leading to lesser incentives for 
the individual to commit a crime. Using data that links social interaction density with 
spatial and geomorphological characteristics of different communities in Italy, they 
found that property crimes are lower in places where the threat of the social sanction is 
high. 
 
5.10  Naming and shaming 
 
Since stigma is a real sanction as illustrated by the cited studies, law 
enforcement agencies are encouraged to use it deliberately as an additional sanction54. 
One of the ways through which it is conducted is through public disclosure initiatives. 
Among the said initiatives are the publication of names of sex offenders under the US 
                                                                                                                                               
concerning reputational penalties and the naming and shaming sanctions. 
53
 See Engelen and van Essen, 2010 for a review 
54Ibid. 
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Megan's Law and the publication of names of tax offenders (See for instance, Pawson, 
2002). "Naming and shaming" typically involves the announcement or publication of 
names of individuals who have committed the corresponding acts in order to draw the 
attention of the wider public, eliciting public disapproval and subjecting the offender to 
an unpleasant experience (X, 2003). The said sanction is also used in administrative 
law. In the US, the Toxics Release Inventory requires manufacturing firms operating in 
selected areas to submit a report of their annual releases of specified chemicals 
(Khanna, et al, 2008). The objective was to give stakeholders information and help 
enforce regulation. 
The "naming and shaming" strategy has its roots in criminological literature. 
Braithwaite (1989) makes a distinction between a type of shaming that is stigmatizing 
from one that is reintegrative. The former results in alienation that may lead to 
recidivism, while the latter encourages future compliance55. 
Coming from the law and economics tradition, Kahan (1991) proposed shaming 
as an alternative sanction to incarceration. Apart from being less costly to enforce, 
shaming also expresses society's moral condemnation in the same way imprisonment 
does. According to Kahan, the current shaming penalties, especially when combined 
with community service, are less harsh and becoming more politically acceptable. This 
combined sanction is akin to Braithwarte's concept of reintegrative shaming. 
 Van Erp (2008), meanwhile, examined the use of naming and shaming 
sanctions in private and public regulation and identified the conditions under which it is 
effective. First, when there are complexities to the market transaction such as 
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asymmetric information, legal enforcement may be deemed problematic. However, she 
cautioned against the redundancy of imposing the reputational sanction on top of the 
formal sanction. There must also be a way to punish the violator in the market and a 
way to spread the information concerning the sanction. It is also effective when the act 
coincides with moral norms in the community. 
The crucial role of what type of information that is conveyed with the public 
disclosure of offenses is explored further by van Erp (2011) in a study of the Dutch 
financial market. According to her, naming offenders  does not necessarily result in 
reputational sanction especially when no consensus is achieved within the community 
as to the inappropriateness of the conduct. Nevertheless, she argues that it can lead to 
higher compliance if the process of naming and shaming is conducted in a reintegrative 
manner. Often, as in the case of financial misconduct, what is prohibited by the law is 
spelled out in broad terms and only through violatons can the act be precisely defined. It 
serves a communicative and educative function across the group if the  process is 
regarded as fair, constructive and facilitates in the arrival of consensus as to the bounds 
of the regulated behavior. 
Funk (2002), however, argued that shaming and other stigmatizing sanctions 
lead to recidivism. Stigma is a one-shot punishment and a person cannot recover from 
the loss in reputation for the rest of his life. The convicted and stigmatized individual, 
who suffers from a lower than average wage, has greater incentives to commit another 
criminal offense. 
Due to the unrecoverable nature of stigma as a sanction, Faure, et al (2009) 
                                                                                                                                               
55This typically consists of a ceremonial integration to society. 
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questioned the earlier assumption that there are no costs incurred from imposing it. The 
costs suffered by an agent of a wrong conviction should be considered. Hence, they 
cautioned against its use alongside administrative processes. If a regulator has 
committed an error and the case was reversed on appeal, there is no way for the accused 
to recover the reputational loss. Thus, its use should be limited under criminal law 
where its strict procedural rules provides checks against wrongful convictions. 
Apart from the unrecoverable nature of stigma, it also has a huge variance. This 
makes predicting its magnitude difficult. When deliberately used in policy, moreover, 
calibration becomes problematic. This issue becomes more acute with respect to social 
stigma. As argued earlier, its determination is governed by the community through a 
social process. On one hand, the rationale for the stigma may not solely be based on 
harm. On the other hand, it may be based on other objectives that may not coincide with 
social welfare maximization. 
 
5.11  Conclusion 
 
Given the nature of norms and how they are conceived and behave, we can 
surmise that  criminal law's institutional design possesses characteristics that could 
influence and affect norms through the following channels. First, the high monetary 
punishment that affects individuals’ extrinsic incentive serve to increase the average 
number of people who observe it, leading to higher stigma. Second, it serves as a 
heuristic device for society in a situation where individuals need to signal their true type 
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to a boundedly rational audience. Through these measures, criminal law is able to 
influence the number of people following a norm, thereby changing average behavior as 
well as providing a list of the average traits that an individual should possess. Since 
social stigma is dependent on the social distance of the act from the average trait, 
criminal law affects norms through the said distancing mechanism. 
Punishment, aside from deterring individuals from committing an act by 
increasing its monetary cost, also increases the proportion of people who are likewise 
deterred -- not just limited to the marginal individuals. While society accords shame or 
stigma based on the distance of the criminal violator to the proportion of the population 
abstaining from the prohibited act and the frequency by which it is committed, criminal 
law pushes the said distance to the opposite direction, hence, raising social stigma. 
Amid rapid economic, social, cultural, and technological change, distinguishing 
a wrongful act becomes more difficult. The complexity of the relationships makes it 
difficult to establish causality between the societal harm and the act. The two may also 
be separated in space and time. In this case, there could be too much harmful activity, 
making it necessary for society to be informed of the extent of such harm. 
Criminalization may communicate this message to society and could evolve as an 
institution to address this particular cognitive limitation. 
An exogenous shock or a group could also arbitrarily change the perceptions 
about an act by attributing a harmful event to it without any grounds. In this case, 
criminal law also has the capacity to regulate the error in the attribution of stigma. 
Criminal law as an institution appears to recognize and address the informational 
problems in society associated with the identification and classification of individual 
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types. The cited branch of law aims to signal an individual’s correct type and direct 
bounded rationality among individuals towards establishing causality between a 
harmful event and the act and actor. 
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6  Social Stigma, Heuristics and Criminal Law 
 
In the previous chapter, the different factors concerning the existence of social 
stigma as an additional sanction in criminal law were discussed. Legal theory 
emphasizes the role of criminal law as an institutional technology that imbues it with 
the capacity to stigmatize certain behaviors. However, it is a static theory that suggests 
that everything that is criminalized automatically carries the sanction of stigma. The 
economic and law and economics literature, on the other hand, are successful in 
identifying the conditions where social stigma exists using the tools of game theory as it 
describes the strategic interaction of individuals when facing criminal sanction. Hence, 
the cited literature is veers away from an ad hoc assumption of stigma and describes the 
dynamic process of stigmatization. 
Legal literature also relates the existence of social stigma with criminal law's 
educative and socializing function. It suggests the existence of an informational channel 
through which criminal law affects social norms, which has yet to be properly addressed 
in the literature on law and economics. As a category, it aids in attaining cognitive 
efficiency in determining which acts merit society's disapproval. On the other hand, the 
studies on social norm as well as behavioral law and economics  provide tools to 
understand it. 
Another aspect that has been largely ignored in the law and economics literature 
with respect to stigma is the appreciation of the characteristics of the party imposing the 
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sanction. Courts are specialized institutions that are paid for their time, possess expert 
knowledge, and skills to impose the sanction. There are rules that had to be followed in 
the investigation, accusation, and trial as well as in the determination of the magnitude 
of the sanction. On the other hand, the party imposing the informal sanction, social 
stigma, is comprised of a loose group of individuals who do not have the time, skills, 
and knowledge to do so. Hence, they are more inclined to rely on certain heuristic 
devices that simplify the process of imposing the sanction to economize time. 
As we have already discussed in the previous chapter, we think that a 
consideration of the crucial role of information and the existence of bounded rationality 
in individuals in imposing the sanction will help clarify the process of social 
stigmatization that takes place under criminal law. 
In this chapter, our aim is to explain this process and make our assumptions 
explicit within a model. In particular, we consider the case where individuals employ 
heuristics in order to simplify the tasks involved in imposing the sanction. Thus, we rely 
on the literature provided by behavioral economics (Garoupa, 1998; Jolls, 1998; and 
McAdams and Ulen, 2009). This is what makes our study different from other studies 
on social stigma. It is, however, similar to the studies of Parisi and von Wangenheim, 
and Carbonara, et al. with respect to the significance attributed to the interaction 
between the law and social norm -- the former represented by the average individual 
type. It is also similar to the study of Cooter et al. (2008) as it takes into account the 
same cognitive bias -- the overattribution error in explaining the attainment of 
equilibrium of social norms. However, unlike the cited study, we start with the 
individual decision-making problem and subsequently derive the equilibrium from the 
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interaction of other individuals' behaviors. 
The model that we developed here is based on the seminal article of Benabou 
and Tirole (2006). In their paper, prosocial behavior is explained as a means to signal 
the degree of intrinsic motivation which is an unobservable attribute. Hence, honor is 
conferred to individuals based on the average traits of those who participated in a 
particular activity. We used it as the workhorse model to study the reverse case of 
imposing social stigma in criminal law. We also added the assumptions of boundedly 
rational agents and judgment heuristics. To sum, the story behind our model is that the 
violation of a criminal standard provides information to the rest of society regarding the 
type which is responsible for assigning the sanction, relying on the judgment heuristics 
that such type possesses. The strategic interaction of all the actors describes the 
movement towards equilibrium and the existence of social stigma. 
 
6.1  The Court and the rest of society: the role of 
judgement heuristics 
 
In this section, the difference between the two sanction-imposing institutions is 
discussed. The differentiation is based on the characteristics of the two institutions, the 
parties who comprise them, the processes for acquiring and disseminating information, 
and the procedures for making decision-making. Using the classification of cognition 
systems posited by Kahneman, the courts belong to the realm of reasoning where 
decisions are made deliberately, with effort, and based on rules. On the other hand, the 
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rest of society's decision-making process can be described as intuitive reasoning as it is 
"spontaneous, immediately comes to mind without conscious search or without effort." 
 
6.1.1  Formal Sanction and the Court 
 
Courts impose the formal sanction after establishing that an individual has 
violated a certain legal standard. The Court is a specialized institution possessing the 
knowledge, skill, and time enabling it to discover the commission of an act, establish 
causality between the act and the social harm, assign the degree of culpability, and 
impose the commensurate punishment. It carefully analyzes the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of an act, looks at the social harm caused by the act, 
considers external factors that may have contributed to the harm, and distinguishes the 
degree of individual culpability and blameworthiness. They also impose monetary 
sanctions based on the degree of social harm and culpability. At every stage of the 
imposition of the sanction, from accusation to the determination of the amount of the 
sanction, strict rules are followed, ensuring that the imposition of the sanction becomes 
rational, predictable, and calibrated.  
 
Although the court itself is composed of judges and individuals who are also 
overburdened with work and are not impartial and perfectly rational, when compared to 
the individuals who impose the social stigma which we conveniently refer to as the rest 
of society, then the court spends relatively more time in determining the magnitude of 
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the formal sanction. In arriving at such characterization, we are guided by the 
classification provided by Kahneman (2003) concerning the two modes of thinking. The 
first which he calls System 1 involves intuitive thinking and is fast, almost spontaneous, 
associative, emotional, slow learning and sometimes governed by habit. System 2 
involves reasoning, deliberate, effortful and rule-governed. Thus, the mode applied by 
individuals who comprise the court belongs to System 2 while the rest of the society 
more likely applies the former mode. 
 
6.1.2  The rest of society and informal sanctions 
 
Individuals who comprise the rest of society has relatively less time, specialized 
knowledge, and skills of the court. They only become aware that the individual has 
committed a certain act when law enforcement agencies apprehend, accuse, and convict 
an individual. Given these reasons, they are more inclined to rely on judgment 
heuristics when imposing the informal sanction. Empirical studies of jury behavior, for 
instance, point to the existence of cognitive biases (See Devine, et al, 2007 for an 
excellent survey). Two kinds of heuristics involved in the assignment of the informal 
sanction will be discussed in detail. One involves a heuristic to simplify the process of 
establishing the causality of an event while the other involves classification or ranking. 
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6.1.2.1  Causality heuristics 
 
Empirical studies have shown that most individuals tend to overemphasize the 
role of individual attributes or personality predispositions as the underlying reason for 
the commission of an act while giving less weight to external or situational factors 
which may have contributed to its occurrence56. This particular cognitive bias is known 
in the field of psychological as the fundamental attribution error.57 Later studies tried to 
understand under the conditions under which this bias exists, taking into account 
judgmental uncertainty, ability, and motivation (Devine, 1989) as well as individual 
accountability (Tetlock, 1985). The studies concluded that there is initially a strong 
tendency to attribute individual dispositions to the observed behavior of others and 
discount situational factors (Kelley, 1967), especially when the acts committed violate 
widely accepted social norms (Jones and Davis, 1965). Although this particular bias is 
gradually tempered after additional information is provided, the rigidity does not 
completely disappear. 
The main reason cited in the literature for its prevalence is the reliance of people 
on simple judgmental heuristics since acquiring information regarding to the 
circumstances surrounding the occurrence of an event requires time. In contrast, courts 
spend a lot of time and resources trying to establish causality between a harmful event 
and the individual act by gathering evidence and isolating external factors that may 
have contributed to the occurrence of the event. 
                                                 
56The classic experiment is Jones and Harris. See also Morris, Larrick and Su (1999). 
57See also Morris and Larrick (1995) for a review of how people try to explain other individual's 
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Attribution theory, meanwhile, seeks to provide an understanding of how people 
make causal inferences based on the information that they possess. It explains how 
people attribute the observable behavior of others and reveals what they perceive to be 
the underlying cause of the behavior58. It is concerned with how the "man on the street" 
provides casual answers to these questions. For this reason, it is sometimes referred to 
as "naive psychology". According to Nisbett and Ross (1980), the person and his 
disposition is the most cognitively available and representative heuristic. Since the act 
and the actor are immediately perceivable, it is easy to establish a causal link between 
the two. 
 
6.1.2.2  Classification heuristics 
 
In imposing the informal sanction, however, it is not enough that society learns 
about the individual's type or attributes. The rest of society must compare the 
individual's disposition or type to the average type of the population. If the individual 
type is believed to have the same attributes as the average person, then there exists no 
stigma. 
This implies that the rest of society can make a rational and logical ranking of 
individual types along different dimensions. For instance, individual type can be 
conceived as a vector since a person can be classified as either good or bad with respect 
to his profession or to his role in the family and community. On the other hand, criminal 
                                                                                                                                               
behavior. This is also known as inference discounting (Kelley, 1967). 
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law may collapse it into a scalar value, ranking individuals as being either a good or bad 
person. However, in a situation where this is too costly for the individual, they instead 
resort to assigning a heuristic attribute to the target attribute (Kahneman and Frederick, 
2002) which is more salient to the observer. This attribute substitution becomes more 
apparent in the context of groups as the characteristics of the group become more 
associated with the individual. 
Experiments in psychology have shown that when individuals think of a set, or a 
group, to the extent that the group is homogenous enough to have a prototype, this 
information becomes more accessible to them (Posner and Keele, 1968; and Rosch and 
Mervis, 1975). The prototype heuristic is the attribution of the average salient features 
of the group to the individual. Thus, when an individual is convicted of a crime, his 
individual type becomes associated with the average characteristics of the set comprised 
of convicted persons. 
 
6.2  Model 
 
The timing of the game is as follows. Nature chooses the distribution θ  of 
individual types which is unobservable. The type defines the individual's intrinsic 
characteristics. Higher type individuals suffer from a higher cost in committing a 
harmful activity than the lower type. 
We consider a discrete distribution of types, with mean and standard deviation 
                                                                                                                                               
58For a general view of causal attribution, see Sloman and Pearl. 
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respectively given by θ  and σ , both known to all agents. In our approach, we prefer 
not to specify a certain distribution so that any suitable one may be employed. However, 
since we just take into account two types, the most natural choice seems to be a 
binomial distribution. 
Individuals that lie below one standard deviation less than the population 
average are considered by the rest of society as bad types, Bθ θ σ= − . The individual 
then chooses whether to violate the legal standard ( ˆx x≥ ) based on the monetary 
benefit and costs of the act and their type. The rest of society observes ˆx x≥  and 
imposes the informal sanction based on a belief function ( )µ ⋅ , conditioned to such 
observation.  
A one-to-one correspondence is set between the type and the actual level of x   
chosen. Thus, a conviction reveals the individual's true type. If the rest of society is not 
boundedly rational, then upon seeing the level of x , they will assign the unique 
individual attribute to the individual and gauge how far he deviated from the rest of 
society. However, this is also a complex task as this requires knowledge of the 
monetary gain and the expected sanction. Rather than assigning a unique value for each 
level of x , what actually happens is that they associate the individual with the average 
attribute of the set of violators. 
 
6.2.1  Individual Utility and Sanctions 
An individual i  derives monetary benefit 0k >  from an activity ix . As the same act 
also harms others, he suffers an intrinsic cost from committing ix  that depends on his 
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type iθ . For a given level of ix , low type individuals suffer from a lower cost while 
high type individuals suffer from a higher cost. The individual utility iU  from ix  is 
given by 
 ( ) 2 .i i i i iU x k x xθ= − 59         (6.1) 
 
Eq. 6.1 implies that without law, different agents choose different levels of x  
depending on their monetary benefit and intrinsic cost, since the maximization of yields 
a unique maximum level of ix : 
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= → = .        
As they all face the same level of monetary benefit, differences in the level of x∗  are 
explained by differences in intrinsic cost.  
 
A law prohibits activity that falls beyond a legal standard xˆ , that can be thought 
of as the level at which a benevolent social planner maximizes the social welfare. When 
caught and convicted with probability pi , an individual has to pay a monetary fine 
0φ > . At the same time, the rest of society also becomes aware of the individual i ’s 
commission of ix  and updates their information regarding the individual type.  
 
If the rest of society is not boundedly rational, then they will correctly ascertain 
the individual’s unique type. In order to do this, the individual needs information on a 
                                                 
59
 Such a utility function has been chosen because of its concavity and the cost term is linear depending 
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host of variables such as the monetary benefit and the expected sanction. As this too 
requires time and effort, the casual observer instead assigns the average attribute of the 
group to the individual.  
Based on the average characteristics of the group of violators, the individual 
violator is assigned the type ˆ( )i iE x xθ | ≥ . They then compare the individual with the 
average population type and impose the informal sanction Ω .  
 
ɵ( )i iE x xθ θΩ := − | ≥               (6.2) 
When there exists no information about his activity, i  is perceived to belong to 
the average type and hence ( )iE θ θ=  and 0Ω = . On the other hand, knowing that the 
individual has committed ˆix x≥ , the rest of society updates its prior belief on i . The 
intuitive reason behind it is that, people ask themselves the question, if i  committed 
ˆix x≥ , how bad a person could he or she be. Their belief function 
ɵ( )i B ix xµ µ θ θ:= ≤ | ≥ , that is, the probability that they consider an individual to be a 
bad type given that he has violated the legal standard involves a Bayesian process. If we 
call Bp  the probability for i  to be a bad type, and 1G Bp p= −  the one for i  to be a good 
type, we have: 
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on the individual type. The monetary payoff appears in the concave term and affects the behavior of the 
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Intuitively, they also assess the likelihood that a good person could violate the 
same standard. If the answer is in the negative, then his would believe that all 
individuals who exceed xˆ   are bad types. On the other hand, if the answer is in the 
affirmative, then they are less certain whether a person who violated the standard is a 
bad type at all. 
Note that the informal sanction or social stigma is triggered by the public's 
awareness or perception of the commission of an act and, hence, does not necessarily 
begin with conviction. A fraction, if not the whole of the sanction, may already be 
imposed even with mere suspicion or during the accusation phase. This implies that the 
court and law enforcement agencies should consider that mere announcement of the 
conduct of criminal investigation may already lead stigmatization of the individual. 
 
6.2.2   Result: perfectly observable case 
When ix  is perfectly observable, there is no uncertainty in conviction. The 
expected value of the individual type conditional on the violation of the standard is 
 
ɵ( ) (1 )i i B GE x xθ µθ µ θ| ≥ = + − .             
 
Since all bad types are those who are one standard deviation away from the 
mean Bθ θ σ= −  and there is no sufficient information to distinguish the individuals 
                                                                                                                                               
marginal utility, whose sensitivity to an increase in activity is independent of the type.   
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who lie above it from the mean, we make the simplifying assumption that Gθ θ= .60 
Substituting, we have:  
ɵ( ) ( ) (1 )i iE x xθ µ θ σ µ θ θ σµ| ≥ = − + − = − .                     (6.3) 
Then, by Eq. 6.2, σµΩ = .  
We then consider two cases to consider how the rest of the society imposes the 
informal sanction. The first case is when x  is perfectly observable and the other case is 
when x  can only be observed probabilistically.  
The definition of Ω  shows that the informal sanction or social stigma depends 
on the beliefs of the rest of society with respect to the type of persons who violate the 
legal standard and the standard deviation of the population. If 1µ = , then society 
believes that all those who are caught and convicted are bad types and Ω  takes on the 
maximum value of σ . If 0µ = , then no stigma emerges: 0Ω = .  
 
 Proposition 6.1 When ix   is perfectly observable, then the informal sanction or social 
stigma is based on the population standard deviation and the belief that an individual 
who has committed ˆix x≥  is a bad type. An increase in µ  and σ  increases the level of 
the social stigma.  
Proof. The proof is straightforward, 
                                                 
60This implies that individuals who are just in the border of committing xˆ  receive the same Ω  as the 
very bad type. However, we assume this for simplicity. Further research could involve having more than 
two classifications of individuals, that is, a distinction between the low and the very low type which lies 
at the extreme tail of the distribution, say a very bad type 2VBθ θ σ= − . 
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0;
0.
σ
µ
µ
σ
∂Ω
= >
∂
∂Ω
= >
∂
 
 
6.2.3  Result: The non perfectly observable case  
When ix  is only observable probabilistically, then the rest of society only has a 
chance to update information regarding individual type and the conviction is only seen 
as probable. We will denote with [0 1]ipi ∈ ,  the probability of conviction of i .  
This implies that the informal sanction depends not only on the conditional 
probability ɵ( )i B ix xµ θ θ≥ | ≥  that an individual is of a particular type given that she has 
committed ɵix x≥  but also on the probability that the action is observed. Assuming that 
the two events are independent, then the expected individual type given that he has 
committed ɵix x≥  and given that he is convicted is expressed by: 
 
 ɵ( ) (1 )i i i B i GE x xθ pi µθ pi µ θ| ≥ = + −       
 
and making the substitutions as in Eq. 6.3, we have: 
 
 ɵ( )i i iE x xθ θ σpi µ| ≥ = − .        
 
The informal sanction or social stigma Ω  is then given by  

i iσpi µ piΩ = = Ω.         (6.4) 
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Proposition 6.2 When ix  is only observable probabilistically, the informal sanction or 
social stigma depends on the population standard deviation σ, the beliefs of society , 
and the probability of conviction. Anyincreasein µ , σ and ipi  a
 
ects Ω  positively. 
Proof. It suces to evaluate the first order partial derivatives of Ω  with respect to all 
the variables: 



0;
0;
0.
i
i
σpi
µ
µpi
σ
σµ
σ
∂Ω
= >
∂
∂Ω
= >
∂
∂Ω
= >
∂
   
        Remark 6.1 . The level of social stigma equals the product of the probability of 
observation times the level of social stigma under perfectobservation.  
         Remark 6.2. As a straightforward consequence of the assumption Gθ θ= , neither 
Ω  nor Ω  depends on the average value of the distribution of the types. 
 
          Proposition 6.2 implies that while it is the rest of society that imposes social 
stigma, the social planner can influence it indirectly through its choice of ipi  and the 
legal standard xˆ . The rationale for the latter is that ix  is not observable to the 
community and only becomes so when there is an accusation or a conviction. This 
provides the opportunity for the rest of society to update their prior belief about the 
individual's personality predisposition. The choice of the legal standard on the other 
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hand affects the belief function of the society with respect to the precision concerning 
the type of individuals that violate the legal standard. 
6.2.4  Individual Expected Utility 
An individual i ’s expected utility from ix  is given by 
 
( ) (1 )(2 ) (2 )i i i i i i i i i iEU x k x x k x x xpi θ pi θ φ= − − + − − − Ω =  
 
 
2 i i i i i ik x x xθ pi φ pi= − − − Ω.        
The optimal level ix
∗
, that is the level at which the expected utility attains its maximum 
value, can be calculated by solving the equations associated to the first order conditions 
(FOCs). From Eq. 6.4, we have to remark that Ω  is affected by ix , although it does not 
contain such variable explicitly. However, by construction, the µ  increases as ix  
increases, thus if we denote with 
ix
µ  the sensitivity of µ  w.r.t. ix , we obtain: 
2
20
i
i
i
i i i i x
EU k
x
x θ pi φ pi σµ
∗
 ∂
= ↔ = ,  ∂ + + 
                            (6.5) 
for i G B= , , after substituting Eq. 6.2. Note that the square root structure of the 
expected utility ensures the uniqueness of the level ix
∗
. Furthermore, note that  
 G B B Gx xθ θ ∗ ∗≥ → ≥ .      
 
The optimal level of ix  depends positively on the monetary returns k , and 
negatively on ipi , φ , iθ , σ , and ixµ . The variables k , ipi , and φ  are what the usual 
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models predict. However, when the rest of the population owns the overattribution 
effect, the variance of the population type and the beliefs of the rest of society about 
which type of individual violates the legal standard also play a role. This implies that 
like in Rasmussen, the probability of conviction enters the utility twice. It increases 
deterrence through the extrinsic cost and it also increases their reputational cost. 
However, unlike in Rasmussen, the channel is not through the effect on wage but 
through the simplifying heuristics adopted by the rest of population that emphasizes the 
overattribution effect. 
Thus, considering the relation obtained from the FOCS in Eq. 6.5, the good and 
the bad types will commit a given level of ix  if  
 i i i
i
k
x
θ pi φ pi≤ − − Ω.           
 
From now on, consider the assumption B Gpi pi pi= = , that is the probability of 
conviction is equal across types.  
Let ɵx  be the legal standard, then ɵθ  is the individual type that is just indifferent 
to the choice of obeying or violating the standard: 
 
ɵ
ɵ
k
x
θ piφ pi= − − Ω.            
 
Therefore, individual types with ɵθ θ≤  would commit ɵx x≥ .  
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6.2.5  Separating and Pooling Equilibrium 
 
We now look for the equilibrium values. There are two kinds of equilibrium that 
are of interest: the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium. In the separating 
equilibrium, the good type chooses to obey the legal standard and the bad type chooses 
to violate it and the rest of society is seen to correctly hold these sets of beliefs. In the 
pooling equilibrium, all types follow the same strategy and a violation is hardly gives 
information regarding the type of the individual violating the standard. 
If an individual obeys the legal standard then his utility is given, with certainty, 
by  
ɶ ɶ ɶ( ) 2i iU x k x xθ= − ,         
where ɵx x<ɶ . When he violates the legal standard, then his expected utility is given by, 
 
ɵ ɵ ɵ ɵ( ) 2i iEU x k x x xθ piφ pi= − − − Ω,        
 
An individual obeys the legal standard if he chooses a level x  such that 
 ( ) ( )i i iU x EU x∗≥        
 
and violate the legal standard if 
 ( ) ( )i i iU x EU x∗≤ .     
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There exists a particular level of legal standard ɵx    
where individuals who are of good type will always choose to obey the legal standard 
and the bad types will always violate the legal standard. At this equilibrium, the rest of 
society believes that all those who violate the legal standard are bad types and all those 
who obey are the good types ˆ( ) 1B x xµ θ | ≥ = .  
At the separating equilibrium, the following conditions hold: 
ɵ
ɵ
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
G G G
B B B
G G G B
B G B B
U x EU x
U x EU x
U x EU x
U x EU x
∗
∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
≥
≤
≥
≤
         (6.6) 
Consider the inequalities in Eqs. 6.6. Since * ˆ( ) ( )GEU x EU x> ,  the first 
inequality is redundant. Now assume that the above level of legal standard cannot 
exceed the optimal level for the good type, that is *ˆ Gx x≤ , which implies that the second 
inequality in Eqs. 6.6 can be relaxed too.   
    
Proposition 6.3 If 1µ = , and the following conditions hold, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )G B G G B B B B GU x U x x U x U xpi φ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗− ≤ + Ω ≤ −      (6.7) 
 
then a separating equilibrium is admitted.  
Proof. By writing down the last two conditions in Eqs. 6.6  we obtain: 
160 
 
* * * * *
* * * * *
2 2 ,
2 2
G G G B G B B
B B B B G B G
k x x k x x x
k x x x k x x
θ θ piφ pi
θ piφ pi θ
− ≥ − − − Ω
− − − Ω ≥ −
ɶ
ɶ
 
 then collecting the terms, we have 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * * * * *2 2B G G B G B B G B B Gk x x x x x k x x x xθ piφ pi θ− − − ≤ + Ω ≤ − − −ɶ  
 which can be rewritten as  
 ( )* * * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )G B G G B B B B GU x U x x U x U xpi φ− ≤ + Ω ≤ −ɶ                 (6.8) 
Remark 6.3. Aside from pi , φ , and Bx∗  the separating equilibrium also depends on the 
standard deviation σ .  
Remark 6. 4 Note also that the legal standard is ˆ Gx x
∗≤ .  
 
Figure 6.1: Separating equilibrium. For the full magnitude of social stigma to exist, the total sanction 
represented by the line ( )*Bxpi φ + Ωɶ should lie above the net utility of the good type UG and below the 
net utility of the bad type UB. Under this condition, all bad types violate the legal standard and all good 
types obey it and confirms the beliefs of the rest of society about the type of the set of violators. 
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The above proposition tells us that the legal standard that leads to a separating 
equilibrium is equivalent to Bx
∗
, the optimal level for the bad type plus a positive 
function of the standard deviation  (See Fig. 6). Within this range, the net increase in 
utility of the good type from increasing Gx
∗
 to Bx
∗
  is lower than the expected monetary 
sanction and social stigma while seen as higher for the bad type. This sustains society's 
beliefs that only the bad types violate the standard. When this is satisfied, a violation of 
the legal standard is informative with regards to the individual type for the rest of 
society. 
When 0µ → , the violation of the legal standard does not provide any 
information regarding individual type and in this case, there is no social stigma. Thus, 
in the pooling equilibrium,  ɵ( )i iE x xθ θ| ≥ =  and 0Ω = . 
In the separating equilibrium, the bad types are worse off since the full 
magnitude of the social stigma is inflicted on them. When they violate another level of 
standard, they pay the total formal sanction. However, since a proportion of good types 
violate the standard too, then the magnitude of the social stigma is absent or, in the case 
of the semi-pooling equilibrium, only suffers from a fraction of the informal sanction. 
On the other hand, while refraining from violating the legal standard allows the 
good types to correctly signal their type, they suffer a cost arising from the difference 
between the first best choice and the legal standard to be followed. There might also be 
some cases where, in the absence of social stigma, they would have chosen to violate 
the standard if their net monetary and intrinsic gain is higher. If transaction cost is zero, 
this would have been Pareto improving since the good type violators will just 
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compensate and pay for the marginal harm that they caused. However, since there is an 
additional social sanction, this would now prevent them from doing so. 
 
6.2.6  Complementarity, substitutability of fine and detection 
 
In the pooling equilibrium, when social stigma is absent, the relationship 
between the two policy variables  pi  and φ  in  in generating the total expected sanction 
from the point of view of the individual is the same as what is predicted by Becker 
(1968). That is, a decrease in pi  should be accompanied by a proportionate increase in 
φ . In the separating equilibrium, this no longer holds. 
In the following we are going to investigate the relationship between the 
stationarity of the expected utility function for all types. 
 
Proposition 6.4 If 1µ =  and 
2
ixφσ
pi
> , then pi  and φ  are strategic substitutes. 
   Proof. We get the total derivative of the expected utility function for the ith 
type, 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
22 ( )
2
2 .
i i i i i
i i i i i i
i
i i i i
i
d EU kd x dx d x d
k dx dx dx x d x d d
x
k dx x d x d
x
θ piφ pi
θ piφ pi φ φ pi pi pi
θ piφ pi φ φ pi pi
= − − − Ω
= − − − + − Ω
 
= − − − + − Ω 
 
 
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By applying the envelope theorem to Eq. 6.5, the first term vanishes, thus the 
following implicit relation between the remaining two differentials can be obtained: 
2
i
i
xd
d x
pipi
φ φ pi= − Ω                                           (6.9) 
Which is larger than the slope at the pooling equilibrium, that is /pi φ , provided 
it is positive. 
If we refer to the case 1µ = , then the social stigma reduces to σ , and if 
2
ixφσ
pi
>  then  Eq. 6.9 is negative and the two are substitutes. 
 
Thus, in the separating equilibrium, whether whether pi  and φ  remain to be 
substitutes depends on the standard deviation. If the population variance is large enough 
such that it satisfies the above condition, then they are substitutes but if it is low 
enough, they are complements. 
 
6.3  Discussion 
 
Although this chapter is limited to a positive analysis of social stigma, we can 
already draw certain implications to guide policy. One is that aside from considering the 
individual benefits and social harm, the social planner should also consider the 
distribution of individual types when determining the optimal level of monetary 
sanction. If it is disregarded and the legal standard falls within the range of the 
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separating equilibrium, then the additional informal sanction exists on top of the formal 
sanction and there may be overdeterrence61. 
 As the range where social stigma could be present has been shown to be related 
to the population variance and the optimal level for the bad type, the policymaker is 
provided with the knowledge of the circumstances where social stigma exists as an 
additional sanction. To be more specific, when the population variance is low, a slight 
increase in the legal standard implies the existence of social stigma. This is because it is 
clear to the rest of the society that a person of average type will not commit the act. On 
the other hand, with a higher variance, the legal standard may be high but only formal 
sanctions exist. 
Since the mechanism by which social stigma operates relies on judgment 
heuristics, one way that the social planner could put it into good use is by providing a 
more rational mapping of individual types and action instead of the average attribute of 
the group62. This points to the crucial role of information in social stigma and social 
norms. Providing more information to society in order to arrive at a more precise and 
rational mapping of individual types and actions is crucial in optimizing second party 
enforcement of stigma. For instance, laws, rules, or organizations that explicitly define 
professional or ethical codes of conduct are useful and may be treated as substitutes for 
other laws63. 
 
                                                 
61See for instance Karpoff and Lott (1993) for evidence concerning reputational penalties for criminal 
fraud. 
62See for instance Jolls and Sunstein (2006) for a discussion of how law can take account of boundedly 
rational individuals. 
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6.4   Tort and Crime 
 
The separating and pooling equilibrium also serves to illustrate the absence or 
weakness of social stigma in tort law while establishing its presence in criminal law. 
The scope of tort law is traditionally confined to regulating accidents and negligent 
behavior. For instance, an accident could happen to the average person, providing little 
information regarding individual type. On the other hand, criminal law usually employs 
a higher legal standard, requires a higher standard of proof, and requires the 
establishment of the offender’s intent. Thus, the institutional properties of criminal law 
ensure that the set of individuals found violating the criminal standard are, indeed, bad 
types. Hence, to the extent that individuals possess judgment heuristics, social stigma is 
more likely to be present in criminal law. 
Apart from this, the requirement of adhering to a high standard of proof in 
criminal law and the requisite establishment of preponderance of evidence in tort law 
can be explained by the degree of complementarity and substitutability between the 
probability of conviction and the fine. Since criminal law usually has a higher legal 
standard than tort law, it lies within the domain of the separating equilibrium where 
social stigma exists as a sanction. Stigma is already triggered by the announcement of 
commission of the wrongdoing. Hence, the high standard of proof that lowers the 
probability of conviction appears to take into account the additional informal sanction. 
On the other hand, under tort law, as it lies within the pooling equilibrium, there is no 
                                                                                                                                               
63See for instance Jones (1991). 
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accompanying social stigma and the fine and the probability of conviction can be taken 
as substitutes in generating the total sanction. As such, the degree of complementarity 
between the fine and the probability of detection in generating the total sanction is only 
true under tort and they become complements under criminal law64. 
 
6.5  Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a positive analysis of social stigma. It illustrates how 
social stigma can arise due to the judgment heuristics adopted by the rest of society in 
assigning the informal sanction and the strategic behavior of individuals in equilibrium. 
Two judgments heuristics concerned with attributing causality and classification are 
identified in simplifying the decision-making process -- the emphasis on personality 
predispositions as the cause of an act and the propensity to assign to the individual the 
average attributes of the group. 
Although the courts do not directly impose the social stigma, they can still 
influence it by making the act visible to the rest of society and influencing the society's 
belief function. Within the range where social stigma is present, the choice of monetary 
sanction and the probability of conviction affect the total sanction differently. 
The study helps to understand the relationship between legal and informal 
sanctions the extent to which they can be regarded as complements and substitutes. 
However, imposing social stigma as shown in the analysis also involves cost to the 
                                                 
64This is contrary to the results derived in Becker. 
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society. While the good types can correctly signal themselves to the rest of society, the 
legal standard is set below their optimal level and they bear the cost. 
Although we did not consider explicitly the social welfare function, we can 
already discuss the broader policy implications of the model developed in this chapter 
especially with respect to criminalization and social stigma. 
(1) Criminalization and criminal law as a category 
Criminal law aids in achieving cognitive efficiency65 in the assignment of the 
informal sanction or stigma to the extent that the parties imposing the sanction are 
boundedly rational and asymmetric information exist. This is due to criminal law's 
existence as a separate category whose traditional scope is restricted to morally 
reprehensible acts, committed only by the most antisocial individuals. Thus, when an 
act is criminalized, its social meaning becomes associated with the traditional set of 
criminal acts, resulting in stigma. However, the act of criminalizing also adds to the 
existing pool of criminal acts. By doing so, criminalization affects the magnitude of 
social stigma. If newly criminalized acts are comprised mainly of trivial acts, the 
existing pool of criminal acts would be diluted, resulting in lower stigma. In this case, 
criminal law fails to provide an effective and credible signal of the individual's intrinsic 
motivation. 
A paradox is seen: while one of the purported objectives of criminalizing so-
called morally neutral offenses is to invoke the informal sanction in criminal law it 
ultimately serves to undermine this same purpose. There are two things at work here. 
Due to representative heuristics, the newly criminalized act may be accorded a higher 
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stigma. Thus, more individuals will be deterred. However, it also affects the distance of 
the average type of convicted criminals from the average of the population. If this social 
distance becomes smaller, the stigma that accompanies a criminal conviction becomes 
lower, leading to lower deterrence. 
As such, if society wishes to preserve the informal sanction under criminal law, 
which some scholars point as the main reason why people observe it, then only the most 
serious offenses that clearly indicate culpability should be criminalized. The criminal 
standard should be set in such a way that only individuals whose intrinsic cost from 
violating it is low -- or at least one standard deviation away from the average intrinsic 
cost suffered by the average individual – would choose to transgress the said standard. 
In layman's words, only those who are incapable of feeling any guilt, remorse, or shame 
could violate the standards. Aside from this, the standard should also be clear and 
unambiguous in order to have a clear correspondence between the individual act and the 
individual type66. This does not imply, however, that stigma is static. According to 
Coffee, society appears to experiment first with a particular standard under tort, to 
differentiate negligence and culpability. Hence the standards under tort sometimes start 
out as fuzzy until it becomes clear and hardens into a criminal standard followed and 
accepted by the majority. 
(2) Overdeterrence 
As already discussed earlier, law enforcement agencies should be aware that 
stigma may exist alongside formal monetary and non-monetary sanctions. Hence, they 
                                                                                                                                               
65
 Cognitive efficiency refers to a condition that  facilitates cognitive processes and learning. 
66In the Benabou and Tirole, 2006 model for instance, there exists multidimensional signaling. 
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should calibrate the the said informal sanction in order to avoid overdeterrence. We 
have already determined earlier the conditions under which it exists. In particular, when 
the legal standard is high enough, a pooling equilibrium is achieved. This implies that 
formal and informal sanctions may complement each other at this level, implying the 
possible imposition of lower sanctions. 
Moreover, stigma may already be imposed by the mere announcement of 
investigation or suspicion, whereas formal sanctions are only imposed after the 
conclusion of a trial. This implies that law enforcement agencies should exercise 
extreme caution when publicizing their efforts during the  early stages of the trial, 
especially if the legal standard is within the range of the pooling equilibrium. 
Otherwise, they are indirectly and unfairly inflicting a sanction on the accused. The 
sanction is also deemed as irreversible in cases of mistakes. This is why law 
enforcement agencies rely on criminal law and its strict procedural rules when invoking 
social stigma. Thus, "naming and shaming" policies should be avoided outside criminal 
law. 
As already discussed in the previous section, the substitutability between the 
fine and probability of conviction changes in tort and criminal law. The main rationale 
is that stigma most likely exists in criminal law, where strict procedural rules provide a 
check to the unpredictability and high variance of the informal sanction. 
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IV  Conclusion 
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7   Conclusion 
 
This book aims to contribute to the discourse on the expansion and the blurring 
boundaries of criminal law, especially with respect to tort by focusing on the two 
distinguishing features of the former -- incarceration and stigma. As mentioned earlier, 
this trend can be characterized by the criminalization of formerly tortious acts, the use 
of tort law to pursue criminal law objectives as a matter of procedural convenience, the 
awarding of punitive damages in tort law, and the relaxation of of the requirement of 
establishing mens rea in criminal law, among others. A debate currently exists in the 
literature as to its desirability. On one hand, it allows greater flexibility in addressing 
new sets of problems. On the other hand, critics argue that there is a good reason to 
maintain the traditional boundaries between criminal law and tort law. 
The purpose of the book is to help understand the conditions under which it 
would be socially desirable to allow the cited trend to continue. The paper, however, is 
limited to the analysis of incarceration and social stigma. A clear understanding of how 
incarceration or the threat of imprisonment and social stigma affect individual 
incentives to violate a particular legal standard is needed to address the issue. Only with 
the proper identification of the channels by which the two sanctions affect individual 
behavior can we properly proceed with their normative implications. 
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7.1  Fines versus incapacitation 
 
In analyzing how incarceration affects the incentive to an individual to violate a 
legal standard, we considered the crucial role of time constraint. This aspect has not 
been fully explored in the literature on law and economics, especially with respect to 
the analysis of the beneficiality of imposing either a fine or a prison term. We observed 
that that when individuals are heterogeneous with respect to wealth and wage income, 
and when the level of activity can be considered a normal good, only the middle wage 
and middle income groups can be adequately deterred by a fixed fines alone regime. 
The existing literature only considers the case of the very poor, deemed as judgment 
proof. However, we illustrate that this also holds for the other extreme of the wage-
income spectrum. One way to address this issue is the imposition of discriminatory 
fines -- that is, imposing higher fines for the rich, similar to the day fine system that 
exists in Germany and other Northern European countries. In this case, the legal system 
can rely on tort law alone to address deterrence issues. Aside from this, day fines may 
also be seriously considered as part of the intermediate or alternative sanctions in 
criminal law. On the other hand, the very poor can also be deterred by increasing wage 
income in the form of affirmative action. 
Converserly, if discriminatory sanctions cannot be imposed by the social 
planner, then a jail term may also be imposed. In this case, the legal system may take 
advantage of incarceration which is a sanction under the ambit of criminal law. 
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However, the social planner should exercise caution. While effective deterrence leans 
towards the imposition of imprisonment as well as wider criminalization of acts, the 
scope for the said sanction is very narrow -- that is, only in cases where the social 
planner cannot impose discriminatory fines due to legal constraints or unobservability 
of wealth. 
Moreover, we have to keep in mind that the main reason for imposing 
imprisonment is wealth and wage heterogeneity. Allocating time endowment, which is 
the same for all individuals, is seen as a possible way to correct other endowment biases 
that lies at the core of the problem with deterrence. Thus, society should pursue less 
costly alternatives since there are less costly forms of sanction that may achieve the 
desired level of deterrence aside from imprisonment. Incarceration or imprisonment is 
the only widespread and universally adopted sanction or punishment that is 
denominated in time. However, this is a costly way to deprive individuals of their time, 
from the point of view of enforcement agencies and from the point of view of the 
individual, as evinced by the huge amount spent annually in maintaining the penal 
system and huge losses due to the destruction of human capital in prison. There are 
other forms of sanctions that are less costly that achieve a similar deterrence effect. As 
opposed to full incapacitation, such as imprisonment -- which disables the individual 
from pursuing opportunities to earn income or enjoy any utility during the period of 
incarceration -- partial incapacitation may be seen as a more equitable and productive 
form of sanction. An example of this is the driving penalty point system where the 
individual's time allocation is simply restricted as opposed to the total deprivation of 
time experienced in incarceration. An offender, in the cited system, is only deterred 
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from spending his time to pursue a specific activity. As mentioned earlier, there are 
empirical studies that show that the system has been effective in curbing vehicular 
accidents. The mechanism and channel at work in the said system is the same as those 
that are present in imprisonment albeit less costly. 
Another important policy implication is that in choosing between a fine or 
imprisonment, the distribution of wage and income in society should be taken into 
consideration. Thus, only in cases where the social planner cannot employ 
discriminatory sanctions -- that is, if he cannot impose a higher fine on the rich -- 
should imprisonment or criminalization be considered. 
In cases where both a fine and a jail term are imposed, the sanction actually 
becomes nonlinear  from the point of view of the individual. Fines should be set 
equivalent to marginal harm. In order to extract the surplus, imprisonment should be 
imposed but the jail term should be very short. We have to emphasize, however, that 
our analysis of fines and jail term as nonlinear pricing only applies to the category of 
efficient crimes, which are crimes that are seen to bring immediate benefits to the 
offender. Hence, the activity is being priced and not being prohibited. 
 
7.2  Social stigma 
 
According to traditional legal theory, criminal law plays another important role 
in society aside from deterrence. It has an educative and socializing function. If this is 
disregarded, criminal law would be treated as an institution that merely prices and 
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sanctions behavior. Critics of the law and economics approach would then claim that 
the said framework only dilutes the cited functions of criminal law. Moreover, they 
claim that criminal law is obeyed not only because of the punitive sanction and the 
threat of incarceration but also because it is an expression of society's treasured values 
and norms. Thus, they argue that the criminalization of morally neutral offenses, the 
relaxation of the requirement to establish mens rea, and the use of civil law to pursue 
criminal law objectives will undermine the educative and socializing function of 
criminal law. 
However, it is not clearly understood how criminal law could fulfill the said 
functions. Also, such a characterization renders criminal law as an anachronistic 
category since it fails to address welfare enhancement concerns. We attempted to 
address this issue by focusing on social stigma by exploring the circumstances where a 
criminal conviction carries an additional social stigma. Through such an analysis, we 
can better understand the dynamic process. 
We first identified the issues that make it difficult to study social stigma from a 
law and economics perspective. The first concerns the metric by which social stigma is 
imposed where we claim that the sanction is not necessarily based on the harm caused 
but on how far the individual deviated from the average expected behavior of 
individuals also known as social norms; and how far his attributes deviated from the 
average traits possessed by the rest of the society. These two averages are determined 
by a social process and depend on the social context. The second issue involves the 
nature of the institutions imposing the sanction. Unlike the courts, which is a 
specialized institution tasked with discovering and assigning blame, the rest of society 
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is comprised of a loose group of individuals who lack the time and specialized 
knowledge and skills to do what the court does. Hence, the rest of society rely on 
heuristics to simplify the complicated tasks associated with imposing the sanction. 
Social stigma is seen to accompany a conviction under the following 
conditions:. first, when the law coincides with the society's social norms; and second, 
when the prohibited act provides information on an unobservable attribute or trait of an 
individual -- crucial in establishing or maintaining social relationships beyond mere 
economic relationships. 
Criminal law may serve as an institution that facilitates cognitive efficiency in 
the process of imposing the social sanction to the extent that the rest of society is 
boundedly rational and use judgment heuristics. The rest of society must simplify the 
complicated and time-consuming task of assigning blame and culpability and 
determining how far the individual deviated from the average trait or expected behavior 
of individuals. We also considered cases where the rest of society relies on prototype 
heuristics and exhibits overattribution bias. 
With these considerations, it appears that the institutional properties of criminal 
law such as the requisite high standard of proof, ensures that the pool of convicted 
criminals are veritable bad social partners. Hence, since the rest of society possesses 
prototype heuristics, criminal law assigns or associates group attributes (the 
stereotypical criminal types) to the individual without investigating the details of the 
case or the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act. This makes the task of 
imposing the social sanction easier. 
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Apart from this, punitive sanctions -- onerous monetary sanctions imposed for 
the commission of a crime -- also ensure that more people are deterred from violating a 
particular legal standard. Hence, it moves the average expected behavior of individuals, 
influences social norms, and increases social stigma. 
Thus, even if the social planner does not impose the social sanction directly, the 
impact of social stigma can still be influenced by the probability of conviction and the 
level of the monetary fine imposed as well as the varying degree of correlation between 
the legal standard violated and the social traits or attributes of the individual. The first 
two look at the complementarity and substitutability of the probability of detection and 
monetary fines when social stigma is present or considered. The last relies on the 
crucial role of information provided by criminal law as an instrument of cognitive 
efficiency. We think that this should be underscored since the degree of individual 
culpability is now difficult to ascertain amid complex economic relationships and the 
complications posed by the technological infrastructure of globalization. Criminal law, 
in this case, serves as a medium to communicate the degree of seriousness of a 
violation. In identifying the channels through which formal sanctions can influence 
informal social sanctions, we have illustrated how they can be complements and 
substitutes. 
Paradoxically, using criminal law in order to invoke stigma for the violation of a 
legal standard may also serve to undermine its strength. This is because newly 
criminalized acts add to the brimming pool of acts considered criminal. Hence, when 
such criminalized acts are deemed to be merely trivial offenses, the determination of 
acts considered criminal fails to effectively reflect the intrinsic cost of committing a 
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crime, which is crucial in establishing and maintening of social relationships. 
The study on social stigma is also a response to earlier calls to put the study of 
bounded rationality and heuristics back into the context of society and institutions (See 
Knight and North, 1997). To date, the concepts of behavioral economics and boundedly 
rational individuals are studied in the context of the individual's own physical and 
temporal cognitive limitations. It is conducted outside the social context. However, it 
appears that institutions, including legal institutions, may have already evolved to 
address these cognitive limitations (See for instance North, 1996; Sunstein, 2005; and 
Tirole, 2009). Thus, this study explores this function in criminal law. 
7.3  Recommendation 
This book, however, was mainly concerned with providing a positive analysis of 
incarceration and social stigma. Its foremost aim was to describe and identify the 
channels by which these instruments affect individual behavior. This will serve to guide 
the social planner in choosing and devising the legal architecture that will best enhance 
society's welfare. The policy or the normative implications considered in the book are 
the narrow extensions of the positive analysis. The study is therefore limited to this. The 
explicit normative implications are not thoroughly discussed, especially with respect to 
how it applies to specific policy issues and is, thus, a good subject for future research. 
Its particularization across space and time is also needed. Another worthy endeavor is 
the testing of the theoretical results we have obtained through empirical observation. 
To sum, the results of our analysis reveal that the scope of criminal law is 
narrow both for the purposes of deterrence and cognitive efficiency. While there are 
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certain conditions where the enforcement of criminal law may lead to an increase in 
social welfare, particularly with respect to incarceration and stigma, we have also 
identified the channels through which they could affect behavior. Since such 
mechanisms can be replicated in less costly ways, society should first try or seek to 
employ these legal institutions before turning to criminal law as a last resort. 
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